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INTRODUCTION 
The Presidency of the United States is much more than what the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States proclaim it to be. Rather, 
it is an institution shaped primarily by the energy and vigor of past occu-
pants. Or, as Professor Corwin states, Presidential authority is n ••• the 
function of two highly variable factors-- 1Crisis1 and 'Personality.'" 
He also observes with some misgiving that it is still "· •• a highly dis-
continuous feature of our constitutional system.nl Therefore, to know 
what the office is today, it is essential to know what past incumbents 
have made it. This dissertation is an examination of the incumbency of 
one such man, James K. Polk. 
In recent years, writers on the American Presidency have come to 
recognize Polk as one of the few genuine contributors to Presidential 
aggrandizement. Edward S. Corwin in his book, The President: Office ~ 
Powe~, lists Polk as one of only ten Presidents who have contributed to 
the development of Presidential power.2 Professor Binkley states: "If 
Tyler saved the Presidency from suffering a backset, Polk carried it de-
liberately forward to a more firmly established place in our constitutional 
system."5 
1Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers (New York: 
New York University Press, 194o), p. 306. 
2Ibid., PP• 29, 325. 
0Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1947), p.99. 
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As is so often the case, it is impossible to determine at the time of 
a radical or revolutionary shift in Presidential leadership whether that 
change will have any lasting effect, or whether it is purely the result of 
the charisma of one great man appearing at a crisis period of American his-
tory. It is only in a later period, when we ce.n observo a man of lesser 
magnitude being able to consolidate and build upon the changes which took 
place earlier, that we can properly judge and analyze the impact, the per-
manence, and the institutionalization of the revolutionary change.4 
It is the central thesis of this dissertation that the administra-
tion of the Presidency under James K. Polk institutionalized those ch8nges 
in the American Presidency which have become associated with the Jackson-
ian type of chief executive. 
Taking a broad view of the Jacksonian administration, what then 
were its chief characteristics which have become identified with the Jack-
sonian type of President? 
First, a Jacksonian President is distingtt:hed on the basis of 
executive leadership based on a theory of direct responsibility to the 
people. Jackson was, as it has been observed, 11 the first popularly 
elected President. 11 5 The controversy during his administration over the 
Second Bank of the United States became in large part a struggle between 
J ackson and the Congress, during which Jackson's course was strongly 
influenced "by his conviction that he bore a mandate fresh from the 
4For a more recent view of this situation, one has only to con-
sider the Presidency of Harry s. Truman to witness the insti tutions.lization 
of the Roosevelt New Deal. Incidentally, the parallel between James K. Polk 
and Harry S. Truman will be apparent throughout this dissertation. 
Swilfred E. Binkley, ~Powers .Q.f. the President (New York: Double-
day, Doran and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 68. 
. 'sovereign 1 people. 11 6 It will be observed that President Polk, even more 
explicitly than Jackson, insisted that his first responsibility was to 
the people. 
Secondly, a Jacksonian f>resident is expected to be the dominant 
and commanding figure within the executive branch of the government. 
Jake son 1 s dismissal of his Secretary of the Treasury stands as a monument 
to Jacksonian control. Nevertheless, while Polk's control was never so 
dramatic, it will be shown to have been more constant and encompassing. 
Thirdly, a Jacksonian ~resident must be the leader and symbol of 
the dominant issue of his day. Jackson became the personification of his 
time in its break from autocracy and in its yearning for popular democracy 
and its espousal of the "common man. 11 7 Polk in a similar fashion became 
the champion of the great cause of his t£me so aptly described in the 
phrase, "Manifest Destiny." 
Fourthly, a Jacksonian President is expected to be the protector 
of the national interest as opposed to the sectional or particular inter-
ests. When Jackson was faced with a serious threat to the .union in t he 
doctrine of nullification, he met it with decisive action made memorable 
by his phrase, "The federal union-- it must be preserved." Polk was 
faced with a serious threat of a similar nature to the union in the contro-
versy over expansion of slavery into the newly-acquired territories and 
6[bid., p. 68. See also Andrew C. McLaughlin, ! Constitutional 
History of the United States, P• 423: "As a matter of plain fact we only 
exaggerate and overemphasize when we say that Jackson was in stark real-
ity the first President of the American people . " 
7John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Qymbol for an Age (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1955). Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,~ Age Qf 
J ackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945). 
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he, too, labored hard, using all the strength of the Presidential office 
to preserve the union. 
Final ly, e. Jacksonian executive is expected to be the head of his 
party as well as the head of the nation. In fact, probably more persons 
remember Jackson for his advocacy of the "spoils system" and "rotation" in 
office than for anything else. It will be observed that President Polk 
was always conscious of his poli ticG.l role, and in f act that in the matter 
of "spoils" he exceeded his mentor. 
There remains to be stated a coordinate thesis of this dissertation, 
which is that President Polk, in his o\vn right, made some important contri-
butions to Presidential ~ggrandizement. 
Prior to setting forth various hypotheses regarding Polk 's contri-
bution to the Presidency, i t is necessary to state what is meant by a con-
tribution to the Presidency. Such a contribution ma.y take the f orm of an 
act or a series of acts which establishes a clear precedent for future 
action by a succeeding President; or it may be the reassertion of a Presi-
dentia~ prerogative which has lost its force through disuse; or it maybe 
the esta.blishment through repeated assertion of a prerogative which, al-
though continually clt:dmed, has never been generally acknowledged, but has 
been subject to continuous challenge. On occasion, it has been possible 
for a President to make a contribution to the Presidency ' through one 
single act which stands out in bold relief: e.g., Truman's decision to 
send troops into Korea.; on other occasions the contribution has been the 
result of the totality of Presidential conduct. For example, while Wash-
ington probably contributed more to the Presidency than any of his suc-
cessors, his greatest contribution was the respect, almost to the point 
of reverence which he gave to the office. This vras accomplished not by 
one magnanimous gesture but by his attributes of char acter and bearing 
~~ich were displayed constantly throughout his eight years of office. 
It is the contention of this dissertation that President Polk 
made the following contributions to Presidential aggrandi zement: 
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Within the executive department, he established the absolute, un-
challenged domination of the President over all lesser officials, e.nd the 
right and responsibility of the President for all executive actions. He 
was able to bring the Treasury· Department, which from the time of Alex-
ander Ha.lllil ton ha.d enjoyed a good measure of independent status, under his 
direct supervision. Significant also was his innovation of budgetary 
control, which enabled the President for the first time in our history to 
present a. truly executive budget to the Congress. 
He asserted the right and proved the ability of a. President with-
out a previous military background to be in fact as well as in name the 
Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces. This right he exercised not only 
in time of peace, but during the Mexican War. In accomplishing this, he 
brought the Department of War and Navy under his direct control. In fact, 
s.s Commander-in-Chief he used his power to deploy the military forces in 
such a manner that, for all practical purposes, he transferred the power 
to declare war from the legislative branch to the executive. 
If Thomas Jefferson's eminence as a President, a.s distinct from 
his fame a s a political philosopher, rests in no small measure upon his 
acquisition of the Louisiana territory, then Polk must be credited with 
the distinction of making America into a continental nation. He demon-
strated as Chief of Foreign Affairs how f ar a President v,ho has the 
courage to exploit his strategic position can go. He demonstrated the 
truth of the two axioms of leadership which Bernard De Voto so aptly 
phrases in his description of President Polk: 
But if his mind was narrow it was also powerful and he had 
guts. If he was orthodox, his integrity was absolute and he 
could not be scared, manipulated, or brought to heel. No one 
bluffed him, no one moved him with direct or oblique pressure. 
Furthermore, he knew hov1 to get things done, which is the first 
necessity of government, and he knew what he wanted done, which 
is the second.a 
The material in this dissertation will be presented in terrls of 
the traditional analysis of Presidential authority and operations. As 
Louis Brownlow reminds us, no cataloging of the various roles that the 
President plays would satisfy all students of the Presidency.9 Yet for 
purposes of analysis, it seems essential to attempt such a cle.ssift:Ca.-
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tion so that the tools of the political scientist can best be brought to 
bear on the subject. Thus Chapters II through VII are entitled, The 
First Dark Horse; Polk's Concept of the Presidency; The President as 
Commander-in-Chief; Chief of Foreign Affairs; Chief of Legi slation; and 
Party Chief. 
In order to bring out in greater relief the thesis of t hi s di sserta-
tion, it is essentis.l that a review be made of the chara.cter and contribu-
tions of the preceding Presidents' administra.tions from the Federalists, 
Washington and Adams, through the Jeffersonians to the Jacksonians and the 
Whigs. Chapter I will sketch such a development of the Presidential office. 
8Bernard De Voto, The Year of Decision: 1M.§_ (Boston, Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1942), pp.7-8. 
9Louis Brownlow, ~ rresident ~nd ~ Presidency (Chicago, Public 
Administration Service, 1949), pp. 14-15. 
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Although there is no lack of materials covering the period of Polk's 
Presidency, there is a scarcity of studies on Polk himself and none that 
approaches the subject from the vie~point of a political scientist. Until 
1957, only E. I. McCorms.c' s biography published in 1922 approached ade-
quacy, and that is v~itten from the standpoint of a historian and biog-
rapher rather than a political scientist. t~st year, Charles Grier 
Sellers' biography, James [. Polk: Jacksonian, ~-1843, was published. 
It represents the best in historical scholarship , but as it ends prior to 
Polk's election to the Presidency, it provides only useful background in-
forma.tion for this study.lO Jenkins' biography written in 1851 is an 
obviously partisan treatment, and a1 though useful for some historical data, 
is too restricted in its outlook and methodology to be of any real sig-
nificance. Martha McBride Morral's fictional account entitled Young 
Hickory is so inadequate in scholarship as hardly to deserve mention. 
Fortunately, however, the four-volume diary of James K. Polk, ed-
ited by Milo Milton Quaife, presents a reliable source of information for 
the political scientist. Material is available in this diary which would 
take years of research to compile. Furthermore, the diary presents 
clearly both President Polk's actions and his thoughts on events at the 
time they occurred. Perhaps it will be felt that the dissertation makes 
too ~uch use of the diary; however, to provide singleness of purpose and 
focus upon the Presidency and its occupant, its continued use has been 
necessary. To indicate that the writer is not alone in utilizing fully 
the Polk diaries, attention is called to Leonard D. ~nite's significant 
lOCharles Grier Sellers, J.ames [. ~' Jacksonian, J:1Q§_-1§1Q. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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recent study, The Jacksonians, in which, when writing on the Polk admin-
istration, he relies heavily upon the Polk Diary.ll 
The Polk papers which have been collected and are available at the 
Library of Congress have been a useful source, in spite of the fact that 
they have neither been edited nor indexed. 
In addition to this material directly relc,ted to Polk, the news-
papers, particularly the Washington UniQg, the organ of the Polk admin-
istrstion, periodicals of the day, the reporting of Congress in the Wash-
ington Globe, and other histories~ materials of the period have been very 
useful. All of these historical sources have been used, as well as con-
temporary studies by political scientists on the executive branch of our 
government. 
One further note on methodology seems necessary. The writer ha.s 
often been tempted to pursue tangential lines of inquiry, such as detailed 
examination of the conduct of the Mexican War, but in addition to the fact 
that such researches may already have been most skillfully done by quali-
fied historians,l2 these temptations have been resisted so tha t the disser-
tation could adhere to its thesis and maintain a sharp focus upon the 
Presidency. 
The significant thing for an understanding of the developing role 
of the President during the Polk administration is not the facts per ~, 
llsee Chapter II~, "The President as Commander-in-Chief," which 
rather closely parallels Chapter V, "Polk as Commander-in-Chief, 11 in this 
dissertation. White cites the Polk Diary thirty~six times out of a total 
of forty-five references in the chapter. Leonard D. White, The Jackson-
ians (New York: '!he Macmillan Co., 1954), pp. 50-66. 
l2see for example Justin H. Smith, War ~Mexico (New York, 
Macmillan Co., 1919), 2 vols. 
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but rather the PI"esident' s interpretation of them. For example, on the sub-
ject of Presidential control over the military field conmanders, it is not 
essential to know that Genera~ Taylor was so incompetent a commander and so 
politically motivated that it was necessary to shift the area of military 
action to another front, or that later General Scott, the highest-ranking 
military commander, was so inadequate as to necessitate his removal; but 
it is essential to know that this was President Polk's interpretation of 
the situation upon which he based his action. 
This dissertation, written with its focus upon the President, 
attempts to demonstrate that the Polk administration exhibits all of the 
major characteristics of the Jacksonian-type executive, which, in turn, 
is significant because it served as the pattern and precedent for the 
strong type of executive leadership Which has become characteristic of the 
American Presidency. 
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CHAPTER I 
PRESIDENTIAL GROWTH FROM WASHINGTON TO POLK1 
This dissertation is a study of the American Presidency during the 
incumbency of one man, James K. Polk. It is justified as being an analysis 
of the Presidency when fundamental decisions were made which shaped the 
destiny of the nation. To understand what the Presidency is today, it is 
necessary to learn what that office has been in times past. The justifi-
cation for any historical study is that it illuminates the present with 
the experience of the past. A study of the development of political insti-
tutions involves an appraisal of a particular institution at critical 
points in its history. To speak of the nature of something is to describe 
what it is. To trace the development of something is to study ·what -· it was 
at selected times in the past. Since the thesis of this paper i s !that 
the Polk Presidency serves as a nearly perfect example of t he Jacksonian 
type of chief executive, it is essential that we examine, briefly at 
least, the development of the Presidential office from the time of i ts 
creation to the Polk incumbency, so that we may have an understanding 
of the state of the office prior to as well as at the close of his admin-
istration. 
From the time of the Constitutional Convention to 1844, Presidential 
history may be conveniently divided into three periods, namely, that of 
the Federalistst Washington and Adams, who held office from 1789 to 1801; 
lThis writer, as would be any writer on Presidential growth and 
development, is greatly indebted to Leonard D. Vfuite for his recent tril-
ogy, The Federalists, The Jeffersonians, and The Jacksonians. 
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that of the Republicans, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams, 
who held office from 1801 to 1829; and that of Jackson-Van Buren, whose 
terms of office extended from 1829 to 1840. Between 1840 and 1844 the 
office was held for one month by the Whig Harrison and for the remainder 
of his term by the first Vice-President to succeed to the Presidency, John 
Tyler. 
The American Presidency is a political institution crea.ted by law 
and overwhelmingly influenced by. custom. Any study which seeks, as this one 
does, to demonstrate a President's contribution to the office and to dem-
onstrate that his administration embodies a concept of executive leader-
ship enunciated by a predecessor, i.e., Andrew JB.ckson, must pla.ce great 
stress upon the impact which custom has had upon the office. 
This chapter shall consider the administrations of the Federalist, 
Republican, and Jacksonian Presidents dovm to the inauguration of James K. 
Polk. 
The Federalists 
The Federalists were to control the executive branch for the first 
twelve years of the existence of the new nation. The fact that the nation 
still endures stands as a monument to their success. "The Federalists 
accepted the philosophy of government for the people but not government 
by the people.n2 The moral standards of their administration have never 
been surpassed. They brought dignity and respect for the new govern.ment, 
qualities essential for its acceptance. They won the support of the "good," 
the "well-born," "the man of property," "the educated," the "natural 
2Leonard D. White, The Federalists (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1948) , P• 508. 
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a.ristocra.t," without whose support the government could not have lasted. 
It was a common assumption of the formding fathers that George 
Washington would become the first President, an assumption Yl'ell founded, 
since he became the only President to receive the unanimous vote of the 
electoral college. That fellow Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, probably 
provides us vd. th the best description of Washington 1 s traits: 
His mind was great and powerful, without being of the very first 
order; his penetration strong; though not so acute as that of a 
Newton, Bacon or Locke; and as far as he saw, no judgement was 
ever sounder. It was slow in operation, being little aided by 
invention or imagination, but sure in conclusion •••• 
He was incapable of fear, meeting personal dangers with the calm-
est unconcern. Perhaps the strongest feature in his character 
was prudence, never acting until every circumstance, every considera-
tion, was maturely weighted; refraining if he saw a doubt; but 
when once decided, going through with his purpose, whatever ob-
stacles opposed. 
His integrity was the most pure, his justice the most inflexible 
I have ever knovm; no motives of interest or consanguinity, or 
friendship or hatred, being able to bias his decision. He was, 
indeed, in every sense of the words, a wise, a good, and a great, 
man. 
His temper was naturally irrita ble and high-toned; but reflection 
and resolution had obtained a firm and habitual ascendancy over 
it. If ever, however, it broke its bonds, he was most tremendous 
in his wrath. 
His heart was not warm in its affections; but he exactly ce.lcu-
lated every man's value, and gave him a solid esteem proportioned 
to it •••• 
[He took a] free share in conversation, [but] his colloquial tal-
ents were not above mediocrity, possessing neither copiousnes s of 
ideas nor fluency in words. In public, when cs.lled upon for a sud-
den opinion, he was unready, short and embarrassed. Yet he wrote 
readily, rather diffusely, in an easy and correct style •••• 
His char~:wter was, in its mass, perfect, in nothing bad, in few 
points indifferent; ••• never did nature and fortune combine more 
15 
perfectly to make a man great •••• B 
Perhaps because of the general assumption that Washington would 
become the first President and because of his unanimous selection, he was 
pr epared to exercise a broad general supervision; a willingness to become 
the symbol of national unity and national aspirations. In any event, when 
joined ~~th that strong character Alexander Hamilton, Washington soon fell 
into the habit o,f acting a role befitting a monarch in a constitutional 
system. But even as long ago as 1790 it was necessary for a monarch to 
employ the services of a Prime Minister. Alexander Hamilton was all too 
willing to be the .American counterpart to the· lQm,_ger Pitt in England. 
Hamil ton even went so f ar as to· request his friends to speak of him as the 
First Lord of the Treasury. 4 Hamil ton 1 s assumption of Prime Ministerial 
frmctions was aided and a.betted by the lack of strong Congressional leader-
ship among the agrarian Republicans; while he, Hamilton, moved about freely 
and forcefully in the caucuses of the Congressional Federali sts. 5 
Not only did Congress accept Hamilton's leadership, but there is 
considerable evidence that the other departments also looked upon him as 
Premier, or at least permitted him to play that role. Professor Binkley 
assembles the evidence as follows: 
On January 11, 1791 we find him [Hamilton] replying to Jefferson's 
request for an opinion concerning our treaty with France and writing, 
"I have perused with attention your intended report to the President, 
5Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904),Vol. XIV, 
pp. 48-49. Letter to Dr. Walter Jones, January 2, 1814. 
4w. E. Binkley, ~Powers of the President, (New York: Double-
day, Doran and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 54. 
5Ibid., p. 52. 
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and will, as I am sure is your wish, give my opinion with frankness." 
Later Jefferson is asking him what the Senate would do .in regard to 
certain pr~posa.ls for a treaty with Algiers. He.mil ton and. not the 
Secretary of War vrr-ote to the House "that it is th& opinion of the 
Secretary for the Department of War that it is exoedient and neces-
sary th&t the United States should retain and· 0ee~p'y ·' wes-t ·Point." 
Hamilton wanted to make all purchases for the War Department. When 
Knox demurred Hamilton persuaded Congress to give him such authority. 
HaMilton prepared the list of questions that constituted the agenda 
at the Cabinet meeting to consider the conduct of Genet. Washington 
had recopied the questions in his own handwriting but Jefferson knew 
the usurper of his prerogative in the field of foreign affairs. It 
was Hamilton and not Jefferson who issued the instructions to Jay 
when he went to London to negotiate the treaty tha.t bears his name. 
Moreover Hamilton took liberties revising and altering important 
state papers prepared by other executive heads.6 
Nevertheless, in spite of Hamilton's function as First Lord of the 
Treasury, the Federalists did not develop an executive-type budget, and 
we shall see that President Polk was the :first President to insist on 
controlling this most vital tool of administrative management. Leonard 
Yfuite su~marizes the budget process under the Federalists as follows: 
For the most part, however, the figures submitted by the respect,..:.. 
ive agencies were merely brought together in a single file by 
Joseph Nourse, t~e Registrar, and transmitted to the clerk of the 
House. There was no budget document, no balance of income and outgo, 
no budget message from the President, and no executive recommendation 
on general fiscal policy.7 
While Washington failed to exercise legislative leadership, his 
Prime Minister Alexander Hamilton more than made up for his deficiencies. 
Prior to Hruailton's appointment as Secretary of the Treasury, there is no 
evidence of any Presidential attempt to persuade Congress on legislative 
matters, but within a week after Hamilton joined the Cabinet, the House 
Committee on Ways and Means was discharged and its affairs referred to 
6rbid., pp. 55-56. See also Leonard D. ill,'hi te, The Federalists, 
pp. 126-127. 
7L. D. White, ~ Federalists, p. 526. 
Hamilton for a report.8 That leading Congressional actions such as 
tariff legislation and debt redemption had their origin in Ha~lton's 
"Report on Manufacturing" is too well known to need retelling. 
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While Washington might have been ~~llin~ in most fields to leave 
matters in the competent hands of his Secretary of the Treasury, he took 
the reins of government as Commander-in-Chief into his own hands. Wash-
ington throughout his administration suffered the inept leadership of t wo 
incompetent Secretaries of War. The first, affable, gigantic Henry Knox, 
had been an able military commander during the revolution, but his gam-
bling instincts and his passion for being a "furious Federalist" did not 
enhance his skill as a civil administrator, except to make him a willing 
tool of Hamilton. After Knox came Timothy Pickering, who served only for 
a year. Washington looked in vain for an able successor to Pickering, 
finally settling on his fourth choice, James McHenry. The latter's chief 
claim to the office was Hamilton's endorsement, ~hich was qualified, to 
say the least: "McHenry you know. He would give no strength to the admin-
instrat:i.on, but he would not disgrace the office •••• " Three years later 
Hamilton's endorsement had weakened. nMy friend McHenry is wholly insuf-
ficient for his place, with the additional misfortune, of not having the 
least suspicion of the fact ••• n9 However, when the ~biskey Rebellion in 
western Pennsylvania required immediate action, Washington provided the 
decisive leadership which it has been our custom to look for in the Presi-
dential office. 
8I bid. , P• 56. 
9Ibid., p. 154. 
••• the contest being whether a small port ion of the United States 
shall dictate to the whole Union, and, at the expense of those ·who 
desire peace, indulge a desperate ambition.lO 
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And after having stated accurately the cause, he personally leda 
force of 15,000 State Militia (a larger force than he had ever commanded 
during the revolution) into Pennsylvania . In the face of this determina-
tion the rebels laid down their arms and the Whiskey Rebellion ended 
without bloodshed. 
In the area of foreign policy the Federalists, after an abortive 
attempt at cooperation •dth the legislative branch, proceeded to assert 
executive supremacy most effectively. In the first instance Washington 
took the opportunity of going to the Senate in person to consult wi~Q them 
and ask their advice on a treaty which he was in the process of negotiating 
with the Creek Indians. The Senate, fearful of Washington's domination of 
their deliberations, approved a motion to submit the President's proposal 
to the Senate for their deliberation. Washington is reported to have re-
plied, 11This defeats every purpose of my coming here, n and Charles Francis 
Adams reports that Washington stated as he left the Senate chamber still 
fluShed with anger flthat he would be damned if he ever went there again.nll 
While Washington never returned personally to the Senate for its 
prior advice on a treaty, he continued to request the Senate's views on 
treaties prior to their negotiation. In addition to Washington, Presidents 
Monroe, Jackson, and Van Buren also consulted the Senate prior to negoti-
ating a treaty. It remained for President Pol~, however, to utilize 
lOJames D. Richardson, ed., Messages~ Papers of the Presidents 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), Vol. I, P e 161, Proclama-
tion of the President, September 25, 1794. 
llGeor ge Fort Milton, The Use of Presidential Power (Boston: Little, 
Brovm and Co., 1944), p.37; see also White, ~Federalists, pp. 60-61. 
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t his practice as a deliberate maneuver to extricate himself from an untenable 
political position.l2 
Washington's neutrality proclamation touched off one of the most 
significant constitutional debates of our history. The debate concerned 
the proper construction to be applied to the clause that "the executive 
power shall be vested in a President of the United States." Hamilton ar-
gued successfUlly that, whereas the Constitution stated that "all legis-
lative power herein granted Shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States," in the case of executive power the Constitution merely provided 
that ~the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States.<Jt Therefore, he argued, the grant of executive power to the Presi-
dent is a general grant of power. Hamilton clearly states the constitu-
tional doctrine which grew out of these debates: 11The general doctrine 
of our Constitution then is ~~at the executive power of the nation is 
vested in the President, subject only to the exceptions and qualifications 
which are expressed in the instru~ent.nl3 This has become the accepted 
constitutional view as related to foreign affairs, while for all other 
powers the President must look to the specif ic grants of the Constitution 
or to specific statutes. 
The achievements of the Federalists during the Washington adminis-
12George H. Haynes , 'lhe Se~ 2f ~ United States (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), Vol. 2, pp. 585-590. Polk 's use of t hi s 
met hod will be treat ed in detail in the chapt er entitled "Polk a s Chief 
of Legislation. 11 
13Alexander Hamilton, Works (Lodge ed.), IV, pp. 142-144; see also 
J ames Hart, The American Presidency 1!1 Action, 1789; Carl Brent Swi sher, 
Amer ican Consti tutional Develo}Hnent, 2d ed. (Bost on: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1954), pp. 45- 98, esp. pp. 77-85; and EdwardS. Corwin, The President: 
Office and Power s (New York: New York University Press, 1940), pp . 208-216. 
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tration were many and significant. If the President did not personally 
attend to the details and initiate the policies which we have come to 
expect from our chief executive, he had an able lieutenant in his Secretary 
of the Treasury who could unify the executive and provide it with strength 
and vigor. In fact, Ydth the possible exception of Thomas Jefferson's 
Presidency, the country was not to experience so vigorous an executive 
leadership until the Presidency of Andrew Jackson. The Federalists' 
accomplishments included, first of all, the provision of a strong moral 
leadership and moral climate in the executive branch which has not been 
equalled since. Secondly, the Federalists could not escape the necessity 
for organizing the government and they provided a basic structure which 
has endured. Thirdly, they brought to the government a public program 
which, although not enacted in all its details, was largely accomplished. 
Fourthly, in the area of foreign affairs they were notably successful in 
asserting the executive primacy; they were unafraid of executive power, 
rather they feared impotency in government. Fifthly, they were distrust-
ful of the people and favored the rich and the well-born, thus providing 
the government with class ties to the lives of the property-ovming class 
of the nation. Finally, they successfully asserted in the case of the 
Whiskey Rebellion the supremacy of federal law and the necessity for order. 
In this instance Washington quickly recognized the seriousness of the 
threat and used the Commander-in-Chief's power with all the vigor neces-
sary for success. 
But in spite of this outstanding record of achievement the executive 
authority was on the wane even before Washington left office, and vdth the 
arrival of Adams in the Vfuite House the slow retreat of executive authority 
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had turned i nto a r out. It seems certain t hat Washington woul d never have 
consented to a second term if there had not been trouble abroad. Yet the 
strong central control which Hamilton had wielded throughout the first 
term was nearly at an end. The Republicans had control over the lower 
house, and the harassment of Hamilton drove him from the Cabinet into priv-
ate life. The third Congress demolished the system of executive leader-
ship but failed to replace it with strong Congressional leadership. 
Albert Gallatin made a valiant but largely unsuccessful effort to organ-
ize the House through a newly-constituted Ways and Means Committee. Gradu-
ally the standing committee system developed to provide a semblance , ')f 
order to the government. 
In 1797 John Adams took over the Presidency and with it the Feder-
alists were once again in control of both houses, but, as we shall see, he 
was unable to reassert executive control. Albert Gallatin's alae leader-
ship of the Republicans in the House was now supported by Thomas Jefferson 
in his role of President of the Senate. Within the executive branch John 
Adams found himself a prisoner. He felt he had to retain Washington's 
Cabinet. Party leadership, instead of residing wi th him, still rested 
with a private citizen, Alexander Hamilton. His department heads were ~not 
only holdovers from Washington's administration; they were to a man loyal 
to Adams' poll tical enemy, Alexander Hamil ton. For example, his Secretary 
of the Treasury was Oliver Wolcott, who had been auditor under Hamilton 
and depended almost entirely on Hamilton in matters of f iscal policy. In 
1789 Adams wrote to Washington that he wished he could turn the Presidency 
over to him.l4 A short time after this letter, on July 2, 1798, Adams 
14-liAi l ton , 22• ill·, p. 51. 
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nominated Washington as Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief. There 
has probably never been such a blatant transfer of constitutionally gr~nted 
powers from a President to another as occurred in this instance. To make 
matters worse for President Adams, he was forced against his own desire 
to nominate Alexander Hamilton as second-in-command to Washington. This 
was a very bitter pill for the proud Bostonian to swallow, but upon Washing-
ton 1 s insistence he gave way.lfi Yet in contrast to this debacle in leader-
ship (another being the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts) Adams 
showed tm.usual determination and principle in his successful efforts to 
avoid a war with France. He stood alone against Hamil ton and the Feder-
alist party with full knowledge that success of his negotiators in arriving 
at a settlement with France would lose for the Federalists the election of 
1800. 
In reviewing the Federalists' handling of the executive office it 
will be observed that under Washington, aided by Alexander Hamilton, execu-
tive power was established and vigorously exercised, but that with the 
Presidency of John Adams executive leadership was divided and Vfeak. In 
1800 the Jeffersonians were to take control until Andrew Jackson in 1829 
issued into the executive branch a new concept of that office. The Feder-
alists were never again to have the opportunity to control the executive. 
The Jeffersonians 
Mr. Jefferson became President in 1800 after one of the most bit-
terly fought contests in our history, a contest which reached its climax 
in the attempt to place Aaron Burr in the Presidency in his place. One 
15white, Federalists, pp. 257-252. 
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might have expected the new President to conduct the affairs of office with 
the utmost partisanship; however, Jefferson was too big a man for that and 
set out to restore harmony in the nation. But how was this man, dedicated 
as he was to separation of powers and states' rights, to mold this new 
administration so that it could lead the nation. The record of the Repub-
licans in Congress was not impressive. The last four years of Washing-
ton's admi nistration had found the Republicans in control of the House of 
Repre sentatives; yet that group of agrarian individualists had been unable 
to present any constructive program. The art of obstruction had been 
highly developed, and now the Republicans faced the responsibility of 
directing the energies of government. 
Chief Justice Marshall, no friend of Jefferson, provides the clue 
to the understanding of both the success of Jefferson and the failure of 
his Jeffersonian heirs. 
Mr. Jefferson appears to me to be a man who will embody himself' 
with the House of Representatives. By weakening the office of 
President, he will increase his personal power. He will diminish 
his responsibility, sap the fundamental principles of government, 
and become the leader of' that party which is about to constitute 
the majority of the legislature.l6 
How was Marshall's prophecy to come to pass? Jefferson was too wise to 
attempt to dominate Congress by means of external formal pressures from 
the executive branch; but with Gallatin's assistance he controlled Cong-
ress internally. Professor Binley reports, and Leonard White confirms, 
that during Jefferson's administration no Congressional official, whether 
Speaker of the House or committee chairman, was appointed except by the 
President's command. Once again the terms, "first lord of the treasury" 
16 . Hamilton, Works, VI, pp. 501-505, quoted by A. J. Beveridge, 
Life of Marshall, II, p. 557. 
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and "chancellor of the exchequer," were being used, but in contrast to 
Washington's administration they were applied not to the Secretary of the 
Treasury but to the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means.l7 And if 
the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means stepped out of line, as 
John Randolph did, then Jefferson saw to hi s removal. This was one of 
the means that Jefferson used to manage Congress, but, as we shall see, 
it was a t wo-edged sword which could be turned against a lesser f igure in 
the Presidential office. Professor White summarizeB this feature of con-
trol very succinctly: 
The principal innovation was the establishment of a floor leader 
who was recognized as the spokesman for the President. Under the 
Federalists the floor leader had been an assistant to the Speaker, 
but not in any sense a representative of the President. Under 
Jefferson, floor leaders were presidential agents, appointed by 
the executive, and dismissed at his pleasure.l8 
A second device utilized by Jefferson to coordinate the legislative and 
executive branches without violating the principle of separ ation of powers 
was the Republican caucus. The first recognition in Congressional debate 
of the existence of a caucus occurred in 1802.19 Jefferson it is believed 
presided on occasion over the caucus meetings. Once again Leonard White 
summarizes very nicely the executive-legi slative relationships developed 
under Jefferson and their implications for the future: 
Jefferson, in short, built up a highly centralized system, operated 
for the most part by conference, consultation, and free discussion 
17 Annals, 7th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 666; Randolph to Gallatin 
in Henry Adams, Gallatin, p. 524; as quoted in Binkley, The Powers 2f the 
President, pp. 49-50. 
18Leonard D. V'Jhite, ~Jeffersonians (New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1951), P• 48. 
l9Angals, 7th Cong., lst Sess., p. 480. 
rather than by harsher means of leadership. The development of this 
very machinery was to make possible ••• a radical change in the rela-
tionship between executive and legislature. If the Rouse leaders 
should get control of the machinery of caucus, floor leader, and 
speakership, they would be in a position to control the whole execu-
tive administration. Precisely this development was to occur as 
Jefferson left the stage.20 
With this shift to Congressional control over these agencies of 
direction would also come Congressional control over the President's own 
advisers, the heads of executive departments. This lack of Presidential 
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control over his subordinates had been indirectly encouraged by Jefferson's 
passion for economy. For in his successful drive to repay the Federalist-
acquired debt and achieve a budget surplus, Jefferson encouraged the Cong-
ress to appropriate funds only according to specific purposes narrowly 
defined. As usual, the greatest savings possible to the executive were in 
the area of military preparedness and Jefferson was pleased to discover 
that his own distrust of a large standing army so coincided with his desire 
to trim the budget. That Jefferson enjoyed the support of his Secretary 
of the Treasury in his low regard for the military is certain. Gallatin, 
writing to his wife in 1802, stated: 
The distribution of our little army to distant garrisons where 
hardly any other inhabitant is to be found is the most eligible 
arrangement of that perhaps necessary evil that can be contrived. 
But I never want to see the face of one in our cities and inter-
mixed with the people.21 
For these reasons Jefferson never gave much thought to his responsi-
bilities as Commander-in-Chief. In general, Jefferson approached the whole 
problem of administration with an unusual degree of naivete, whichhe 
20white, Jeffersonians, pp. 52-55. 
21 Henry Adams, ~ Q£ Gallatin, p. 504; as quoted in ~hite, 
Jeffersonians, p. 214. 
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expressed rather clearly in a letter written in 1817, nine years after~e 
had left the Presidency. Referring to "the difficulties supposed to 
attend the public administration," he wrote: 
There are no mysteries in it. Difficulties indeed sometimes arise; 
but common sense and honest intentions will generally steer through 
them, and, where they cannot be surmounted, I have ever seen the 
well-intentioned part of our fellow-citizens sufficiently disposed 
not to look for impossibilities. We all know that a farm, however 
large, is not more difficult to direct than a garden, and does not 
call for more attention or skill.22 
However, despite Jefferson's low regard for administra tion and his 
high regard for Republican principles, in a matter of grave significance 
he did not let his views become fixed and doctrinaire. The greatest 
achievement of his administration, the Louisiana Purchase, was carried 
through despite his Constitutional doubts, because he had the vision to see 
the significance of this acquisition to the future of the nation. Frederick 
Jackson Turner argues that it had greater significance for the nation's con-
stitutional development than all of Alexander Hamilton's measures.25 In 
summation then, Jefferson's most significant contribution to the Presidency 
was the consummation of the Louisiana Purchase, for while it is true that 
he was a most skillful manipulator of Congress, the very tools which he 
developed became a Frankenstein Monster which almost destroyed the independ-
ent executive. 
History has stamped James Madison as one of the best Constitutional 
theorists but one of the worst Presidential practitioners. The Congression-
al caucus (shpped by Jefferson) had by 1808 passed from the control of the 
executive into the hands of Congress. Every succeeding President from 
22A. A. Lipscomb, ed., ~Writings of Thomas Jef~erson, XV, p.ll2; 
as quoted in ~bite, Jeffersonians, P• 4. 
25ueorge Fort Milton, ~Use of Presidential Power, P• 61. 
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Madison to Andrew Jackson was hand-picked by the Republican Congressional 
caucus. Madison was not even permitted to name his own Cabinet, being 
forced to name Robert Smith as his Secretary of State rather than Gallatin, 
whom the President wished to fill that post. The Congressional caucus, as 
a tool of legislative domination of the executive, was assisted by a radi-
cal change in the Speakership of the Rouse of Representatives. In 1811 
Henry Clay became Speaker and from that day until 1825 the Speaker dom-
inated and organized the House leadership. Prior to 1811 the Speaker, 
while a partisan figure, acted primarily as an impartial moderator; but 
after that date he became the real party leader. Miss Follett believed 
that Clay was the most powerful man in the nation during his reign as 
Speaker from 1811 to 1825.24 Under Clay's direction the functioning of 
the old Committee of the Whole was largely abandoned in favor of standing 
committees, which under his direction became strong instruments of control. 
By.·;·, 1825 there were over twenty standing committees which encompassed all 
of the activities of the various departments. Clay was not alone in the 
Congress in asserting that branch's predominance; he was aided by a number 
of young men about whom the nation was to hear much during the next thirty 
years. The trio o.f Clay, Webster, and Calhoun were to cause dif.ficul ty 
.for many a chief executive. 
Nor was Madison able strongly to contest this Congressional force. 
He refused to attempt to dictate policy to Congress, and even his messages 
were noted .for their ambiguity. Pro.fessor Binkley states: "Madison's 
lack o.f leadership was matched by his lack of decision.n25 Being unable 
2~. P. Follett, ~Speaker of the House of Re_presentatives, {New 
York: Longmans Green,l896), p.69; quoted in White, Jeffersonians, p.55. 
2~inkley, 2R• cit., P• 56. 
to lead or decide, Madison soon found that in spite of his own sincere 
desires for peace~ the War of 1812 was being forced upon him. The Con-
gressional Caucus, acting as the device to select the Republican nominee 
for President, kept Madison in doubt about his nomination until he had 
adopted a policy which made war inevitable.26 
A close examination of the conduct of the War of 181227 forces 
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one to concur with the severe judgment passed by Arthur Ber.non Tourtellot 
that: 
Madison was the worst wartime commander in chief ever visited 
upon the republic and his War of 1812 was a hodgepodge of misman-
agement, bad appointments, disastrous reverses, embarrassing 
retreats and home-front disunity. We did not win the war; the 
British simply lost it. And the ultimate outcome was in spite of 
rather than because of Madison 1 s emplo~ent of the command powers 
of the Presidency.28 
While Monroe haa a little better time as President than Madison, 
he was in no way better able to cope with a Congress determined to rule 
the executive branch. Three issues will serve to illustrate Monroe's 
reluctance to assume the mantle of leadership. One of the gravest issues 
in our history was in the process of being temporarily settled in the 
Missouri Compromise, yet there is no evidence that President Monroe .. ~took 
any interest in this most important measure. It seems impossible that he 
26n. R. Anderson, "The Insurgents of 1811," American Historical 
Association ReHort~ (1911) I, p. 174; as noted in Binkley, p. 58. 
27White, Jeffersonians, pp. 219-220. "Madison's lack of judgment 
in selecting field commanders was never more completely illustrated •••• The 
events attending the British capture of Washington revealed the greatest 
confusion as to the proper function of the commander in chief, the Secre-
tary of War, other· members of the cabinet, and the general commanding in 
the field." 
28Arthur Bernon Tourtellot, ~Anatomy of American Politics 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1950), p. 54. 
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failed to recognize the significance of the election of the Speaker of the 
House, and yet when that matter was brought to his attention, he refused to 
participate in the choice. Even in the matter of granting recognition to 
the newly freed republics of South America he submitted the question to Cong-
ress and asked for its concurrence in the form of an appropriation for dip-
lomatic representatives.29 The Presidential office under Monroe had fallen 
to such an insignificant place in the American scheme that, despite a severe 
economic depression in 1819, President Monroe was able to win almost unani-
mous re-election in 1820. Only twenty years later Van Buren was to discover 
that the people held the President responsible for such economic crises, 
and every President since has been held responsible for the economic state 
of the nation. 
Before John Quincy Adams came to the Presidency in 1825, no Presi-
dent since Thomas Jefferson had appointed a completely ne·w Cabinet. Nor 
had any President been elected save by Congressional caucus nomination. 
Indeed the tendency in 1825 was, as Binkley has observed: "the presidency 
bade fair to represent in time, not much more than a chairmanship of a 
group of permanent secretaries of the executive departments to whiCh Cong-
ress at times paid more attention than to the President.n50 John Quinc,y 
Adams was by makeup a man who would have asserted Presidential leadership 
if he could; but having received fewer electoral votes than Andrew Jackson 
and having been elected President by the House of Representatives, he had 
no mandate for leadership either from the country or from the electoral 
29Binkley, QR• £11., P• 60-63. 
50! bid., P• 64. 
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college. After the mid-term Congressional elections Adams found himself 
the first President to face a Congress in Which both Houses were in con-
trol of the opposition. Any '."lthoughts Adams might have had about providing 
energetic leadership were doomed by that mid-term election. 
In summary, the period of the Jeffersonian Presidents was a period 
of weak Presidents, and was marked by Congressional domination. In some 
respects Jefferson was the _exception to this rule, yet the very agencies 
he created to manage Congress were by their very nature more adaptable to 
Congress' ruling the executive. As during the Federalist reign, no Jeffer-
sonian President exercised control over appropriation. Ra.ther the practice 
was as White has reported: 
Nourse compiled the figures prepared by the departments, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury transmitted them to Congress. No one apparently 
expected from the executive branch any coordinatioh or general over-
all consideration in the interest of a balanced program.51 
The first war in our history was the most mismanaged of any conflict 
it has been our misfortune to enter. Once again Professor ~bite has neatly 
summarized the situation: 
The first war crisis found at the head of the government a man with-
out talent for organizing the force of his country, for selecting 
its military leaders, for inspiring public confidence, or for pro-
viding national leadership. Fortunately in its succeeding military 
crises the country was not again to be so destitute of energy in the 
office of the Chief Executive. Its lack from 1812 to 1815 nearly 
destroyed the influence of the presidency at the time.52 
One thing that both the Federalist and Jeffersonian Presidents had 
in common was the fact that they were all "gentlemen" in that peculiar}7 
Virginian use of the term. In fact, with the exception of the t wo Adamses, 
5lwhite, Jeffersonians, p. 145. 
52Ibid., p. 45. 
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all were Virginians. The same social class which had dominated the Consti-
tutional Convention and had put that Constitution in operation in 1789 had 
continued to occupy the Presidential office until 1829. Respectability 
and integrity were the cornerstones of the Federalist and Jeffersonian 
administrations. Perhaps here lies the explanation of why no President 
prior to 1829 had attempted to influence legislation or command leadership 
through the use of patronage.55 Government was operated upon a delibera-
tion theory rather than a will theory.54 The role of the government was 
to refine by the use of intellectual process the unlearned and inarticu-
lated aspirations of the people. Indeed the whole framework of government 
as devised by the founding fathers and as put into practice by both the 
Federalists and the Jeffersonians may be understood not only as a means of 
dividing power in order to protect the minority but also as being "a struc-
ture for eliciting from deliberation a judgment founded on the common good." 
We shall see that with the Jacksonians an entirely different concept of 
government emerged. A concept based on a nwill" theory of government 
rather than one based on Madison's concept of the public interest which may 
be refined "by passing it through the medium of a chosen body of citizens.n55 
53 
IbiQ.., p. 45. 
34samuel H. Beer, "The Representation of Interests in British 
Government: Sketch of Theory and Practice from the 18~~ Century" an unpub-
lished manuscript presented at the American Political Science Association 
Annual Meeting, 1956, Washington, D. C. ·~ , p. 20. See also Alfred DeGrazia, 
Public and Republic: Political Representation in America (New York, 1951). 
35The Federalists, No. 10. 
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~ Jacksonians56 
As has just been mentioned, the Jacksonians broke most decisively 
with their predecessors by acting upon a "will" theory of government. Not 
that either Federalists, Jeffersonians, or Jacksonians consciously thought 
of themselves as acting upon a theory of the role of government. On the 
contrary, politicians in the Anglo-Saxon countries have constantly taken 
pride in the fact that they act pragmatically and do not follow an ideo-
logical pattern. Therefore, it must be understood that in speaking of · a 
"deliberative" or a "will" theory of government, one is not implying that 
these theories are the products of political philosophers consciously acted 
upon, but rather they should be considered as post-operative ideals which 
may help to explain the difference in orientation between the Federalist-
Jeffersonian Presidents and the Jacksonians. 
According to the will theory, the function of government is not to 
deliberate upon the common good, but to consult the sovereign people, which 
in practice means the majority, and inact their will. From this view fol-
lows the significance of Jackson's and Polk's claim to being a better image 
of the people than the legislative branch. 
Jackson was the first President since Washington who was in no way 
indebted to Congress for either his nomination or his election. Also at 
this period the state legislatures had largely lost control over the selec-
tion of the Presidential electors. It is for these reasons that Binkley 
states: 
56 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little 
Brown & Co., 1945). The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to 
Professor Schlesinger for his (the writer's) underlying concepts of the 
Jacksonian era. 
He may be said to have been the first popularly elected President 
of the United States and his career in the executive office is 
strongly colored by his firm conviction that he bore a mandate 
fresh from the hands of the "sovereign" people.57 
The noted historian Claude G. Bowers makes the same point when he says: 
The reign of Andrew Jackson ushered in a new day in American polit-
ical life. It organized the methods of a functional democracy. He 
had been swept into office despite the opposition of a major part 
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of the press, the moneyed element, and the political leaders of long-
established reputation. His support came from the ma.ss of the 
people. 58 
The vigor with which Jackson was to pursue his mandate from the 
people was to create a determined opposition. The Whigs, While giving lip 
service to the "will" theory of government, strongly maintained that the 
Congress rather than the President best knew the will of the people. Pres-
ident Harrison clearly expressed this view as follows: 
••• it is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment 
be entertained that the President, placed at the capital, in the 
center of the country, could better understand the wants and wishes 
of the people than their own immediate representatives •••• 59 
In addition, President Harrison further developed the concept of a weak 
President by pledging himself to a cautious use of the veto, stating that 
the power to recommend measures to Congress should not make the President 
the source of legislation, and advocating that the Constitution was in 
error in not making the Secretary of the Treasury independent of the Pres-
ident. And although Harrison died one month after taking office, Whig 
theories might have prevailed had not "the force of events and the strength 
$.~inkley, 212.• ill.·, p. 68. 
58claude G. Bowers, Making Democracy~ Realit~: Jefferson, Jackson 
and Polk (Memphis: Memphis State College Press, 1954) , p. 87. 
59James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers .Qf ~ Presidents, ~-
1897 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897), Vol. IV, pp. 7-10. 
of persona~ity of two Democratic Presidents, Jackson and Polk, set prece-
dents that were destined to make the office of Chief Executive one of power 
and influence --Whig opposition notwithstanding.n40 
As is widely knomi, President Jackson 1 s method of handling his 
Cabinet was to circunrO',~nt them through the use of a small cortege of 
personal advisers, which has come to be known as the "kitchen cabinet.w It 
remained for Polk to re-establish the Cabinet as a functioning advisory 
body completely subservient to the chief executive. This is not intended 
to imply that Jackson permitted any member of the Cabinet to defy his will. 
When his Secretary of the Treasury attempted to do so by refusing to with-
draw deposits from the Second National Bank, J a ckson dismissed him. From 
Jackson's dismissal of Duane until 1861, no Cabinet officer disputed the 
ultimate supremacy of the President. Thus doggedly President Jackson 
asserted his own superiority within the administration while simultane-
ously asserting the domination of the President over Congress as the repre-
sentative of the people. 
In his first annual message to Congress Jackson recommended the 
direct election of the President in order that "as few impediments as 
possible Should exist to the free operation of the public will.n41 While 
this proposal was directed at overcoming the debacle that had occurred in 
1825 When Adams had been elected by the House of Representatives, yet there 
was implied the principle of direct responsibility of the President to the 
people. In 1854, while asserting his supremacy over department heads, 
40r.eonard D. White, !rut Jacksonians (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1954), p. 48, 46-49. See also: E. M. Carroll, Origins of the Whig Party 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1925). 
41Richardson, Messages, II, p. 448 (Dec. 8, 1829). 
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Jackson stated this position again: "The President is the direct repre-
sentative of the American people, but the Secretaries are not.n42 He 
certainly construed the election of 1852 as a vote of confidence from the 
people, supporting his veto of the Bank Charter renewal and as a mandate 
to continue his war on the Bank. His withdrawal of Federal funds from the 
Bank, which contributed to its failure, was Jackson 1 s means of fulfilling 
the people's mandate. 
Jackson's view on the direct representation of the people by the 
President was further developed by President Polk, who addressed Congress 
as follows: 
The people, by the Constitution, have commanded the President, as much 
as they have commanded the legislative branch of the Government, to 
execute their will •••• If it be said that the Representatives in the 
popular branch of Congress are chosen directly by the people, it is 
answered, the people elect the President. If both Houses represent 
the States and the people, so does the President. The President~ep­
resents in the executive department the whole people of the United 
States, as each member of the legislative department represent por-
tions of them •••• 45 
A logical corollary to the theory of a government based on "will" 
rather than on "deliberation" was the theory of rotation in office. Prior 
to 1829 there had developed for forty years the practice of retaining able 
men in public office for, after all, and in spite of their possible polit-
ical differences, they were all "gentlemen." Professor White states "one 
might have concluded in 1828 that the tradition of permanence and stabil-
ity in public administration was as well established as the two-term trad-
ition of the Presidency. n44 But such a conclusion would have been mistaken, 
42Ibid., III, 90 (April 15, 1854). 
45~., IV, p. 664-665 (Dec. 5, 1848). 
Polk's action in this matter is presented in the 
Legislator." 
44whi te, Jacksonians, p. 500. 
A further tre~tment of 
chapter, "Polk as Chief 
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for it reckoned not with the new spirit of democracy -- a belief which in-
sisted that self-government must include ~~de participation in government 
by the citizens. Yet the extent of proscription during the Jackson admin-
istration has been greatly exaggerated in the public mind. In 'total, the 
proportion of office-holders removed was probWbly not greater than ten per 
cent; it certainl y did not exceed twenty per cent.45 
In reviewing the Jackson Presidency one is struck by the fact that 
it was a period of flux, of intense struggle-- struggle with Congress 
over the Bank veto, struggle within the administration over the dismissal 
of his Secrets.ry of the Treasury, Duane, strt¥?;gle with South Carolina 
over nullification, struggle of the common man to unseat the aristocrats 
from power. When viewed in this light, it is not surprising that new 
institutions, new habits of doing things were not firmly este.blished during 
those tumultuous eight years. Nor was Van Buren, caught in the throes of 
economic panic brought on by the collapse of the Second-National Bank, able 
to- institutionalize the new order. To President Tyler, being the first man 
to be elevated to the Presidency by the death of the President, must go the 
credit for insisting that the Vice-President upon the death of the President 
became the "President," and not the "Acting President.n46 He was able, 
through strong reliance upon the veto power, to prevent the tide from turning 
against the executive branch, but as a President ~thout party or popular 
support he could not carry the revolution any further. 
45rbid.' p. 508. 
46Robert J. Morgan, ! Whig Embattled (Lincoln: University of Neb-
raska Press, 1954). The central theme of this University of Virginia dis-
sertation is the significance of Tyler's insistence upon being President 
in the full meaning of that term. 
This chapter has achieved its purpose if, it' has conveyed to the 
reader the gradually ghanging character of the Presidential office from 
the time of its first incumbent, George Washington, to the time of the 
revolutionary changes brought about by Andrew Jackson. 
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Particlar attention is directed to the evidence that the Pres-
idents preceding Polk had to a large measure failed to exercise immediate 
or direct control over the executive departments. This was particularly 
true of the President's relations with the Treasury Department. Through-
out this period there had been close relations between Congress and the 
Tree.sury Department. Occasionally, the initiative was with the Secreta.ry 
of the Treasury, as was true of Hamilton and Gallatin, but usually the 
Department was subservient to the Ways and Means Committee of the Rouse of 
Representatives. In dramatic fashion Jackson asserted his control over 
this Department, but it remained for President Polk to develop a day-by-day 
regularized Presidential supervision. 
A second area of Presidential function which had to wait until the 
Polk Presidency to be asserted in its full scope and magnitude was that of 
Connnander-in-Chief. While it is true that Washington did exercise this 
function vdth vigor during the Whiskey Rebellion, this does not serve as a 
reliable precedent for Presidential action as Commander-in-Chief beca.use 
of Washington's unusual military reputation. Washington's action fails to 
establish that a civilian President could function effectively as Commander-
in-Chief. John Adams, it ~~11 be recalled, abdicated this function, call-
ing Washington out of retirement to assume the duties of Commander-·in-Chief, 
thus almost destroying for all time the possibility of a President direct-
ing the military. Madison's role as Commander-in-Chief only served to 
56 
detra.ct from the Presidential office. 
The next chapter will deal with the election of President Polk. 
It will attempt to give insight into his character, his political adroit-
ness, his Psmbition, and his determination to be President in his own 
right. This is necessary for an understanding of the manner in which he 
was to conduct the office after the election. 
CHAPTER II 
THE FIRST DARK HORSE 
A rallying cry of the Whigs during the election of 1844 was "Who 
is Jsmes K. Polk,"1 but like most campaign slogans it represented only a 
partial truth. James K. Polk had been on the national scene almost as 
long as had Andrew Jackson, having been elected to Congress for his first 
term at the same election which had elevated J a.ckson to the White House. 
Moreover, Polk had served as Jackson's floor manager in his fight against 
the Bank s.nd had gone on to become Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
Polk remained in the House of Representatives until he resigned to carry 
on a successful gubernatorial campaign in 1839. Even his campaign and 
term of office as Governor of Tennessee was not without its national over-
tones. 
The Whigs of Tennessee had often charged during the gubernatorial 
campaign of 1839 that James K. Polk's main objective in winning the contest 
was to promote his candidacy as Vice-President in the election of 1840. 
Nor does it appear that this charge was entirely unwarranted. The return 
of the home state of Andrew Jackson to the r~s of the Democratic party 
was regarded as being of national significance. Polk's campaign had empha-
sized national issues rather than local ones, and his inaugural address as 
1As Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., has just completed a thorough biog-
raphy of Polk from 1795 to 1843, it is unnecessary to develop at any length 
his pre-Presidential career. Therefore, this chapter will be restricted to 
the events immediately preceding his election, with the aim of throwing 
light upon his chars.cter e.nd political associations which were subsequently 
to influence his conduct of the Presidential office. Charles Grier Sellers, 
Jr., James !· Polk; Jacksonis.n: 1795-J:.§iQ (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957). 
.I 
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Governor of Tennessee had been almost entirely devoted to national issues.2 
When, within days after Polk's inauguration, both houses of the Tennessee 
legislature began considering a resolution to nominate Polk as a Vice-Pres-
idential candidate in 1840, it would appear that the Whigs were justified 
in their charge that Polk desired the governorship merely as a stepping-
stone toward the higher national office. 
Polk's chief opponent for the Vice-Presidential nomination was the 
incumbent, Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky. There did exist a faction of 
the Democratic party that was bitterly opposed to Johnson's renomination, 
and they were anxious to support Polk as a rival candidate. Polk, however, 
in spite of his interest in the office, w~s opposed to putting himself up 
as a candidate of a faction of the party, and felt that out of party loyal-
ty he must support the nomination of the Democratic convention.5 General 
Jackson, a continual strong supporter of Polk, wrote to Van Buren favoring 
Polk's selection as a running mate and advised Van Buren to abandon his 
Vice-President, Johnson: 
A man ought to be chosen that all the republicans in every state 
would cheerfully unite on, and if this is not done it will jeop-
ardize your election -- it ought to be a man whose popularity would 
strengthen you, not one that would be a dead weight upon your popu-
larity.4 
Jackson's charge that the incumbent Johnson would be a dead weight upon 
2John S. Jenkins, James K· Polk (Auburn, N.Y.: James M. Alden, 
1851), pp. 104-ll5, quoting James K. Polk, "Inaugural Address as Governor 
of Tennessee." See also Sellers, ~· cit., pp. 578-582; The Nashville 
Republican Banner, Oct. 18, 1859. 
5Eugene Irving McCormic, James K· ~ (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1922), p. 161. 
4Letter of Andrew Jackson to Martin Van Buren, April 5, 1840 
(~Buren Papers, Library of Congress). 
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Van Buren's shoulders was not without foundation, for in 1836 when Van Buren 
was able to win an easy majority in the electoral college, Jo,hnson failed to 
win a majority and the election of the Vice-President had to be determined 
in the Senate. Johnson is the only Vice-President who holds the dubious dis-
tinction of being elected by the Senate of the United States.5 
Because of the split in the Democratic party over the choice of Vice-
President, it seemed to many of the leaders that it would be best not to 
hold a convention at all. There was, of course, not a national committee 
with constitutional authority to call a national convention. But, acting 
on the past precedent of 1831 and 1835, the Democratic members of the New 
Hampshire legislature issued a call for a Democratic Convention to be held 
in Baltimore on May 4, 1840. The Democratic party responded to the call 
and adopted a platform of nine planks, supporting the current administration 
and the heritage of Andrew Jackson and Thomas Jefferson. Following the 
adoption of the platform, a resolution was unanimously passed presenting Mr. 
Van Buren to the voters for re-election as President of the United States. 
However, the expected strife over the selection of a Vice-Presidential can-
didate did occur. After much debate the supporters of Johnson realized that 
they could not muster the necessary two-thirds vote of the convention. The 
convention, faced with a stalemate, passed the following resolutions unani-
mously: 
5It will be recalled that the election of 1800, with its ensuing 
contest between Jefferson and Burr, occurred prior to the adoption of the 
12th · Amendment to the Constitution, and therefore the Senate did not enter 
into the situation. In 1824, while there were four candidates for the Pres-
idency, they all ran on one ticket and Calhoun was the only Vice-Presiden-
tial candidate. Calhoun thus won all the electoral votes for Vice-President. 
In the contested election between Hayes and Tilden in 1879 when the disputed 
electors were credited to Hayes they also voted for Hayes' running mate, 
40 
Resolved, That the convention deem it expedient at the present time 
not to choose between the individuals in nomination, but to leave the 
decision to their Republican fellow-citizens in the several States, 
trusting that, before the election shall take place, their opinions 
shall become so concentrated as to secure the choice of a Vice-Pres-
ident by the electoral colleges.6 
Six months prior to the Democratic Convention the Whigs had met in 
a National Convention on December 4, 1839.7 Th.e0 Whigs, displaying a good 
degree of political astuteness, assembled a formidable group of dissident 
elements. United in their fear of federal and executive domination, under 
the Whig banner were the pro-bank, high tariff Northern Federalists and low 
tariff, anti-bank Southerners. To insure the stability of this alliance, 
at least for the duration of the ca~paign, the Whigs passed over their 
acknowledged party leader, Henry Clay, and selected an aged, impoverished 
military hero, General William Henry Harrison, as their standard bearer. 
Nor was their selection of Vice-President made on the basis of party prin-
ciple. They selected John Tyler, who had been a Democrat during all his 
early career but had broken with Jackson over states'-right issues. His 
selection was dictated by the expediency of trying to capture dissident 
Southerners who resented Jackson's advocacy of a strong executive. To 
insure further their universal appeal, they totally ignored issues by fail-
ing to adopt a platform. 
The campaign that followed the nominations was perhaps unique in 
William A. Wheeler. Therefore, both the Presidential and Vice-Presidential 
candidates on the Republican ticket received a majority of the electoral 
votes. 
~dward Stanwood, ! History of ~ Presidency fror:L:1?39 to 1897 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.), p. 201. 
7Robert J. Morgan, ! Whig Embattled, pp. 147-151. The information 
in this dissertation dealing with the Presidency of John Tyler relies 
heavily on this source. 
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its day for a failure to join issues. The Democnats made a fatal error 
early in the campaign when in en attempt to belittle Harrison they declared 
that he lived in a log cabin and drank hard cider. The Vihigs were quick 
to seize these symbols and turn them into standard campaign equipment. At 
every Whig rally the center of attraction was a large log cabin from which 
there issued to the faithful an abundant supply of apple cider. The Vir-
ginia Democrats recorded: 
••• the Whigs have raised in this state seventeen log cabins orna-
mented by two stuffed bear sldns, one living bear, together v.ith 
coon skins, brooms, gourds, and cider barrels innumerable •••• 8 
In such a campaign the Whigs went forth in "triumphant humbuggeryn9 
to defeat the Democrats. In spite of the Democrats' feeling that the elec-
tion of 1840 had been stolen from them by fraud and deceit, a probable 
greater cause for their defeat than the carefully selected ~hig candidates 
and the campaign of circuses and cider, was- the hard fact of the depression 
of 1857. A depression which Van Buren had inherited from Jackson's attack 
on the Second Bank of the United States. This depression, coupled with 
the general reaction which so often follows a period of rapid economic and 
social change, were the basic factors accounting for Van Buren's defeat. 
Harrison received a substantial victory in the popular vote and 
nearly three-fourths of the electoral vote, i.e., 254 to 60. Little inter-
est was shown in the Democratic electors' vote for Vice-President, and most 
of them, in the absence of a nominated candidate, did~ for the incumbent 
8ncommi ttee on Humbugs. Report of the Committee appointed to in-
quire into the Charges, Devices, and Humbugs of the Whig Party •••• " 
Proceedings of the Democratic State Convention, Charlottesville, Va., Sept. 
9-10, 1840 (Manuscript at the University of Virginia Library). 
9 Morgan, .Qll• cit., p. 149. 
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Johnson. The final tally of the Democratic electors for Vice-President was 
as follows: Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, 48; Littleton W. Tazewell of 
Virginia, 11; and James K. Polk of Tennessee, 1.10 
The Whig victory secured in the election of 1840 was a short one, 
for a month after taking office, Gener8~ Harrison died~ John Quincy Adams 
accurately prophesied difficulties for the first Vice-President to become 
President, remarking that: 
••• the policy of Mr. Tyler will look exclusively to his own election 
for the next four years, and that of Webster will be to secure it for 
him: •••• Mr. Clay ••• left to fight his own battles ••• will soon be in 
unequivocal opposition.ll 
Tyler's first course was to run foursquare against the most favored 
Whig measure, a national bank. On September 11, 1841, the break with the 
Clay Whigs was complete, for on that day, following his announcement that · 
he would veto the second bank bill against the expressed wishes of his 
entire Cabinet, Tyler's first Cabinet resigned in mass. After this break, 
Tyler tried for some time to seek an alliance ~~th those elements of the 
Whig party which opposed Henry Clay. In this endeavor Tyler was supported 
by Webster. But as this plan proved to be a failure, Tyler began to seek 
the open support of the Democrats. After Webster's resignation from the 
Cabinet in May of 1845, Tyler began selecting Democrats for Cabinet posts. 
Upshur, as Seeretc.ry of State, Thomas Gilmer, ex-Governor of Virginia, and 
William Wilkins, a Pennsylvania Democrat, were among those appointed to 
Tyler's Cabinet. Finally in 1844, Tyler had the opportunity to make addi-
tional appointments; selecting Calhoun to replace Upshur, upon the latter's 
10A.K. McClure, Our Presidents (New York: Harper- !_;and Bros., 1909) 
pp. 72-75; see also Stanwood, QR• cit., p. 204. 
11 Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, (Phila-
delphia: Lippincott, 1876), X, 405. 
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untimely death on the gunboat Princeton, and John Y. Mason to be Secretary 
of the Navy, Mason being appointed only after James K. Polk had declined 
to accept the post. 
Polk, in his cautiously worded letter refusing the post in Tyler's 
Cabinet, was careful to point out: 
••• that all the public preferment which I have at any time enjoyed, 
I have received directly from the hands of the people, and since I 
have been in retirement I have often declared to my friends, that if 
I ever again filled any public place, I expect -· to receive it from 
the same source •••• 1·2 
In a letter to Cave Johnson, he clearly indicated that he refused the posi-
tion because he felt that if he were to accept, it might be construed by 
the Democrats as a face-saving retreat from his position as a potential 
Vice-Presidential nominee and thus prevent him from campaigning to secure 
the Vice-Presidential nomination at the Democratic Convention, which was 
only two months away.l5 
At that time the nominees of both parties seemed a certainty. The 
Whigs were determined not to make the mistake they did in 1840 and were 
prepared to nominate Henry Clay, the genuine spokesman for their party, as 
their standard bearer. It was generally understood among Democrats that 
Van Buren would once again receive the nomination, enjoying as he did the 
advantage of being considered the party's candidate, and the legacy of 
Andrew Jackson. Thus it seemed certain that he would be nominated, although 
unenthusiastically, as the Democratic Presidential candidate in 1844.14 
1~etter of James K. Polk to Theophilus Fisk, March 20, 1844. 
Tepnessee Historical Magazine, I, 1915 (Nashville: Tennessee Historical 
Society), "Polk-Johnson Letters, 1855-1848," pp. 255-256. 
1~etter of James K. Polk to Cave Johnson, March 21, 1844, loc. s!!·, 
P• 257. 
14 Stanwood, .22• cit., pp. 206-210. 
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If the nomination for the Presidency was considered a decided 
issue, the contest for the Vice-Presidential nomination was wide open. As 
had been indicated earlier, Polk, ever since his election to the Governor-
ship of Tennessee in 1859, had maintained an interest in the Vice-Presiden-
tial nomination. Six months before the nominations were to be made, Polk 
had been active in securing the support of General J ackson, and had been 
urging the General's associates to write letters in behalf of his candidacy 
to leading Democrats throughout the nation.l5 
Polk continued as a strong supporter of Van Buren, and refused to 
take part in any scheming with Cass or other potential candidates, feeling 
that his own chances for the Vice-Presidential nomination were best served 
by remaining loyal to Van Buren. These views were indicated in a letter to 
Cave Johnson as late as two months before the Democratic Convention • 
••• The movement which you say is on hand-- to profess publicly to 
support Van Buren with a secret intention to attempt to nominate 
Genl. Cassin the convention-- can receive no countenance from me •••• 
If any such movement is being made in this State, it has not come 
to my knowledge. Should any such be made !!!l: ~ shall I!Q1 ~ useg 
in that way.... It is now settled that the preference of a large 
majority of the party is for Ml:.· YM! Buren, and the wholi party 
should yield to his nomination and make it unanimous •••• 6 
This remained Polk' a position both privately and publicly until two 
15 
Letter of James~. Polk to Andrew J. Donelson, October 19, 1845. 
Tennessee Historical Magazine, III, 1917 (Nashville: Tennessee Historical 
Society), npolk Donelson Letters,n pp.53-54. "Andrew J. Donelson (1799-1871) 
was a nephew of the wife of General Jackson. He was long a member of Jack-
son's family, and was made the President's personal secretar y. Thus re-
sponsible and familiarly associated with General J ackson, Doh elson estab-
lished many long personal friendships with the circle of those politically 
close to the General.... It was to be expected that those who sought to 
learn the General's views or to impress their own upon him should seek the 
favor of one so closely in his confidence." Ibid., p. 51. 
16 Letter of James K. Polk to Cave Johnson, March 18, 1844. Tenn-
essee Historical Magazine, I, 1915, p. 254. 
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weeks prior to the Democratic National Convention in Baltimore. However, 
events had not remained unchanged. The issue of the annexation of Texas 
was rapidly crowding all other issues to one side. Both Van Buren and 
Clay, in an attempt to remove this issue from the forthcoming campaign, 
had publicly taken similar positions in opposition to the !~mediate annexa-
tion of Texas.l7 
Andrew Jackson from the days of his own administration had been a 
very strong advocate of the annexation of Texas. Thus, with the Conven-
tion only a month away, the Democratic party was badly split, w~th its two 
living ex-Presidents, General Jackson and Martin Van Buren, on opposite 
sides of this important issue. Undoubtedly, Van Buren felt assured that it 
was too late for anyone to prevent his nomination. Unfortunately for him, 
he underestimated the strength of General Jackson's intervention, who, 
although in poor health and in retirement at the Hermitage, was still the 
most important figure in Democratic circles. Jackson, quick to realize 
the significance of the Texas question and the error of Van Buren's stand, 
s~moned Polk to a meeting at the Hermitage,l8 which marks the beginning 
17 National Intelligencer (Washington) April 27, 1844; Washington 
Globe, April 28, 1844. 
18 . A week prior to the publication of the Van Buren letter, Polk 
had written a letter expressing himself on this fateful issue. This letter 
was not published until May 6, only three weeks from the opening of the 
Democratic National Convention. Polk expressed himself as unequivocally in 
favor of immediate "reannexation. 11 The poll tically clever term "reannexa-
tion" carried the implication that t..'IJ.e United States had some legal claim 
to the terri tory of Texas. It was based on circuitous reasoning which 
claimed that the Louisiana Purchase had included Texas. In opposition to 
this interpretation was the historical fact that Texas had continually, 
until its independence, been under Merlcan jurisdiction. It also conveni-
ently ignored the fact that the United States in 1819 had surrendered, as 
part of the Florida purchase, any claim to territory beyond the Sabine 
River. See Justin H. Smith, The Annexation .Qf Texas (New York: Barnes and 
Noble, Inc., 1941), PP• 5-9. 
46 
of Polk's ce.mpaign for the Democratic nomination for President of the United 
States. Polk describes this historic meeting in some detail in t wo letters 
to his strong confidant and political adviser, Cave Johnson: 
Strictly Confidential Monday Night, May 13, 1844 
At the urgent solicitation of Maj. Donaldson, Genl. Armstrong, and 
one or two other friends who wrote to 1ne, I came to this place on yes-
terday. Today Genl. A. and myself visited the Hermitage •••• He, J ack-
son, has no idea that Mr. V. B. can be nominated or if nominated tha t 
he can receive any Southern support. He is not excited but is cool 
and collected and speaks in terms of deep regret at the fatal error 
which Mr. V. B. has committed. He says however that it is done and 
that the convention must select some other as the candidate •••• Vfuat 
you can or will do at BaltL~ore God only knows. My earnest desire is 
that you shall harmonize and run but one man. Genl. J. thinks that 
Mr. V. B. is becoming sensible that his opinions are not in harmony 
with those of the people and will withdraw and hopes he will do so. 
Genl. J. says the candidate for the first office should be an annexa-
tion man, and from the Southwest, and he and other friends here urge 
that my friends should insist upon that point. I tell them, and it 
is true, that I have never aspired so high, and that in all proba-
bility the attempt to place me in the first position would be utterly 
abortive.... I aspire to the 2nd office and should be gratified to 
receive the nomination •••• I am however in their hands and they can 
use my name in any way they might think proper •••• 
••• Surely there is patriotism enough among these leaders yet to 
save the party. This can only be done by uniting upon .Qne candidate 
and he must be favorable to the annexation of Texas. I have stood by 
Mr. V. B. and will stand by him as long as there is heJPe, but I now 
despair of his election-- even if he be nominated •••• l9 
The following day, Mr. Polk saw fit to write another letter to Cave 
Johnson in which he made the proposition of his own candidacy even clearer. 
Perhaps he felt that he had been too subtle in his letter of May 15, and 
he wrote: 
••• He, General Jackson, thinks the candidate for the Presidency should 
be an annexation man and reside in the Southwest, and he openly expresses 
(what I assure you I had never for a moment contemplated) the opinion 
19tetter of James K. Polk to Cave Johnson, May 15, 1844. Tennessee 
Historical Magazine, I, p. 239-240.-
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that I would be the most available man; taking the Vice-Presidential 
candidate from the North •••• 20 
With this expression of the desires of General Jackson, the plans 
for Polk's nomination for President were launched, only a fortnight before 
the Baltimore Convention was scheduled to meet. That Polk directed his own 
strategy vd. th the able assistance of Cave Johnson and Gideon Pillow is quite 
evident from the correspondence. Although Polk became an active seeker 
after the first place, he seemed always ready to fall be.ck and be content 
with the Vice-Presidential nomination, if that was the best that could be 
made of the situation. In the letter already mentioned, dated the fourteenth, 
and in a second letter vmich was probably written the same day but may have 
been written on the 17th of May, Polk outlines to Cave Johnson the methods 
to follow to bring about the desired results: 
••• I have but little hope that union or harmony can be restored among 
the members of Congress, but I have hope that the Delegates "fresh 
from ~ people" -- who are not members of Congress -- and have not 
been so much excited can be brought together. Let a strong appeal be 
made to the Delegates as f ast as they come in, ~ take the matter into 
their 2!!!. hands, to control and overrule their leaders at Washington, 
.!hQ. ~already produced~ distraction, and thus ~~party •••• 
I suggest as a practicable plan to bring them to act, -- to get one 
Delegate from each State who may be in attendance to meet in a room 
at Brovm' s Hotel or somewhere else and consult together to see if they 
cannot hit upon a plan to save the party. If you will quietly and 
without announcing to the public what you are at, undertake this with 
energy and prosecute it ~dth vigor, the plan is feasible, and I think 
will succeed •••• Some one has to take the lead and no one can do it 
with more prospect of success than younself. Show this to Genl. Pillow 
con~identially who will be a most efficient man in carrying out such 
a plan. My old friend Williamson Smith of Miss. is a delegate and 
will do any and everything he can. So will Turner of Alabama. In set-
ting on foot such a movement, of course you should keep your own coun-
sels, -- for if knovfn to all there would be troublesome spirits who 
would set to work to defeat it •••• 21 
20Letter of James K. Polk to Cave Johnson, May 14, 1844. Tennessee 
Historical Magazine, I, 241. 
21rbid., p. 242. 
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In the second letter written to Cave Johnson on the 14th of May, 
Polk again reaffirms that he had never aspired to anything higher than the 
Vice-Presidential nomination, but informs Johnson that if Van Buren ~~th-
draws, he, Van Buren, will still be in a position to control the nomination, 
so t hat it will be necessary to handle the Van Buren forces \rlth "delicacy" 
if the Presidential nomination is to be secured f .or Polk. He advises Johnson 
tha t Jackson has been active in his, Polk's, behalf: 
If a new man is to be selected, my friends at Nashville think that 
my position and relations to the party give me more prominence than 
any other. You will be on the spot and will be best able to jUdge. 
Whatever is desired to be done, communicate to Genl. Pillow. He is 
one of the shrewdest men you ever knew, and can execute whatever is 
resolved on with as much success as any man Who will be at Baltimore. 
Lead him therefore into all your views. He is perfectly reliable •••• 22 
The Democratic National Convention met on May 27th; Polk kept con-
stantly informed of the progress of the political maneuvers by a rapid ex-
change of letters. In particular Gideon J. Pillow, who was chairman of 
the Tennessee delegation, kept Polk informed o.f developments both prior to 
and during the convention. In these letters, Pillow assumes sole: cr.edi t; ... .for 
Polk's nomination, but as we have already observed, the idea was hatched 
at the Hermitage, and Polk himself had taken his closest political adviser, 
Cave Johnson, into his confidence in personally planning political strategy. 
It appears that the credit. for Polk's nomination must be broadly shared, 
with Genl. Pillow's chief function being that of the active contact man; 
diligently carrying out ideas and plans which, perhaps unknown to Pillow, 
had already been developed by Polk and Johnson. Nevertheless, Pillow's role 
was essential and his reporting of it to Polk provides us with an unusual 
... 22Letter of James K. Polk to Cave Johnson, May 17 _14_, 1844. 
Tennessee Historical Magazine, I, 243. 
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view of the tempo of affairs during the Democratic Convention of 1844. 
In a letter dated May 24th, Pillow demonstrates his political 
astuteness and for the first time mentions Polk as a possible Presidential 
candidate: 
Dear Govr. Washington, May 24, 1844 
Since my l ast letter to you our troubles have increased. The 
anti-Van Buren party are becoming stronger and though Van can get, 
agreeably to the best estimates I can make, about 145 votes iP con-
vention, yet I fear the Two thirds rule will ~ adopted •••• [Van 
Buren received 146 votes on the first ballot.j ••• I regard every-
thing as thrown into confusion and uncertainty. I would not still 
~e surpri~d if a compromise were finally made by both parties 
Lfactions_J taking you up, for the P • This I give as 
a :g,ossibili ty.25 
The following series of quotations from letters of General Pillow 
to Polk provide better than any other account the excitement and strategy 
of Polk's nomination at the Baltimore Convention: 
Washington City 
Saturday 25th. May, '44 
You have more friends here than any man in the field and if 
your name had been brought before the Country for the first place, 
we would have far more unanimity.... Things may ta.."ke that turn yet. 
We of the South cannot bring ~ matter Jm.• If it should be done 
by the North it will all work right •••• 24 
May 28th, 1 44 
My dear Sir 
We have been all day engaged balloti~ for Candidates for Pres-
ident. We commei:\ced at 149 for Van [146_J and 82 for Cass. After 
6 Ballotings we now stand 99 for Van anA 116 for Cass -- 52 for ~ohnson and 55 for Buckhannon [Buchananj. We have for 2 hours past 
had the most extraordinary excitement in convention. The Whole 
Convention had well-nigh got into a general pel-mell fight. The 
Ohio Delegation produced it all. At this moment the excitement is 
still wholly ungovernable by the Chair. If the balloting continues 
the chances will be for the nomination of Cass judging from the 
present vote. The V B men will not go for Cass and the Buckhannon 
25r.etter of Gideon Pillow to James K. Polk, May 24, 1844. American 
Historical Review XI, 1905-1906 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1906), p. 857. 
24rbid., May 25, 1844, P• 859. 
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men say they won't. I doubt very much if Cass can ever get ~3 of 
the votes. I have within the last few minutes received a proposition 
from a leading delegate of the Pennsylvanie. and of Ma.ssachusetts to 
bring your name before the Convention for President. I said to them 
that your name was subject to the will of the Convention, that I 
would not at present bring it before the Convention, that if it was 
the will afthe Convention the name should be brought out by the North. 
There is, I think, a strong probability of your name ultimately 
coming up for President. I do not think it prudent to move in that 
matter now. I want the North to bring you forward as a Compromise of 
all interests. 
Time will alone tell what will be done. You shall hear from us. 
We are about adjourning and it is night. 
Yours, 
Gid. J. Pillow25 
~altimore] May 29, 1844 
Dear Govr. 
On this morning we brought your name before the Convention for 
the Presidency. On the first bal lot you received 42 votes -- on 
the 2nd. you received 266 votes, being every vote in the Convention •••• 
Never was there such unanimity - - never was there such enthusiasm 
before seen or witnessed in ~ body. I held you up before the Con-
vention, as the "Olive Branch of Peace," and all parties ran to you 
~to !ill ark of safety.26 
Pillow faithfully reports the results and the excitement of the 
Convention. Only a few additional words need be said on Polk's nomination. 
The first vote that actually sealed Van Buren's fate was the vote on a mo-
tion introduced by General Saunders of North Carolina requiring a t wo-thirds 
vote for the nomination. The importance of this motion was easily appar-
ent, for if it were defeated Van Buren was certain to be nominated, but if 
the motion carried t here was the chance that he might be defeated. The 
motion carried by a vote of 148 to 118. It is ironical that the t wo-thirds 
rule which was instituted in 1852 for Van Buren's benefit, to demonstrate to 
the country that Van Buren was not dictated to the Convention by Andrew 
25 Ibid·, ~ay 28, 1844, pp. 840-841. 
26:rbid., May 29, 1844, pp. 841-842. 
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Jackson but was the overwhelming desire of the party at large, should now 
be turned against him. It was not until the eighth ballot when the dele-
gation from New Hampshire was polled that Polk received his first Conven-
tion vote. It did not appear that the ninth ballot would be conclusive 
until New York State was called upon; at that time they requested permission 
to retire to caucus. The roll call continued during their absence, but 
upon their return, B. F. Butler addressed the Convention and ~Qthdrew Van 
Buren's name in the interest of harmony and cast the vote of New York for 
James K. Polk. This was the signal for the stampede, as delegation after 
delegation rushed to change their vote so that they might demonstrate 
their loyalty to the new winner. A scene that has been constantly repeated 
in conventions since that day. Thus was completed the nomination of the 
first "dark horse" in American politics. 27 Frazer, a delegate from Pennsyl-
vania, probably. best stated the motivation of the individual delegate when 
he informed the Convention that he had voted first for Van Buren as in-
structed, and next for Buchanan as a favorite son, and that finally he had 
voted for "James K. Polk, the bosom friend of Gen. Jackson, and a pure, 
whole-hogged democrat •••• n28 
The campaign began almost at once, for in Polk's acceptance of the 
nomination he stole one of the Whigs' main issues by disclaiming any inten-
tion of seeking a second term. 
27For various descriptions of the Democrs.tic Convention of 1844 see: 
Niles Register, June 1, 1844; Edward Stanwood, ! History Qf the Presidency 
from 1788 to 1897 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1898), PP• 206-225; and 
A. K. McClure, Our Presidents and H.Q![ We Make 1b&m (New York: Harper & 
Bros., Publishers, 1909), pp. 75-95. 
2~cCormic, .2:2• cit., P• 236. 
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It has been well observed, that the office of President of the United 
States should never be sought nor declined. I have never sought it, 
nor shall I feel at liberty to decline it, if conferred upon me by 
the voluntary suff r age of my fellow citizens •••• I deem the present 
to be a proper occasion to decle.re, that if the nomination made by the 
convention shall be confirmed by the people, and result in my election, 
I shall enter upon the discharge of the high and solemn duties of the 
office with the settled purpose of not being a candidate for reelec-
tion •••• 29 
The Whig p::J.atform contained only four resolutions. The first pro-
claimed in general terms the fact that Clay and Frelinghuysen were dedi-
cated to the principles of the Whig party. The last two ra:oolutions were 
respectively eulogies of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential cancii-
dates; only the second resolution outlined the principles of the party: 
Resolved, That these principles may be summed as comprising: A 
well-regulated currency; a tariff for revenue to defray the neces-
sary expenses of the government, end discriminating with special 
reference to the protection of the domestic labor of the country; 
the distribution of the proceeds from the sales of the public lands; 
a single term for the presidency; a reform of executive usurpations; 
and generally such an administration of the affairs of the country 
as shall impart to every branch of the public service the greatest 
practical efficiency, controlled by a well-regulated wise economy.50 
In contrast to this brief statement of principle the Democra.ts 
adopted a lengthy series of resolutions, including the readoption of the 
nine planks in the Democratic platform of 1840. The first resolution 
indicated that the Democratic rancor over the way in which the campaign 
of 1840 had been fought still existed. 
Resolved, That the American Democracy place ·their trust, not in 
factitious symbols, not in displays and appeals insulting to the 
judgment and subversive of the intellect of the people, but in a 
clear reliance upon the intelligence, patriotism, and the discrim-
inating justice of the American people.51 
29Jenkins, Q2• ~., p. 155; quoting James K. Polk, Letter of 
Acceptance, June 12, 1844. 
50 
Stanwood, 22• cit., pp. 220-221. 5~bid., p. 215. 
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The Democrats had no complaint to make on the seriousness of the campaign 
of 1844; for there have been few campaigns in history where the issues were 
more clearly drawn or where the opponents were more representative of the 
divergent viewpoints of the t wo parties. It was in the final plank of the 
Democratic platform, however, that the new and decisive issues were clearly 
stated: 
Resol ve.d, That our title to the whole of the terri tory of Oregon is 
clear and unquestionable; that no portion of the same ought to be 
ceded to England or any other power; and that the reoccupation of 
Oregon and the re-annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable 
period are great American measures, which this convention recommends 
to the cordial support of the Democracy of the Union.52 
The Democrats were to make the most of this final plank during their cam-
paign, and by joining the Oregon question with the annexation of Texas 
were able to unite both the North and the South. In addi tioh to these 
two issues, Polk stressed two others, the independent treasury and the 
tariff. 
On the tariff question, as was the custom of the time, Polk wrote 
a letter to J. K. Kane which was carefully drafted for publication purposes. 
Although Polk was, and his record bore it out, a low tariff man, he wrote 
his Kane letter in such a manner that if a protectionist was anxious to mis-
construe the letter in favor of protection he could do so; while at the 
same time there was really nothing inconsistent in the letter that Polk 
might later have to retract. It is significant that the letter was ad-
dressed to J. K. Kane of Philadelphia, for Pennsylvania was one of the 
doubtful states "1lich favored a protectionist policy. Polk's instructions 
5~., pp. 215-216. 
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accompanying the letter indicated his awareness of the importance of this 
letter.33 The significant paragraph of this letter is as follows: 
I am in favor of a tariff for revenue, such a one as will yield a 
sufficient amount to the Treasury to defray the expenses of the 
Government economically administered. In adjusting the details of 
a revenue tariff, I have heretofore sanctioned such moderate dis-
criminating duties, as would produce .the amount of revenue needed, 
and at the same time afford reasonable incidental protection to 
our home industries •••• In my judgment, it is the duty of the 
government, to extend as far as it may be practicable to do so, by 
its revenue laws and all other means within its power, fair and 
just protection to all the great interests of the whole Union, em-
bracing agriculture, commerce and navigation.34 
The Democratic Convention too had assisted in holding the State of Penn-
sylvania., nomins.ting for its Vice-Presidential candidate, after Senator 
Wright of New York rejected the nomination, George M. Dallas of Pennsyl-
vania. In any event, between the carefully worded Kane letter of Polk 
and the hard campaigning of Dallas and Buchanan, Pennsylvania went Demo-
cratic by 6,000 votes out of a total of over 350,000 cast. 
Another difficulty which the Democrats were to overcome was the 
independent candidacy of President Tyler. R. J. Walker, an early supporter 
of Polk, soon saw the danger of Tyler drawing Democratic votes from Polk 
and sounded out Tyler on a possible withdrawal. Tyler informed Walker that 
he had considered withdrawing but resented the attacks upon him and his 
administration in the Democratic papers, especially the Washington Union.35 
35ni have addressed a letter upon that subject to Ron. John K. Kane 
of Philadelphia, with a request that he would show it to Mr. Dallas and Mr. 
Horn, and if i~ their judgment it was absolutely necessary, they were at 
liberty to publish it, but not otherwise." Letter of James K. Polk to Cave 
Johnson, June 21, 1844, Tennessee Historical Magazine, I, 245. 
54Letter of James K. Polk to Hon. J. K. Kane, June 19, 1844 (Polk 
Paper.s., Library of Congress). Generally known as the "Kane Letter." Later 
Kane was appointed District Judge of Easton, Pa.: Polk to John K. Kane, 
Jan. 11, 1846 (~Papers, Library of Congress}. 
5~etter of R. J. Walker to Polk, July 10, 1844 (Polk Papers, 
Library of Congress). 
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When Polk learned of this he i'ITlJllediately conte.cted General Jackson request-
ing his help in silencing the Democratic attacks on Tyler.56 Jackson i~~ed-
iately took action which was joined by a chorus of pressure upon Tyler from 
various quarters.57 And on the 20th of August, Tyler 1 s letter of withdrawal. 
Thus one more formi dable barrier to Polk1 s election was removed. 
In spite of the Democratic success in the field of campaign strat-
egy, the struggle for the election continued unabated. The Vfuigs, in a 
circular in South Carolina addressed to the voters of the Pendleton District, 
described Polk as follows: 
••• we will under no circumstances, vote for James K. Polk, having 
no confidence in him, and regarding him as wholly unworthy of the 
trust in every point of view •••• He has made no sacrifice-- per-
formed no service for his country, to entitle him to so distin-
guished a position •••• He has originated no great measures for the 
benefit of his country, nor has he evin<;:ed his adherence to any other 
political principles than his party leaders, for the time being, have 
seen fit to dictate to him •••• Having been t~~ce rejected for the 
office of Governor in his own state -- having no hold upon the confi-
dence or affections of his countrymen at home, and no talent to com-
mand respect for us abroad he is not the man for the times or for the 
Union •••• 58 
At times the campaign became really venomous. Polk was accused of 
being both a duelist and a physical coward. His ancestors were accused of 
having been disloyal Tories during the Revolution (a charge which Polk 
most bitterly opposed). It was also rumored that a gang of slaves bad been 
56tetter of James K. Polk to Jackson, July 23, 1844 (Jackson Papers, 
Library of Congress). 
57Letter of Andrew J ackson to Blair, July 26, 1844 (Jackson Papers, 
Library of Congress); see also Letter of Andrew Jackson to Lewis, July 26, 
1844; Tyler, Letters ~ Times of the Tylers, Vol. II, pp. 145-146, see also 
pp. 556-559, and 541. 
58aenry Thomas Shanks, ed., The Papers of Willie £:. Mangum (Raleigh, 
N.C., State Department of Archives and History, 1955) IV, 145. 
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seen on their way to a southern market branded with the ini tals "J. K. p. n59 
Although the election was bitterly fought in all the states, prob-
a.bly no two were more fiercely contested than Tennessee and New York. Polk 
was naturally very interested in winning his OV~-'Il state end returning Tenn-
essee to the Democratic ranks, but Clay, too, was active in winning his 
neighboring state of Tennessee. Both parties held their large rallies in 
Nashville, which were attended by the leading politicians from all sections 
of the nation. But in spite of the Democratic efforts Clay carried the 
state by 113 votes. Thus Polk became the only President in our history who 
failed to carry his own state. 
At the close of the Democratic Convention in May, the situation for 
the Democrats in the State of New York looked dark indeed. The Convention 
had hoped to regain favor in New York after having rejected Van Buren for 
Polk, by nominating the then New York Senator and staunch supporter of Van 
Buren, Silas Wright; as the Vice-Presidential candidate. But, much to the 
consternation of the delegates, Wright telegraphed back that he refused to 
accept the nomination. So, reluctantly, as it has been a~ready noted, the 
delegates turned to Mr. Dallas of Pennsylvania. Fortunately, Van Buren was 
quick to rally to Polk's aid and persuaded Silas Wright to run for Gover-
nor of New York. 40 This gave the ticket a strong leader and united all 
5~cCormic, ~· cit., p. 275. The London Times, 7 April 1846, 
reported a more visious canard -- "Presidential oath taken on a Bible 
bound in the skin of a Negro," quoted from Punch. 
4<\etter of James K. Polk to Van Buren, January 4, 1845 (Van Buren 
Papers, Library of Congress). "The disinterested and magnanimous ground 
which you so promptly assumed, had the immediate effect to reconcile the 
party to a nomination which they had not anticipated •••• My personal 
thanks are due to you for the cordial manner in which you gave your power-
ful support to my nomination, and thusly contributed so largely to my 
57 
factions. While the Democrats were reunited behind Wright and Polk, the 
~fuigs of New York State were having their difficulties. Clay attempted, 
in his Alabama letter, to hegge on his anti-Texas letter. This attempt 
to represent himself as adyocs.ting one policy in the North and another in 
the South was costly. It failed to win votes in the South, but alienated 
many northern supporters. So much so, that many were persuaded to support 
the abolitionist candidate, James G. Birney, of New York. The final vote 
gave Polk a plurality over Clay in New York State of only 5,000 votes, 
while the abolitionist candidate polled nearly 16,000. 
The loss of New York State by Clay was crucial, for Polk went on 
to win the election by 170 electoral votes to 105 for Clay; if Clay had 
carried New York, the vote would have been 141 for Clay and 134 for Polk. 
Although there were the usual cries of fraud and deceit, the elec-
tion was over. 41 The President-elect began inn:nediately to assume the 
responsibilities of his new position months before his inauguration. He 
election." Perhaps of greater interest, in the light of previous informa-
tion in this chapter, is the first paragraph of this letter of Polk's to 
Van Buren. "In the Spring of 1842, when I had the pleasure to see you 
last, I confidently anticipated that you would now occupy this position •••• 
It is scarcely necessary for me to say-- that my nomination at Baltimore 
was unsought and unexpected. Until the moment it was made it was very far 
from my thoughts, that any state of circumstances could arise, which could 
lead to such a result." 
41For example: Polk's majority in Louisiana was 699. The parish 
of Plaquemines, near New Orleans, had voted in previous years, and in 1844, 
as follows: 
Democrat Whig Democratic Majority 
1840 250 40 210 
1842 179 93 86 
1843 310 36 274 
1844 1,007 37 970 
This Democratic vote was larger than the entire white male population of 
all ages in the parish in 1840; and it took ten years ~efore the parish 
could again register half as many ~emocratic votes as Polk received. See 
Stanwood, .212.• ill·, PP• 224-225. 
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was soon to learn that the task of organizing and directing a new adminis-
tration was a formidable one . 42 
The function of this chapter has been to acquaint the reader ~~th 
Polk's attempt to secure the Presidency, and to provide a better under-
standing of Polk's character, ambitions, and his determination to be Pres-
ident in his own right. His unusual ascendancy to the office, the first 
"dark horse" President, left him in a position where he was freer than most 
men of commitments to party factions. His commitments were mostly personal 
ones to individuals such as Cave Johnson and General Pillov1, to whom Polk 
recognized his indebtedness. 
The next chapter will deal with the newly-elected President's con-
ception of his office, inclUding his relations with his cabinet and the 
executive departments. 
42For an account of the 1844 nomination and election sympathetic 
to Martin Van Buren, see James C. N. Paul, Bill ig_ the Democra cx; (Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951). 
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CHAPTER III 
POLK'S CONCEPT OF' THE PRESIDENCY 
The most essential element of Presidential authority rests in 
these t wo simple and direct declarations in the Constitution: "The execu-
tive power, shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,nl 
and ~e shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed •••• n2 With 
these two simple grants of authority the President is made responsible for 
the administration of the entire executive branch of the government. 
The constitution-makers were aware of the need for an agent who 
could bring the separate powers together and provide vigorous unified 
action. They were aware that government is a continuous action, and if the 
will of the majority is to prevail there must be unity. Perhap s the Pres-
idency may have been originally designed to be no more than a pseudo-
monarchy a presiding officer, about whom a myth of national loyalties 
could be spun. Yet included in ~~e Federalist, the chief source of con-
stitutional rationalization, is an awareness of the fact that 
A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. 
A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and 
a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, 
in practice, a bad government.5 
The leaders of the Constitutional Convention were aware that the chief 
defect of state constitutions was the weakness of the Governor. They 
knew how impotent was government by assembly, and being conservative they 
1Article II, sec. 1, clause 1. 
2Article II, sec. 5, clause l. 
5The Federalist, No. 70. 
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feared at the same time popular rule, so they provided for executive 
vigor by making the President potentially the greatest power of all. 
Alexander Hamilton, the leading advocate of a strong executive, was rea s-
onably satisfied with the constitutional results, stating, "The executive 
department ••• combines, as fax as republican principles will admit, all 
the requisites to energy.n4 Yet, even if it be true that ~~e Constitution 
provides the .President with sufficient authority to be the dominating ele-
ment of our government, it is also, nevertheless, true that this grant of 
authority must be exercised and recognized as such by the office holder. 
As someone has said, this constitutional grant is only a "hunting license," 
and what the President does with it is detennined by the times which he 
faces and his own personality. As Professor Corwin states, Presidential 
leadership is "• •• the function of two highly vs.riable factors - 'Crisis' 
and 1Perso:rudity,'" and he goes on to observe that because of this " ••• pres-
idential leadership is still ••• a. highly discontinuous feature of our con-
stitutional system."5 
In this chapter then we shall see how President James K. Pol:k 
interpreted and acted upon his grant of constitutional power; how he util-
ized his cabinet, how he administered his departments, and how he carried 
out the ceremonial functions of the office. 
That Polk was ready to assume t he responsibilities of the of fice of 
President of the United States is demonstrated by the fact that on inaug-
ural day he outlined to Bancroft the four great measures of his administration: 
4rhe Federalist, No. 77. 
5Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers (New York: 
New York University Press, 1940), P• 306. 
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the reduction of the tariff, the re-establishment of the independent treas-
ury, the settlement of the Oregon question, and the acquisition of Cali-
fornis .• 6 He had already without waiting for 6ongressional action begun to 
make choices of objectives. The inclusion of the acquisition of California 
on his list of goals disQiliosed an intent not previously indicated. 
Polk was constantly aware that he and he alone must exercise the 
powers of the Presidential office and held fast to this view throughout 
his term of office. In February 1846, Polk became annoyed a.t Buchanan 1 s 
att empt to dictate Presidential appointments and used the occasion to 
express his determination to be President in his own right. 
He [Buchanan] may differ with me in opinion on public questions, 
and when he does, having myself to bear the responsibility, I 
will control. As long as he will carry out my policy and act 
faithfully I am l'lilling tha.t he shall remain in the office of 
Secretary of State; when he ceases to do so, he must cease to 
occupy that position.... If I would yield up the Government into 
his hands and suffer him to be in effect President, ••• I have 
no doubt he would be cheerful and satisfied. This I cannot do. 7 
Although the President was determined to exercise fully the powers 
of that office, he nevertheless remained a basically h'l1l;lible and democratic 
men. So much so, that he was able to express the following sentiments 
on the fourth anniversary of his arrival in Washington to take up the 
Presidential task: 
There have been four years of incessant labour and anxiety and 
of great responsibility. I am heartily rejoiced that my term 
is so near its close. I will soon cease to be a servant and 
will become a sovereign. As a private citizen I will have no 
6 George Bancroft, nJames K. Polk," Appleton 1 s Cyclopedia of Ameri-
.£§!l Biograph;y,:, V, 55. See also Bj:}lte·:.t ;-: a1 Political Cartoon entitled 
npolk's Dream.n 
?James K. Polk, Diary, ed. by Milo Mil ton Quaife, 4 volumes 
(Chicago: A.C.McClurg & Co., 1910), I, 235. Heree.fter cited as Polk, 
Diary. 
one but myself to serve, and will exercise a part of the sover-
eign power of my country. I am sure I will be happier in this 
conditioh than in the exalted station I now hold.a 
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Polk brought to the Presidency a high regard for the independency 
of the three branches of government. When a matter was before the courts, 
he could not be persuaded to utilize his influence. Ex-Governor Thomas 
of Maryland, a Democrat, argued long and hard to have the President inter-
fere and stop a federal prosecution of the Governor in the Circuit Court 
of the District of Columbia. Polk records in his reply to this attempt 
to have the President interfere in a pending case a clear statement of 
his views on the separation of powers. 
He [Polk] informed Gov. Thomas that he did not consider that he 
possessed any such power; that the Judiciary and the Executive 
were independent coordinate Departments, and that he had never 
known such a power exerted by the Executive of any State, and 
that he had never heard of it havipg been exercised by the Pres-
ident of the United States ••• [he_linquired of Gov. Thomas what 
power he would have to enforce suCh an order if he were to issue 
it? The Judges of the Court i:a this District would not be bound 
to obey him, and if they disobeyed him he would have no power to 
impose obedience;· that according to the law as he understood it, 
the Court was the exclusive Judge of the propriety of permitting 
or ordering a nolle prosequi in any case pending before them, and 
without the assent of the Court it could not be done.9 
But, when it came to making appointments to the Supreme Court, 
Polk was as much aware as has been any holder of the Presidential office 
of the influence that the Court exercises on public policy. Polk was 
very care.ful to nominate for the Court a person in whose Republican views 
he had confidence. In spite of the insistence of his Secretary of Stat e , 
Polk refused to nominate another in whom he did not have confidence. In 
this instance, Polk once again demonstrated his determination to be master 
Bpolk, Diary, IV, 351-552. Spolk, Diary, I, 51-52. 
in his own house • 
• • • in reference to the Judgeship I was responsible to the country 
for the appointment and did not select Mr. B.'s choice. He was 
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most anxious to have Mr. John M. Read of Phila. appointed. Mr. Read, 
I learned, was until within 10 or 12 years ago a leading Federalist, 
and a Representative of that party in the Legislature. Although he 
has since that time acted with the Democratic party, I have no con-
fidence in the orthodoxy of his political opinions or constitutional 
doctrines, and was therefore unwilling to appoint him to a station 
for life where he would almost certainly relapse into his old Federal 
Doctrines & been latitudinarian in his doctrines. I have never known 
an instance of a Federalist who had after arriving at the age of BO 
professed to change his opinions, who was to be relied on in his con-
stitutional opinions. All of whom have been appointed to the Supreme 
Court Bench, after having secured a place for life became very broadly 
Federal and latitUdinarian in all their decisions involving questions 
of Constitutional power.... I resolved to appoint no man who was not 
an original Democrat and strict constructionist, and who would be 
less likely to relapse into the Broad Federal doctrines of Judge Mar-
shall & Judge Story.... I have great confidence that Judge George W. 
Woodward was a sound, original, and consistent democrat, of the strict 
construction school, that he was a man of fine talents & well quali-
fied.lO 
That Polk was a fine judge of character is indicated by the fact 
that Mr. Read in his later life became a Free-Soil Democrat and still later 
on a Republican. 
On Christmas Day in 1845, the day after Bolk hadnominated Judge 
Woodward, Buchanan called, complaining of having had two sleepless nights 
over the Supreme Court appointment, and was particularly hurt that Woodward 
had been nominated, and that he, Buchanan, hadn't even been informed by 
the President. Polk promptly answered: 
••• that as President of the U. S. I was responsible for my appoint-
ments, and that I had a perfect right to make them without consult-
ing my Cabinet, unless I desired their advice. Mr. B. said it had 
been done by all my predecessors. I told him I did not so under-
stand it •••• I told him ••• that I •.• knew his opinion and wislies, 
that I was not satisfied with Mr. Read, had made up my mind that I 
could not appoint him and that any further consultation vnth him 
[Buchanan] in reference to Mr. Read would have been useless.ll 
lOibid., PP• 137-138. 11 lQid., pp. 144-145. 
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There are numerous testaments to Polk's strength of character, some 
evidence of which has already been given. Even the staunch ~~ig Hora ce 
Greeley pronounced him "one of the ablest men and the most powerful speaker 
in the south west.nl2 But in spite of his reputation as a strong character 
and a compelling speaker, Polk lacked persohal magnetism, he developed no 
personal following, and he confided in but a few loyal and tested personal 
friends. He was anxious to keep separate his private and his public life. 
Writing to Mr. Campbell, who was managing his Mississippi plantation, he 
said: 
I need only repeat to you my request, that as my private business 
does not concern the public, you will keep it to yourself. There 
is a great disposition vdth many persons -- to parade everything 
connected with the president whether private or not before the 
public. -- This I do not desire shall be the case.l5 
He made no display of sentiment or virtues so as to attract favorable 
attention. For example, John Stilwell Jenkins, a contemporary and biog-
rapher of Polk, quotes George Bancroft as applying the follo~~ng views 
on making a display of religious virtues to Polk: 
Religion is the very best possession in the world, and the last 
to be spoken of. It should dwell quietly in the heart, and rule 
the life; not be hawked about as a commodity; nor scoured up like 
a rusty buckler for protection; nor be worn over the shoulders 
like a blanket for defence.14 
Polk was, however, capable of displaying rare political courage 
toward his friends. One day the Ron. Felix G. McConnell, Representative 
12 ( Claude G. Bowers, Making Democracy~ Reality Memphis: Memphis 
State College Press, 1954), p.55. 
15r.etter of Polk to Campbell, July 25, 1847, in the Polk Papers, 
Library of Congress. 
14John S. Jenkins, James K,. Polk (Auburn, New York: James A. Alden, 
1851), P• 551. 
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from Alabama, called on Polk, requesting a loan of $100.00. Polk recog-
nized that he was suffering from acute alcoholism, but nevertheless 
granted him the requested loan.l5 Two days later, McConnell was found 
dead in a disreputable hotel room, a suicide. Polk was very grieved and 
wrote in his diary that McConnell "was a true democrat and a sincere friend 
of mine. nl6 Mr. Polk, accompanied by his Secretary of the Navy, JUdge 
Mason, attended his friend's funera1.17 
Polk demonstrated his tolerance and democratic faith in other ways 
as well. Not only did he defend the Mormons in their right of religious 
freedom, regardless of how absurd it might seem to him, but he also 
affirmed their right to emigrate, in words that closely parallel a recent 
Supreme Court decision.18 Polk stated: 
••• that as President of the U. S. I possessed no power to prevent 
or check their emigration; that the right of emigration or expatri-
ation was one which any citizen possessed.l9 
On one occasion Mr. Polk was confronted with a fanatical Presby-
terian minister, who, although desiring a. chaplaincy for himself, accused 
Polk of fostering Catholicism, because he, Polk, had hired three Catholic 
priests to work in Mexico with the Army. Polk denounced the Protestant 
minister soundly and expressed a strong belief in the doctrine of separa-
tion of church and state, stating: 
I told him that, thank God, under our constitution there was no 
connection between Church and State, and that in my action as 
15polk, Diary, II, 125. 16!Qid., P• 151. 17Ibig,., p. 135. 
1811This court should ••• hold squarely that it is a privilege of 
citizenship of the United States ••• to enter any state of the Union, 
either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent resi-
dence therein •••• " Edwards v. California 514 U.S. 160, 185 (1941). 
19Polk, Diary, I, 205. 
President of the U. S. I recognized no distinction of creeds in 
my appointment to office.20 
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The only other time that Polk expressed as much indignation in his 
diary was when he heard that the following remarks had been expressed by 
a Senator as the kind of discipline good for a President, namely Polk • 
• •• the only way to treat an ugly Negro who was unruly, was to 
give him a d-- n drabbing at the start, and he would lear;n to 
behave himself.2l 
Polk stated he could not "express his contempt for a Senator who could be 
capable of such coarseness and vulgarity. 111 22 
The President brought to the office a strong determination to 
make his own decisions and to be the dominating force of hi s administration. 
Thi s determination was joined with a sincere respect for the basic liberal 
traditions of our Constitution and seasoned ~~th a kindly regard for the 
wel fare of his fellow citizens. It will now be observed how these attri-
butes of mind and character operated to carry out the functions of the 
chief executive. 
The President ~ Head of the State 
The fact that the American President reigns as well as rules has 
proven to be both a liability and an asset. It has been a l iability 
because of the tr.emenious additional burden placed upon him by the require-
ment that he perform all the ceremonial functions of a monarch. 23 But an 
even more significant liability, one that is closely related to the asset 
20polk, ~iary, II, 188. 21 22 Ibid., pp.l99, 203. Ibid., p. 199. 
25rn contrast to the present-day President, who spends much of his 
time seeing delegations of Boy Scouts, veterans, etc., Polk was occupied 
in seeing delegations of Indians, exchanging gifts, and smoking peace-
pipes. 
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side of the ledger, is that because he is so honored as Chief-of-State, 
the populace come to think of him as being omnipotent and infallible; so 
much so that they tend to regard any feilure to come up to their expecta-
tions as a moral failure. What he does is judged by an absolute standard 
without regard as to Whether he has the authority necessary to carry out 
hisrresponsibilities. Sidney Hyman has characterized this dualism between 
his reigning and ruling character as follows: 
He personalizes the eternal clash between the forces that attract 
us to the seat of power and those that repel us from it; between 
the conviction that nothing can be done without power, and the 
opposite conviction that those who wield it are either unworthy 
of it or invariably misuse it.24 
On the asset side, the fact that the President reigns as well as 
rules creates a great storehouse of good will from which he can draw. 
The President personifies the national mood, its aspirations, and its 
hopes. The respect Which he gains through reigning enables him to pro-
vide the leadership necessary to a successful administration. 
Polk acd~pted the ceremonial and social functions of the position 
with good grace and held receptions t~~ce a week, on Tuesday and Friday 
evenings, as well as the usual dinners and social a.ffairs for special 
occasions. New Year's Day, for example, was always open house at the 
White House for all citizens. 
Polk was, however, careful to observe all proprieties in entering 
into social functions. After the battle of Cerro Gordo, an American 
victory, an evening had been designated by the Mayor of Washington for 
the illumination of the city to honor the victory. Polk, upon learning 
24Sidney Hyman, ~ American President (New York: Harper & 
Bros., 1954), pp. 14-15. 
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that some of the public departments were planning to illuminate their 
buildings, forbade them to do so, citing the fire danger. He did; however, 
consent to having the Presidential mansion and the residences of each of 
the department heads illuminated.25 Polk also declined to attend a dinner 
party celebrating two war heroes, Generals Quitman and Shields, claiming 
tha t there was no precedent for a President doing so, and that he didn't 
thihk it would be consistent with official propriety.26 For similar 
reasons he had earlier refused to serve on a committee to solicit funds to 
raise a statue to General Jackson, although he did make a contributron of 
the maximum amount any one person was permitted to contribute, one hund~ed 
dollars. 27 
Polk recognized a responsibi ,:i ty to invite various important persons 
to have dinner at the Presidential mansion, and often was host for leading 
Whigs as well as Democrats. In fact, he stated that he made it a policy at 
all social functions to include both Democrats and ·wb.igs among his guests.28 
He had Mr. Bancroft extend an invitation to John Quincy Adams to attend a 
dinner party; but was quite upset when Bancroft reported back that Adams 
declined to attend until the President had made some explanation of a charge 
against Adams which had been made during the campaign. Polk sta ted, "I 
would not think of inviting him to dinner; and that I had only thought of 
extending that courtesy as President of the U.S. which his age and the 
stations he had held seemed to make proper. "29 Polk did, however, entertain 
his rival in the election of 1844, Mr. Clay, and records the following banter 
2~9lk , Diary, III,p.l9. 26Ibid., P• 268. 27Ibid., I, p.24. 
2~bid., III, P• 259. 29!Qid., I, p. 151. 
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that occurred between Mr. Clay and Mrs. Polk: 
As he [Clay] was leaving he remarked to Mrs. Polk in a very pleasant 
manner that he would visit her drawing room soon, that he had heard 
a general approbation expressed of her administration, but that he 
believed there was some difference of opinion about her husband's 
administration. She replied pleasantly that she was happy to hear 
from him that her administration was approved and added, if a polit-
ical opponent of my husband is to succeed him I have always said I 
prefer you, Mr. Clay, and in that event I shall be most happy to 
surrender the White House to you.50 
That Mrs. Polk exercised considerable influence over the social 
functions of the White House is evidenced by the fac~ that Polk reports 
that two or three times he had decided to invite John Van Buren (son of 
the ex-President) to dinner only to have his decision countermanded by 
Mrs. Polk, a.nd she had, in fact, once burned John Van Buren's invitation 
to dinner, which Polk had given to his private secretary to mail.5l In 
general, though, Mrs. Polk enjoyed an enviable record as White House host-
ess and many of the occasions were quite lively affairs. Polk records his 
special pleasure in waiting on Mrs. Alexander Hamilton, who Polk found even 
at 88 to be intelligent and very interesting. 52 Another distinguished 
guest of the Vl'hi te House was Mrs. Madison. 35 
The President had a high regard for the interest of historians in 
the Presidency. There are only two occasions recorded in the Polk Papers 
on vmich Polk wrote to ex-President John Tyler. On the first occasion 
Polk informed Tyler that he had discovered a paper belonging to Tyler and 
was returning it to him. The President hastened to add that he had not 
read the paper except to note that it belonged to Tyler.54 The second 
50Ibid., III 2:26 
' P• '"' • 
51Ibid., IV, p. 245-246. 52rbid., I, p.226. 
35:!Qid., IV, P· 21:6. 
34polk to John Tyler, November 11, 1848. (Polk Papers, Library of 
Congress. 
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instance occurred when Polk was packing in preparation for leaving the 
White House. The President had discovered "The Journal of Major George 
Washington," which had belonged to Tyler and Polk returned it to him.35 
Polk records a most amusiDg conversation he held upon the subject 
of hand-shaking, which reveals him to have had quite a sense of humor and 
a mind that analyzed the smallest incident. 
I told them that I had found that there was great art in shaking 
hands, and that I could shake. hands during the whole day vd.thout 
suffering any bad effects from it. They were curious to know what 
this art was. I told them that if a man surrendered his arm to be 
shaken, by some horizontally, by others perpendicularly, and by 
others aga.in with a strong grip, he could not fail to suffer 
severely from it, but that if he would shake and not be shaken, grip 
and not be gripped, taking care s~ways to squeeze the hand of his 
adversary as hard as he squeezed him, that he suffered no incon-
venience from it. I told them also that I could generally antici-
pa~e \Vhen I was to have a strong grip, and that when I observed a 
strong man approaching I generally took advantage of him by being 
a little ·quicker than he was and seizing him by the tip of his 
fingers, giving him a hearty shruce, and thus preventing him from 
getting a full grip upon me. They were much amused at my account 
of the operation, \mich I give lgave] to them playfully, but ad-
mitted that there was much philosophy in it. But though I gave my 
account of the operation playfully, it is all true.36 
Polk did not, however~ care for the formal reception of credentials 
from foreign emissaries or formal announcements of roys.l births, which he 
found at best amusing and at l'rorst quite contrary to his democratic beliefs. 
Polk remarked how one minister had described in such detail the birth of 
a royal heir that one must have supposed that the minister had been the 
attending physician or midwife. 57 On another occasion when a new minister 
delivered his credentials and addressed Polk in French, a language Polk 
didn't understand, Polk replied in English without waiting for the minis-
ter's remarks to be translated. \\'hen a~sured by the translator that his 
BSpolk to John Tyler, Feb. 27,1849, (Polk Pape!:£?., Library of Congress. 
BSpolk, Diarl, IV, 264. 57~bid., II, 215-216. 
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remarks were proper, Polk stated that he had he~rd the same speech from 
foreign ministers so many times that he didn't need a translation in order 
to make the proper reply. 58 To express his contempt for diplomatic eti-
quette and ceremony, Polk records the following anecdOte about Mr. Jeffer-
son: 
An anecdote is told of Mr. Jefferson to the effect that the French 
minister, whom he invited to Dinner with the Diplomatic corps, had 
taken offence because he had not been assigned his proper place at 
the table. Mr. Jefferson had been informed that he was dissatisfied 
& that he intended to call foran explanation. ~bile in his office 
his porter announced to him that the French minister was in waiting. 
Mr. Jefferson was in his shirt sleeves but said promptly, show him in. 
The French minister entered in State attired in his Court dress & 
found Mr. Jefferson with one foot up in the act of drawing on his 
boot. Mr. Jefferson turned his head as he entered & said, "Come in, 
Sir; we have no ceremonies here." -The Frenchman was astonished, sat 
a few minutes & retired [without] making known his business, and 
afterwards said it was useless to raiseany question of etiquette 
or ceremony with such a people.39 
One further incident is worthy of reporting because it furnishes 
an example of both Polk's democr~ ... tic character and his sense of humor. Polk 
received a missionary from China who was accompanied by a Chinese youth. 
Polk records the close of the meeting as follows: 
On taking leave of him, [the Cl)inese youth] and while shaking hands, 
he expressed in his own language, which was interpreted by Mr. Dean, 
that he had seen the King of this country, and said he would tell it 
to his countrymen when he got home. I told him through Mr. Dean 
that there was no king in this country, but that he had seen a citizen 
who had been chosen by the people to manage the Government for a 
limited time. This was explained to him by Mr. Dean, but I am not sure 
that he comprehended it •••• He afterwards called on Mrs. Polk in the 
parlour •••• I understood that he had said to her, he was glad he had 
seen the Queen.40 
The Presiden.:t_ !'i§. Administrative Head 
One of the first problems to beset e. President, a problem faced 
38rbid., P• 285. 59rbid., P• 175. 40Ibid., I, p. 257-258. 
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even before he takes the oath of office, is the selection of those of fic-
ials who will compose his family of personal adyisers, the cabinet. The 
cabinet forms the top pyramid in the administrative structure, with the 
chief executive located at its apex. The cabinet serves a dual func~ion 
for the President, acting as subordinate administrative officers concern-
ing themselves with the details of day-to-day execution of governmental 
policy in their respective departments; and also comprising a council of 
advisers on questions of highest policy. 
~~ile it is true that there are few legalistic barriers to limit 
the choice of Presidential selection, the most noticeable restriction 
being that which forbids the appointment of members of the legislative':~ 
branch to cabinet posts, and since the decisions made by the President 
are for the most part discretionary in nature, it has been generally 
accepted that the Senate ought not to turn do·wn the President's selections. 
Yet there does exist in another sense a severe restriction upon the Pres-
ident's range of choice. Mr. Laski has noted some of the practical guides 
the President must follow in selecting his cabinet. 
He must have one or two men iiDO are likely to be influential with 
Congress •••• One, at least, must be a person directly expert in 
the handling of the party machine •••• There ought to be repre-
sentatives of the territorial sections of the country •••• There 
ought, desirably, to be representatives of the predominant relig-
ions of the United States.... A president has also to pay for 
his nomination and election.41 
And in such a way Polk too was similarly restricted in his selections for 
his cabinet. 
Prior to his a.rri val in Washington for the inauguration he had 
41Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency (London: Harper & 
Bros., 1940), pp. 78-80. 
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already been considering the problem of selecting a cabinet, but with his 
usual caution he refused to disclose his intentions, even in a letter to his 
closest adviser, Cave Johnson. 42 One of the first tasks which confronted 
Polk was how to bring harmony to the party, especially how to placate the 
feelings of New York, still bitter about his victory over Van Buren in 
the Democratic Convention. Polk therefore offered to Silas Wright the posi-
tion of Secretary of the Treasury, which position, because of the signifi-
cance of the tariff and the independent treasury issues, Polk considered 
the most important post. Wright declined the post, stressing his obligation 
as the newly elected Governor of New York. Both Wright and Van Buren did, 
however, press the claim of Benjamin F. Butler for one of the two top posi-
tions, either State or Treasury. In the meantime, however, Polk had filled 
these two places in his cabinet. Still endeavoring to satisfy the New York 
Democrats, he did offer Butler on the 25th of February the position of Sec-
reta.ry of War, which Butler promptly refused as beneath his dignity. Polk 
had by this time become somewhat impatient about trying to satisfy the 
Van Buren faction in New York and, acting on suggestions made earlier by 
Senators Dix and Dickson of New York, he tendered the War office to William 
L. Marcy, who promptly accepted.45 One ~Titer has recently described the 
selection of Marcy over the objections of Van Buren as the final cause of 
42r,etter of James K. Polk to Cave Johnson, December 21, 1844, as 
published in the Tennessee Historical Magazine, Vol. I, 1915, "The Polk-
Johnson Letters, 1835-1848," p. 254. 
4~cCormac, !m• cit., PP• 291-299. See also H. Barrett Learned, 
The Sequence of Appointments to Polk's Original Cabinet: A Study in 
Chronology, 1844-1845," American Historical Review, Vol. XXX, 1924, 
pp. 72-76. 
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the break between Van Buren and Polk.44 
The balance of the appointments was somevvhs.t easier to make, and 
Polk achieved a final composite picture of which Laski would have approved. 
Of the six members of Polk's cabinet, three were ex-Congressmen: Buchanan, 
Secretary of State, and Walker, Secretary of the Treasury, had been Sena-
tors; Cave Johnson, Postmaster General, had been a member of the House. 
The latter, CB.ve Johnson, occupying the traditional position for the cab-
inet politician, was Polk's chief political adviser both prior to and after 
his election. The geographical distribution was excellent: William L. 
Marcy, Secretary of War, represented New York; George Bancroft, Secretary 
of the Navy, represent ed New England; George Mason, Attorney General, repre-
sented Virginia; James Walker, Secretary of the Treasury, the deep South, 
Mississippi~ and James Buchanan and Cave Johnson, Pennsylvania and Tennessee, 
respectively. On the political front we have seen that, although through no 
lack of effort on Polk's part, he failed to satisfy the Van Buren f action in 
New York. He did, however, placate the t wo factions of Pennsylvania, by 
countering the selection of the leader of one, George M. Dallas, as Vice-
President, by selecting the leader of the other faction, Buchanan, to be 
Secretary of State. He also mtillified the Tylerites b,y the retention of 
John Mason in his cabinet, which also coincided with the desire of Polk, and 
of every President, who is after all a very lonely man, to have one close 
personal friend in the cabinet. Mason and Polk had attended the University 
of North Carolina together. 
44Joseph G. Rayback, 11Martin Van Buren's Break with James K. Polk: 
The Record. 11 New York State Histor~, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, January 1955, 
pp. 51-63. (The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Associ-
ation.) 
Polk's success in forming a cabinet was recognized abroad. The 
London Times observed, 
They are highly respectable citizens and I have no doubt ~~ll gen-
erally prove efficient public officers. Nor are they distinguiShed 
as leaders of either of the great cliques. In this particular the 
selection, to say the least of it, is judicious.45 
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After Polk took over the reins of the Presidency, he made extensive 
use of his cabinet, particularly on matters of policy. Polk held cabinet 
meetings twice a week, on Tuesday and Saturday, and his diary records over 
400 such meetings. During 1846, the President noted 114 cabinet meetings 
in his diary, for in addition to the regular meetings, he quite frequently 
called "special" meetings, even on Sunday, although the Sunday meetings 
never passed without a word of regret being recorded that the pressure of 
work had necessitated holding a meeting on the Sabbath. He also expected 
every member of the cabinet to be present at a cabinet meeting, advising 
them in a general notice sent to each cabinet member that: 
I disapprove the practice which has sometime prevailed, of Cabinet 
officers absenting themselves for long periods of time from the 
seat of Government ••• 46 
And when Robert J. Walker absented himself from Washington without receiv-
ing prior approval of the President, Polk recorded the following evidence 
of his disapproval: 
45 London Times, April 10, 1845, p. 6, col. 1. 
46 James Buchanan, The Works of James Buchanan, ed. John Bassett 
Moore (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1909), VI, p. 110-111. See also 
draft of a letter of President Polk dated January 15, 1845 which was to be 
sent to each cabinet appointee, stating that he, President Polk, expected 
to remain in Washington the ~~ole year around and expected his cabinet 
members to do the same. (Polk Papers, Library of Congress.) Polk continued 
the same practice in appointing Clifford Attorney General in 1847. Letter 
of Polk to Clifford September 50, 1847. (Polk Papers, Library of Congress.) 
I cannot understand the necessity of all this secrecy and mystery 
in the movements of the Secretary, and still less can I understand 
why he should have left the City on public business of so much 
importance without at least advising me of it, if not consulting 
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me before he left. I am wholly at a loss to understand the neces-
sity of such a movement. There could have been no necessity to 
conceal it from me. How it happened that his note to me, without 
date, was not delivered until noon to-day remains to be explained.47 
Polk, contrary to the accepted view of the use of the cabinet, did 
encourage a mutual sharing of opinion and views. That is to say, for 
example, that if the matter at hand were chiefly a money matter he encour-
aged all members of the cabinet, not only the Secretary of the Treasury, 
to partake in the discussion, and often gave equal weight to the contri-
butions of the other members of the cabinet.48 
He also utilized the cabinet to consider about every weighty topic 
with which his administration was confronted. His diary shows that the 
cabinet discussed in great detail the conduct of the Mexican War, the 
Oregon Boundary Dispute, tariff legislation, and a host of other items. 
He did not, however, in contrast to the position assumed by Washington, 
feel bound to oonsult the cabinet: 
I did not consult the Cabinet to ascertain their opinions of the 
subject. Having made up my mind that I could not sign the Bill 
under any circumstances, it was unnecessary to consult the Cabinet 
on the subject.49 
Nor did he feel bound, having consulted them, to obey or follow their 
judgment. 50 He did, however, feel an obligation to inform the cabinet of 
his decisions: 
On reflection I considered the proposed mediation of Great 
Britain between the U. S. & Mexico, with a view to effect an 
47Polk, Diary, II, 166. 
50 Ibid., PP• 156-157. 
4~bid., pp. 194-195. 49Ibid., p. 58. 
honorable peace between them, of sufficient consequency to con-
sult the Cabinet in reference to it. Although my Ol m mind was 
made up to reject the proffered mediation, I considered it 
respectful to inform the Cabinet of it.51 
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This is not meant to imply that Polk never listened to, acted upon, 
or delayed acting upon the advice of his cabinet. On the contrary, although 
always the master, he found great value in his cabinet discussion, gener-
ally pursuing the policy of wa.i ting for a con census of opinion. In order 
to induce a concensus, Polk felt it was poor policy to request written 
opinions from his cabinet. 
I have never called for any written opinion from my Cabinet, pre-
ferring to take their opinions, after discussion in Cabinet & in 
the presence of each other. In this way harmony of opihion is 
more likely to exist.52 
Polk was able, however, to enforce harmony if the occasion called 
for it, and probably more than any other American President he insisted 
upon "joint cabinet responsibility" for measures arrived at during cabinet 
discussions. 
The two following selections from the President's diary illustrate 
his insistence on cabinet responsibility: 
••• Mr. Walker said in an emphatic tone that he was in favour of sub-
mitting it to the Senate, but that he would be opposed to it unle s s 
it was understood that every member of the Cabinet would support ti1e 
measure, but that if any member o-f the Cabinet should exut an_in-
fluence in his intercourse with Senators to prevent his _their_ 
acceptance of the proposition with or without modification, he would 
be opposed to submitting it to the Senate. I interposed promptly 
and said of course if it was submitted to the Senate every member 
of the Cabinet would support the views presented in the message; and 
before the message was sent in, I remarked, there must be unanimity in 
the Cabinet in regard to it.55 
The Cabinet having all expressed their opinions, I then observed 
that the Secretary of War had communicated to the Cabinet all the 
5~., P• 131. 5~., IV, p. 131. 55polk, Diary, I, p.455. 
information which he p~·ssessed, and that we all had the same means 
of judging of the propriety of the proposed call that he had. I 
stated that I was in favour of the call, and that I did not base 
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my opinion upon that of the Secretary of War, but upon the facts 
which were in the knowledge of every member of the Cabinet. I did 
not think that the Secretary of War should be held solely respons-
ible for the measure because every member of the Cabinet possessed 
the same information which he did, and had the same means of judging 
which he ha.d. I thought therefore that each member of the Cabinet 
should take his own full responsibility, and not escape that respons-
ibility by saying that he yielded his as sent to the .call because 
the Secretary of War thought it necessary.... It was then unanimously 
agreed that nine additional Regiments to serve during the War should 
be called for from the States.54 
Although Polk was master of his cabinet and allowed no dissent from 
the position of the administration, he did at the same time act with com-
passion toward his cabinet members. On one occasion he was successful in 
persuading his Attorney General, Clifford, not to resign from the cabinet. 
I think Mr. Clifford an honest man and a sincere friend. He feels 
in his new position somewhat timid, fears that he will not be able 
to sustain the reputation of his predecessors, and had therefore 
brought himself to the conclusion that he had better resign. He 
finally concluded not to tender his resignation, and retired, appar-
ently well satisfied at the interview I held with him. 55 
When he felt, however, that .one of his cabinet members had overstepped the 
bounds of his authority, he could be quite firm in insisting that the member 
confine himself to his proper sphere of authority. For example, Polk rebuked 
his Secretary of the Treasury in no uncertain terms, as follows: 
In drawing the paper he seemed to have acted as though it was part 
of his duty as Secretary of the Treasury to regulate a tariff of 
duties in Mexican ports.... I disapproved the paper. The members 
of the Cabinet were backward in expressing their opinions, though 
it was manifest they disapproved it also. I told the Secretary of 
the Treasury that I would address an order to him in the form of an 
order, and would request him to respond in his report simply to the 
enquiries I might make •••• In disapproving it I endeavored & I think 
succeeded in avoiding to wound his feelings of self-esteem.56 
54Ibid., 
5~bid., 
of Congress. 
II, p. 255. 55rbid., P• 275. 
p. 442; Polk to Walker, March 24, 1847. Polk Papers, Library 
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And on another occasion Polk again insisted that his Secretary of t he 
Treasury alter his report so that it would conform with the President's: 
I finally said to Mr. Walker that by law he made his Report to 
Congress and not to the President, but, though this was so, the 
country would hold the President responsible for it. I told him 
I had in my message very fully considered the Mexican war. & our 
future policy ••• that I thought if he took up the !O!Ubject-.~ . ~ it 
would place me in a very embarra s sing condition; that I would 
be charged with holding one policy in the message and causing my 
Secretary of the Treasury to hold another in his Report ••• and that 
I had done this in order to avoid my proper responsibility. Mr. 
Walker said that he had merely submitted the paper for considera-
tion, and that he would not insert it in his Report. The truth is 
it was Wholly out of place in a financial Report.57 
One of the virtues of the American President, as Hamilton pointed 
out so clearly, is unity in the executive. Hamilton went on to observe that 
unity in the executive may be des~royed if, although vested ostensibly in 
one man, it may be controlled or subverted qy another who is supposedly 
acting in the capacity of an adviser.58 Polk early recognized the wisdom 
of that dictum and endeavored to prevent any of his cabinet rivaling him-
self as the leader or dominant figure in the administration. He also 
accurately observed that no one who was a candidate for the Presidency 
could give the type of objective advice that was expected from an adviser. 
"It is a great misfortune that a member of the Cabinet should be an aspir-
ant for the Presidency, because I cannot rely upon his honest and disinter-
ested advice •••• a59 Toward the latter part of his term in office, Polk 
had occasion to reiterate the views just expressed: "No candidate for the 
presidency ought ever to remain in the Cabinet. He is an unsafe advisor. 1160 
Polk hs.d attempted, albeit without complete success, to guard against 
57 Polk, DiarY, III, p. 241-242. 58 ~Federalist, No. 70. 
59 Polk, Diary, I, p.297. 60 Ibid., III, p. 550. 
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the very dangers he noted above, for before he took office he drafted a 
letter which was sent to every person ivhom he invited to join his ca.binet, 
the pertinent part of which reads as follows: 
Should any member of my Cabinet become a candidate or an aspirant 
to the Presidency,or Vice Presidency, of the United States, -- it 
will be expected upon the happening of such an event, that he will 
retire from the Cabinet •••• 
If sir: you concur with me in these opinions and views, I shall 
be pleased to have your assistance as a member of my Cabinet: and 
now tender you the office of and invite you to take 
charge of the Department.61 
Indeed it was no accident that Polk was the dominant factor of his 
administration, nor should it be surprisigg that loyalty to the adminis-
tration and himself should be a paramount virtue with him. 
But, in spite of the precautions which Polk undertook to insure 
administrative loyalty, he was continually troubled by what he felt was 
disloyalty on the part of the cabinet. In particular he suspected his 
Secretary of State of both leaking confidential information to the press62 
and opposing administrative measures which were before the Congress, 65 and 
although Polk threatened upon a number of occasions to dismiss anyone from 
61 Buchanan, Works, VI, p. 110-111; draft of a letter dated January 
15, 1845 by Polk to be sent to all cabinet appointees. PoL~ Papers, Libr-
ary of Congress. 
62polk, Diary, II, p. 482; Polk was very angry vhen he learned that 
the secrets of the Trist mission had been published in the New York Herald. 
See<:,New York Herald, April 20, 1847; see also Polk, Diary, III, p. 354 ff; 
and Polk:-Diarx, III, p. 596 ff, Polk learns that confidential message de-
livered to the Senate in Executive Session has appeared in the New York 
Herald, see ~ York Heral~, March 22, 1848. 
6Brolk, Dia:r,y, I, p. 185-195. Polk feels that Buchanan has opposed 
and worked against the confirmation of a Presidential appointment to the 
Supreme Court. See also Pollc, Diary, I, p. 261, Polk feels that Buchanan 
has worked against the passage of the administration's tariff legislation. 
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the cabinet who was found to be disloyal,64 he never brought himself to 
carry out his threats. 
During the last days of Polk's administration there occurred much 
discussion among the cabinet, including President Polk, over the manner 
in which the reins of government might be turned over to Mr. Taylor. PoD<: 
insisted that the cabinet should resign to him, although if their individual 
consciences required that they continue to .perform the duties of their office 
until Taylor had named a successor, they were free to do so, but it was 
apparent that Polk was pleased when his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Walker, 
stated that he was unwilling to serve even for a day under Mr. Taylor. 
On another matter of the transition from his Presidency to that of 
Taylor's Polk was quite adamant. When Buchanan inquired if the cabinet 
shouldn't call upon the President-Elect to pay their respects, Polk replied 
with vigor: 
••• if my Cabinet called on Gen 11 Taylor before he called on me, I 
should feel that I had been deserted by my own politica.l family. 
I stated that it might be that Gen'l Taylor would not call at all, 
and in that event if my Cabinet called on him it would place me in 
a position which it would be unpleasant to occupy.65 
64rbid., p. 196. 11 ••• if I found that any member of my Cabinet gave 
countenance to a factious minority of the Democratic Senators to unite 
with the Whigs in making war on my administration by rejecting my nomina-
tions, he would find me a lion in his path, and that I would not submit to 
it, whatever the consequences might be." See also Pollc, Diary, I, p. 187 
and 255. In the latter instance Polk clearly states hi s views of Buchanan 
and under what conditions he has kept Buchanan in office: "As long as he 
will carry out my policy and act faithfully I am willing he shall remain 
in the office of Secretary of State; when he ceases to do so, he must cease 
to occupy that position. His melancholy and dissatisfied manner and con-
versation is already embarrassing to the public interest, and is becoming 
exceedingly disagreeable to me. I will bear and forbear much in the hope 
that he may consider better of his course." 
65 Polk, Diary, IV, p.350. 
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All of the cabinet gave assurances, except Mr. Buchanan, that they would 
not call upon Taylor until after he had called on Polk. Polk delivered 
in his diary what most historians would probably regard as an apt su~ary 
of Buchanan's character: "Mr. Buchanan is an able man, but is in small 
matters without judgment and sometimes acts like an old maid.n66 Polk 
succeeded in keeping his cabinet closely allied until the very end, all 
of them calling upon him at his hotel after the inaugural parade; Mr. 
Buchanan, Mr. and Mrs. Marcy, and Mr. and Mrs. Mason accompanied the Polks 
to the boat, and Mr. Walker joined him on board to journey with the Folks 
as far as New Orleans. 
~ Direction of Departmental Affairs 
If one of the chief reasons why the executive branch has come to 
dominate the other two branches of the government is that it is the branch 
which has the knowledge of public affairs, that is, it has the day-to-day 
experience with administrative detail that places it in a position to lcnow 
what is needed and where the weaknesses lie; then, President Polk in a 
similar fashion was ~ble to dominate the entire executive branch because of 
his superior knowledge of the detailed operation o,f each component part. 
Polk was able to gain complete ascendancy and domination over all of his 
subordinates because he knew, probably as well as his department heads, 
what was happening in each department and bureau of the government. 
66rbid., p. 555; however, Philip G. Auchampaugh in his biography, 
James Buchanan and His Cabinet (Lancaster, Pa.: Privately Printed, 1926), 
p. 7, contends that Buchanan was never treated fairly by either Jackson or 
Polk and that in spite of this treatment Buchanan always defended the 
Polk administration. 
67Polk, Diary, IV, p. 576-577. 
Although Polk utilized the cabinet primarily for policy formulating, he 
did taKe the time to inquire about administrative detail. 
At each meeting of the Cabinet I learn from each member what is 
being done in his particular Department, and especially if any 
question of doubt or difficulty has srisen.68 
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That this supervision was more than an accident or the result of a 
meddlesome nature is quite apparent. To Polk it was a matter of a.dminis-
trative principle the assumption of necessary responsibility. He clearly 
stated his views on the responsibility of the President to supervise the 
operations of the government upon a number of occasions. 
The public have no idea of the constant accumulation of business 
requiring the President's attention. No President who performs 
his duty faithfully and :· conscientiously can have any leisure. If 
he entrusts the details and smaller matters to subordinates con-
stant errors will occur. I prefer to supervise the whole operations 
of the Government myself rather than entrust the public business to 
subordinates, and this makes my duties very great.69 
PolK also observed that he had become so familiar with the operation of 
the government that he preferred to manage affairs without the assistance 
of his cabinet officers. He expressed this opinion after a lapse of six 
weeks in the late summer of 1848, during which time he had never had all 
the cabinet members together in Washington at one time, but had person-
ally attended to the absent members' affairs. Probably at no other time 
in our history has the country been governed so extensively by one man. 
I have not had my full Cabinet together in council since the ad-
journment of Congress on the 14th of August last. I have con-
ducted the Government without their aid. Indeed, I have become 
so familiar with the duties and workings of the Government, not 
only upon general principles, but in most of its minute details, 
that I find but little difficulty in doing this. I have made 
myself acquainted with the duties of the subordinate officers, 
68 Ibid., P• 131. 
69 . 
I.Qid. , P• 261. 
and have probably given more attention t o details than any of 
my predecessors. It is only occasionally that a great measure 
or a new question arises, upon which I desire the aid and advice 
of my Cabinet.70 
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It would be erroneous to conclude that this period constituted a 
change in Polk's habitual use of the cabinet meeting as a means of insur-
ing conformity to administration policy. Rather it must be recalled that 
these six weeks occurred after Polk had accomplished all the major object-
ives of his administration: i.e., the Oregon boundary settlement, tariff 
reduction, the Mexican War concluded with the addition of California and 
New Mexico to the Union. Furthermore, during this period Congress was not 
in session and the national election of 1848 was imminent. Upon Congress 
reconvening in January 1849, Polk once again resumed his cabinet sessions 
in an effort to press Congress to settle the vexing question of estab-
lishing governments in the newly acquired territories. 
Not only did Polk feel a great responsibility toward the details 
of government, he also insisted that the subordinate officers hold them-
selves responsible for the operations of their offices during their absence, 
and that absences should be taken only for good and proper reason. The 
Postmaster and Naval Officer of New York City applied to Polk for leave to 
attend a Constitutional Convention in New York and Polk told them: 
••• ~hat they would be held responsible for the discharge of the 
duties of their respective offices, and that if with such responsi-
bility resting upon them I would not object to their attendance 
upon the convention, provided the public business was properly done 
and they would see that no duty was neglected and that the public 
interest did not suffer by their absence.7l 
Polk was, however, even more determined when General Shields, 
70Ibid., pp. 150-131; see also P• 120. 71 Ibid., I, P• 580. 
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Commissioner of the General Land Office, informed him that he desired to 
go West to organize and aid in bringing out volunteers for the Mexican War. 
I told Judge Shields that there was no propriety in his leaving 
his office, and that he could be of no possible use to the Govern-
ment in bringing out or organizing the volunteers. I told him 
plainly that .I thought all public officers in Washington ought to 
remain at their posts & do their duty.... I told him that I hoped 
my friends in Congress and elsewhere would suffer me to conduct 
the War with Mexico as I thought proper, and not plan the campaign 
for me & without consulting me.72 
As Harold Laski among others has accurately pointed out, under the 
American Presidential system there is no way in which the President can 
.avoid being involved in many issues which under a Parliamentary system 
would be settled further dOl\'Il the chsin of command. 75 That Polk 1ms no 
exception to the ,judgment laid down by Laski is very apparent. Two exam-
ples of his becoming involved in minor affairs are: first, he was called 
on to intervene in the method of awarding contracts for street paving in 
the District of Columbia. Polk decided tha.t it would be proper for the 
Commissioner of Public Buildings to himself employ the labor and do the 
necessary street construction, instead of awarding same on contract.74 The 
second instance occurred when some journeymen painters who were painting 
the Capitol called on Polk and asked him to decide whether the Commissioner 
of Public Buildings should pay them for wet days when they could not paint. 
In the absence of a Taft-Hartley law en,joining the payment of workers for 
work not performed, Polk advised the payment for wet days be made if that 
were the customary labor practice. He added the cynical note: "I have a 
7~., PP• 427-428. 
7~arold Laski, The Ameri~ Presidency, pp. 88-91. 
74polk, Diary, IV, p. 125. 
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suspicion t.'l1at these workmen are iVhigs •••• n7 5 
An amusing incident occurred which serves to demonstrate Polk's 
knowledge of minute departmental affairs. A diplomatic letter had been pre-
pared by the Department of State for Polk's signature. Polk observed that 
a passage in it did not conform to standard diplomatic usage and called 
Buchanan's attention to the error. Buchanan insisted that Polk was in 
error and that the form was correct. Polk offered to bet Buchanan a basket 
of champagne that he was right and that Buchanan was wrong. Buchanan 
accepted the wager and brought forth a bound letter book in which he ';stated 
there vrere precedents for the form used. After searching the letter book 
for some time, Buchanan could find no precedent and promised to deliver the 
champagne to Polk. Polk declined to accept it, stating that he had been 
only jesting. Polk states the moral of this episode to be: 11I record this 
incident for the purpose of Showing how necessary it is for me to give my 
vigilant attention even to the fOJ'JllS & details of my [subordine.tes 1] duties." 
It also served another purpose, one of which Polk was aware, although pre-
ferring not to comment, because it humiliated the haughty Buchanan in front 
of the rest of the cabinet and reminded all that Polk was the master. 76 
In the chapters which follow, it will be seen that on numerous occa-
sions President Polk also issued orders and directed the activities of minor 
administrative officials.77 That this supervision of detail caused Polk to 
76 
Ibid., III, PP• 97-99. 
77
"Several of the Heads of Bureau and other public officials also 
called on Bpsiness," Polk, Diary, III, p. 51; "I saw some of the subordin-
ate officers and transacted business with them." Ibid., p. 115; "I saw 
some of the subordinate public officials on business." Ibid., p. 430; "I 
saw also the Commissioner of Public Lands and other subordinate officers 
on business." Polk, Diarv, IV, p. 151. 
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vrork long hours without proper leave and rest is vd thout doubt. He records 
one day in which he worked, proofreading a message for Congress, from 6 P. M. 
until 7 A.M. the following morning. 78 Even ~hen he did absent himself f rom 
the city he insisted that he be informed daily of events in the Oapt tal: 
"I left instructions with them to keep me advised daily of the State of pub-
lic business •••• n79 Polk himself observed that he had not been more than 
three or four miles from the Capital for thirteen consecutive months,ao and 
during his entire term :·iof office he was absent from the Capital not more than 
six weeks.81 Not only did he drive himself hard, he feared that the work 
of his department heads would endanger their health as well. 
The Cabinet met at the usual hour, all the members present 
except the Secretary of the Treasury, who was detained by indis-
position. I have observed that he has been sinking for several 
weeks pa~t under the immense labours of his Department. He ha.s 
not been able to speak above a whisper for the last month, and 
there is danger that he may lose his voice entirely, and tha t 
his general health may be destroyed and his life endangered, if 
he continues to apply himself as he §as heretofore done to the 
very laborious duties of his office. 2 
Probably no historian would disagree with Polk's statement, 11In 
truth, though I occupy a very high position, I am the hardest working man 
in this country.n85 And probably every person who has occupied the posi-
tion of President of the United States has had occasion to express the 
following sentiments: 
When I retired at night I was much fatigued, having passed a week 
of great labour and responsibility, and of great solicitude & 
78Ibid., III, p. 240. 
80 Ibid., IV, p. 78. 
79Ib..;d., 69• a1 51 k p. , see so p. • 
81Polk found it impossible even to vi sit Vice-President Dallas in 
Philadelphia; Letters of Polk to Dallas, Oct. 1, 10, 1846; Dec. 28, 1846; 
May 24, 1847; June 16, 1847. Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 
82Polk, Diary, III, p. 10. 85~., II, P• 360. 
anxiety. With me it is emphatically true that the Presidency 
is "no bed of roses.n84 
Polk ~ Budget Officer 
88 
Prior to Polk's administration it had been firmly established that 
the President had no responsibility over the departmente.l estime.tes which 
were submitted to Congress. One of Polk's major achievements was to 
reverse this procedure, and for the first time in the history of our nat ion 
we had the beginnings of an executive budget. Polk insisted throughout his 
administration that all budget requests be first submitted to him for re-
view; thus there was compiled a truly complete budget for the entire execu-
tive branch of the government. Not only did he review the budget requests, 
he advised and insisted that the department heads revi se their estimates 
do\vnward. Polk, himself, became What in later days has been entitled the 
Director of the Budget. 
With the exception of his administration there is no evidence that 
even Bureau estimates were reviewed by Department hea_ds; at least there 
was no law requiring a review, nor did they have any staff ai des to assist 
them in any review. This was the situation that prevailed at least until 
Lindoln's administration in 1861. The only function of the Treasury was 
to gather the various estimates together and submit them to Congress under 
one cover. In 1 859 , Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury expressly 
denied any responsibility for a composite budget or for a review of budget 
84tibid., III, p. 162. See P.;):;{.'ltes iii; y, a series of four photographs 
of Polk which cover a period from 1855 to 1849 and are a clear indication 
of how President Polk aged during that time. They include Polk as Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, Governor of Tennessee, President Elect, 
and President in 1849. 
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i terns submitted to him by the other departments. 85 As Leo.nard White ob-
serves, "Congress did not receive an executive budget, but only the 
collected departmental estimates based upon bureau and field figures that 
might or might not have been reviewed. 11 86 Polk was determined to change 
this practice, even before the pressure of war expenditures necessitated 
stronger control over budget estimates. In addition to pure control over 
fiseal matters, Polk also insisted on control over all reports from the 
Bureaus to their chiefs; and over anyone in the executive branch who had 
reason to report to Congress. 
The President called the attention of the members of the Cabinet 
to the importance of having their annual Reports, preparatory to 
the meeting of Congress, prepared at the earliest practicable day, 
so that they might be submitted to him for his examination. He 
stated to them tha t he wished the estimates to be submitted to 
Congress of appropriations of the next fiscal year, to be made on 
the most economical scale, and to be as small a.s the public service 
would permit. He told them that they must give vigilant attention 
to the estimates and Reports prepared by the several Heads of 
Bureaus, remarking that as a general rule the Bureau officers were 
favourable to large expenditures •••• 
The President reminded the Cabinet that the mon~~ly Reports 
of their several Departments in reference to the manner in which 
their clerks had performed their duty ••• had not been made to him 
for the last two months, and requested that the reports for this 
month should be made •••• The reports from the General Post Office 
have been regularly made every month, but from no other Department.87 
After the Mexican War had begun Polk was faced with the need for 
even tighter fiscal control. For although collections were good, Polk was 
operating under the reduced tariff rates of the Walker Tariff, which he 
85aous~ Document 5, 26th Cong., lst Sess., p. 7. 
8~fuite, 22• cit., P• 78. 
87Polk, Diary, I, p. 48- 49; see also I, pp. 775, 85, and 105; 
II, p. 219; and III, p. 178. 
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considered one of the major accomplishments of his administra.tion, and he 
was particularly anxious that the finance of the war succeed vdthout it 
being necessary to request an increase in the tariff. When his Secretary 
of War stated that he was having diff iculty getting the bureau chiefs to 
reduce their estimates and suggested that Polk speak to them personally, 
Polk welcomed the opportunity to speak with them. Polk notes that within 
an hour of his interview with the Secretary of War, the Paymaster General 
and the Commissary General called. Polk admonished them to reduce t heir 
estimates and pointed out what he regarded as errors in their requests. 
On the following day Polk spoke with the Quarter Master General. 
I told him, as I had done the commissary Gen 11 on yesterday, that 
the appropriations a.sked for should be ample, but not extravagant 
or mo.re than would probably be needed. He submitted to me his 
estimates, and I found that he had reduced them near seven millions 
below the sum he had first proposed. I consider Gen'l Jesup a 
worthy man but a visionary one and unfit for the important Bureau 
which he fills, but I must use the officers of the army... fur-
nished me by law. I think it probable that the estimates may now 
be brought down to a reasonable amount.B8 
After the close of the War, Polk discovered, as have other Pres-
idents, that it is difficult to return to the prewar level of expendi-
tures.89 Polk observed two practices among bureau heads which tended to 
make them favor large appropriation estimates: 
It has heretQfore, I learn, been the habit of the Heads of Bureaus 
of the Diffe~nt Departments who ha.ve been charged with the duty of 
preparing these estimates to make them la.rger than is necessary00 calculating that they will be cut down and reduced by Congress. 
88Ibid., III, p.219-220 and pp. 123-222 passim. 
89Ibid., IV, p. 180, "On comparing them vd. th the appropriations 
for similar projects for previous years, and before the Mexican war, they 
were found in some branches to exceed these appropriations.n 
90Jbid., P• 165. 
••• they s~pose their own consequence depends somewhat on the sums 
they may t.Jiave] to disburse in their respective branches of the 
service during the year.91 · 
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Perhaps this was the first statement of the desire for "empire building." 
Polk warns his department heltds that 
The Bureau officers, whose duty it is to prepare the estimates, are 
· always in favour of large appropriations. They are not responsible 
to the public but to the Executive, & must be watched and controlled 
in this respect.92 
That Polk was successful in his endeavors to control the size of the 
budget is evidenced by the fact that he was able to carry out his aim and 
repurchase a half a million in government bonds. 93 
Another area in the realm of fiscal affairs to which Polk was 
particularly alerted was the subject of the corrupt use or misuse of 
government funds. 
Polk, who was very conscious of the need for public of ficials to 
be beyond reproach, would s.ccept nothing of greater value than a box of 
cigars or a cane, which rule also applied to Mrs. Polk.94 Polk became 
alarmed s.t one time that because he hB.d invested a small sum, $5 ,000.00, 
in United States Government bonds, he might be accused of being a war 
profiteer. He therefore directed that his bonds be sold and refused to 
accept the profit that was due him. The broker therefore informed Polk 
that he would donate the profit to the Orphan Asylum of Washington, and 
9lrbid., P• 175. 9~bid., P• 181. 
93Ibid., p. 195; see also pp. 162-196 passim. 
94Anson Nelson and Fanny Nelson, Memorials 2f Sarah Childress 
Polk. (New York: Ansen P. F. Randolph & Co., 1892), PP• 89-90. 
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Polk replied, characteristically, that "he could, of course, do Yli th it as 
he pleased. 1195 
Shortly after Polk began keeping a diary he was confronted by a 
request from a Senato·r from Florida to overrule his Secretary of the 
Treasury and to authorize the payment of Federal troops in Florida be made 
to an individual in Washington who, the Florida Senator claimed, had 
proper power of attorney from the officers and men to receive payment for 
them. Polk wisely upheld his Secretary of the Treasury and insisted that 
payment should not be made to an agent in Washington but be made to the men 
directly. The gross sum involved in this transaction was estimated to 
exceed $200,000. 
Polk on another occasion refused to e.gree to the demands of Sena-
tor Douglass and Representative Smith that the expenses of a bearer of dis-
patches from Oregon to Washington be paid from the Treasury. the dispatch 
was a private letter from the Governor of the Territory of Oregon to Polk; 
and Polk felt that the law passed b,y Congress which authorized the payment 
of compensation to bearers of dispatches could not be interpreted to cover 
such an instance. The Congressmen thought it did. Polk finally made the 
following proposition to the Congressmen: 
••• I s~id to him :senator Douglas~ if Mr. Thornton ] t he letter 
bes.rer_ would state his claim on oath and he and Mr. -Smith would 
vouch for his character and veracity and that it was the intention 
of Congress in the appropriation they had made to pay him that I 
would, upon this evidence, in connection ~~th Gov. Abernathy's letter, 
direct him to be paid.97 
Senator Douglass did not take to the suggestion very well and he and Pres-
ident Polk had some strong words over it; so much so that even the President 
95polk, Diary, III, p.15-l7. 96 IQid., I, p.50. 97 Ibid. ,IV ,p. 81-82. 
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acknowledged regret that the incident had occurred, stating: "I regret 
exceedingly the excited conversation with Mr. Douglass. There was no 
occasion for it, and it was his own fault that it occurred.n98 
When the President was confronted with actual dishonesty or evasion 
of the law, he could move swiftly and surely to remedy the situation. One 
such occurrence developed only a few weeks after the Pos~master of New 
York City had been appointed, a position at that time requiring Senator-
ial confirmation. The Postmaster had refused to comply with requests from 
the Postmaster General to post bond as he was required to do by law, claim-
ing that he couldn't do so until his compensation was increased. Polk 
directed the Postmaster General to inform him that he must comply a t once 
or be removed; this action brought the politically influential Postmaster 
of New York to Washington to see the President personally. The President 
informed him that he was to be immediately removed from office, but finally 
agreed to c·onsent to allow him t.wo days in which to post the required bond. 
Polk summed up his attitUde in his diary as follows: 
Mr. Morris is a leading democrat, but in the discharge of my official 
duties I can & will know no man or his politics, but require all pub-
lic officers to conform to the law.99 
In another instance Polk demonstrated that he could act with even 
greater speed and severity. When it was reported to him tha t the Receiver 
of Public Monies in the Land Office at Upper Sandusky in Ohio had defaulted 
to the amount of $7,100, Polk stated: 
In less than three hours after the case was reported to me the 
removal was made, a commission issued for his successor, signed, 
and the orders issued to the U.S. Attorney for the Distri8t of 
Ohio to prosecute criminally the defa-ulting Receiver •••• .L 0 
98Ibid.., p. 85. 99Ibid., I,, P• 406. 100Ib1· d., III 59 , p. ' • 
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The situation that most alarmed President Polk, however , occurred 
in the Treasury Department. The situation was brought to his attention 
when in the absence from WaShington of the Secretary of War, Polk had 
appointed the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mason, to the post of acting 
Secretary of War and had requested him to determine the unencumbered bal-
~~ces available for prosecuting the vmr from the accounts of the War Depart-
ment. Mason was unable to determine the facts required from the records 
of the War Department, but did secure information from the Treasury which 
indicated that most of the money in the Quartermaster account had already 
been drawn. This alarmed PoLk greatly and he summoned both the Quarter-
master General and the Secretary of the Treasury back to Washington immed-
iately. When General Jesup, the Quartermaster General, returned, he 
reported a certain balance on hand; but he then returned on the next day to 
report that he had discovered a private memorandum of his which indicated 
that there was actually an unexpended balance of t wo million dollars more 
than he had reported the day before. This resulted in Polk giving the 
General a needed lesson in public accounting: 
I told him that his books should be kept in such manner that any 
one familiar with accounts should be able on inspecting to see at 
once the amounts drawn from the Treasury, in whose hands the funds 
were, and the amounts remaining undrawn, and should not be left to 
rest upon the personal knowledge of himself and his clerks, or upon 
any private memorandum \ffiich he might keep •••• I told him that 
since I had instituted this investigation I had ascertained t hat 
the accounts of the Navy Department were so kept, and that a balance 
sheet was made out in that Department at the end of every month by 
each Head of Bureau, and laid on the Secretary's t able, by which he 
could at a glance at any time tell the amt. available under each 
head of appropriation at the beginning of every month.101 
The day after this lecture the Quartermaster General returned and reported 
101IbiJi., pp. 157-158. 
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the circumstances to be that the War Department a.t the request of the Treas-
ury had paid to New York bankers a sum of two million dollars to be paid at 
a latter day to the Quartermaster in New Orleans; and that of this sum 
"Sixteen Hundred Thousand Dollars remained in the hands of Corcoran, or 
Corocran & a Banker in New York named Morgan •••• He stated further that 
these Bankers had been and were, as he understood, using the money in specu-
lations in stocks. n102 President Polk expressed his dismay and shock to 
Buch~~an as follows: "I eA~ressed to him my utter astonishment at it, and 
told him, as the fact was, that I had not been so much troubled since my 
administration began, & that it had almost made me sick.nl05 Polk undoubt-
edly recalled the warning given to him more than two years earlier by 
General Jackson regarding Robert J. Walker, his Secretary of the Treasury,l04 
and it is certain that Polk recalled the Swartwout scandal during Jackson's 
Presidency. When Walker was confronted with the circumstances he sta ted 
that "if such an explosion took place he would be blown higher than anyone 
102 Ibid., pp. 140-141. 105! . 142 b~d.' p. ~· 
10~n Jackson's last letter he wrote to James K. Polk to warn him 
of the possibility that Walker might be involved in some dishonest prac-
tice: n ••• should Mr. Walker have the folly to have any thing to do vdth 
either of these abominable projects - I say to you put your veto upon them 
both, or you and yo.ur Secretary will be blown sky high. - and whatever 
comes those corrupt speculators for yours or his character if they can get 
hold of the cash - I can write no more - friendship has aroused me to make 
this attempt - your frien~, Andrew Jackson." Letter o.f Andrew Jackson to 
James K. Polk, June 6, 1845, Jackson ~~:Pa:e,ers, Library of Congress. (Jack-
son died June 8, 1845.) 
105polk, Diary, III, p. 145. Samuel Swartwout was a collector 
of the Port of New York during Jackson's Presidency. The most significant 
sc~~dal of the J ackson administration was caused by Swartwout's defalcation 
of over a million dollars. See also Von Holst, Constitutional and Politi-
cal fiistory of~ United States, II,pp.350-360, and White, £12.• cit., 
PP• 424-429. 
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else ••• "106 and offered to resign his office if Polk 1dshed, but the Pres-
-ident reluctantly accepted his explanation that it was a necessary arrange-
ment, i.e., the transfer of funds to bankers for payment at a l ater date to 
the Army was necessary, because the risk of transporting -·bullion was too 
great and notes could not be sold in distant places except at a large dis-
count. Polk did, however, insist that if any future transfers of funds were 
made to bankers the time interval be sufficiently short so that the funds 
could not be used for stock speculation.l07 
President Polk from the very outset of his term in office insisted 
that he be the controlling force of his administration. It should be 
remembered too that he came to the office with no clear title to leadership 
even in his own party. The giants of his own party were still the aged 
Jackson, the embittered Van Buren, and the recalcitrant Calhoun. Certainly 
the two distinguished leaders of the Whigs, the defeated candidate Clay, 
and Massachusetts's Senator Webster, had a greater personal following than 
had the newly elected President. His reputation for party regularity had 
made him the first "dark horse" candidate but he remained virtually unknown 
in the country at large. But as chief executive, he demonstrated in true 
Jacksonian manner, that he alone would be the responsible agent of his 
government. In contrast to the Vfuig view that the Cabinet constituted a 
council whose advice was legally binding upon the President, Polk asserted 
his independence and personal responsibility for the conduct of every 
action anywhere in the executive branch. From his letter offering the 
106Ibid., p. 145. 
l07For a complete account of this episode see Polk, Diary, III, 
p.l24-l51. 
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appointment until ~~e very day he turned the reins of government over to 
his successor, he insisted that his Cabinet members be loyal to only one 
person, himself. He demanded that there be just one voice for his admin-
istration and vigorously enforced "cabinet responsibility" towards that 
end. That he was able to maintain unity in the executive was no mean feat. 
He became President when most leaders in the party thought themselves better 
.qu~~ified. He wisely did not include such acknowledged party leaders as 
Van Buren, Calhoun, and Thomas Hart Benton in his cabinet. Yet by no means 
was his cabinet made up of insigDificant mediocrities, but included such 
leaders as the renowned historian George Bancroft, the extremely able Secre~ 
tary of the Treasury, Robert Walker, and a few party stalwarts such as 
Buchanan and Marcy. One must :eoncur_t.; with the judgment of Henry Barrett 
Learned, lffi.o stated, "ThatPolk made no serious error in the selection of 
any single member of his council is likely to remain the judgment of 
students of the Polk epoch.nl08 
As chief executive, Polk made a significant contribution to the 
power and duty of the President when he asserted his authority over the 
fiscal activities and reports of the subordinate officials of the executive 
branch of the government. He established the right of the President to know 
the details of the operation of the smallest segment of his administration. 
He was not content to rely upon his cabinet members in their capacity as 
department heads to carry out the executive will; instead, he established 
for the first time the right and duty of the President to control personally 
dep~rtmental activity of the executive branch. He recognized that regard-
108s. Barrett Learned, "The Sequence of Appointments to Polk's Orig-
inal Cabinet; A Study in Chronology, 1844-1845," American Historical Review, 
Vol. XXX, 1924, P• 85. 
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less of the statutory requirements, the people would hold him responsible 
for the entire activity of the executive branch, and therefore he was 
determined that if he was to be held accountable he would control. While 
President Polk's debt to Andrew Jackson in this regard should not be over-
looked, yet it should be noted that Polk maintained control not spasmodically 
nor on flamboyant issues only, but rather as a matter of routine and through 
the usual channels of government. He made no use of "kitchen cabinets" 
but utilized his regularly appointed cabinet to its fullest extent. 
In the remaining chapters it shall be observed how he used these 
.. ~ .. ,............ . --~ 
attributes of character and applied them relentlessly as -~£m!IDander-in-chief, ... ) 
• : ,, -,.,,••'·''• ."• , ...... :v•~~ ,,. , ,,.,,•~- - ·-----... --·-·-,...,..~,-' 
..,,_ . . . 
chief of foreign affairs, chief legislator, and as party chief. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLK AS CHIEF OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS~ 
Even John Locke, that strong advocate of legislative power, con-
ceded that what he chose to call "federative" power must be exercised by 
the executive branch. The careful distinction which he drew between 
federative and executive powers is stated as follows in his Second Essay 
on Civil Government: 
These t wo power~, executive and federative ••• [are] really distinct 
in themselves... one comprehending the execution of the mQ~icipal 
laws of the society within itself upon all that are parts of it, the 
other the management of the security and interest of the public 
without •••• 2 
He goes on to explain why it is that the federative powers must in large 
measure be left undivided in the hands of t.~e executive. Locke states 
that the federative power: 
••• is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, 
positive laws than the executive, and so must necessarily be left 
to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be 
managed for the public good. For the laws that concern subjects 
one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough 
precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners 
depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs 
and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those 
~is chapter does not purport to be a detailed examination of 
the foreign relations of the United States during this vital period of 
westward expansion, but merely a study of the exercise of presidential 
power . For a bibliography of foreign relations studies of the period see 
Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Comma.ger, The Growth of the American 
Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), vol. I, Bibliog-
raphy pp. 782-785. There is still needed, nevertheless, a complete study 
of the foreign relations of the United States during the decade of the 
1840's. 
2John Locke, Second Essay gn Civil Government, section 147. 
who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best 
of their skill for the advantage of the commonwealth.5 
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And because Locke's observs.tions about the nature of foreign rela-
tions are in accord with the realities of the situation, that foreign 
affairs are incapable of being controlled in advance by positive law, the 
President has been able to assume and hold the initiative in this area., 
notwithstanding the constitutional division of the federative powers be-
tween the executive and legislature. Perhaps Corwin best summarizes the 
power of the President in foreign affairs: 
The President today is not only the organ of communication of the 
United States with foreign governments -- he is the only organ of 
communication therewith; and as such he is entitled to shape the 
foreign policies of the United States so far as he is actually able 
to do so within the conditions which are imposed by the acts of 
Congress;· and more often than not Congress chooses to follow the 
leadership which his conspicuous advantages of position serve to 
confer upon him.4 
President Polk in characteristic fashion applied himself \':i th 
near ly equal fervor to both the details and the major policies in the field 
of foreign relations. In the same fashion that he distrusted the profes-
sional judgment of the military expert, he was distrustful of the profes-
sional diplomat and felt that the use of common sense and decisive action 
would prod~.JCe the best results. The follo\'1-:ing excerpt from the President's 
diary provides an excellent illus~ration of his suspicion that the diplo-
matic corps is often nnrepresentative of American values. 
The Secretary of State introduced Christ,gpher Hughes late Charge 
d'Affaires to the Netherlands and Dab~e_u S. Carr, Esq., Minister 
Resident at Constantinople, who was on a vi sit to the U.States on 
Dr bid. 
4corwin, The President: Offic,!'i an!J Powers, p. 253. 
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leave of absence. I suppose they called to pay their respects. 
After the ordinary salutations, however, they engaged in conversa-
tion between themselves about the fine arts, Power's Eve, Fisher-
man Boy, and Greek Slave; and about the distinguished persons they 
had seen abroad. They seemed to be well satisfied with themselves, 
and it was very clear that they had a good opinion of themselves. 
Their conduct was scarcely respectful to me, though I suppose t hey 
did not intend to be disrespectful. Altogether their deportment 
was highly impolite. They said not a word in reference to their 
respective Missions, or public affairs abroad, e.nd were so busi1y 
engaged in their conversation Ydth each other that they gave me 
no opportunity to make a single inquiry.5 
On the day following this conversation Polk informed his Secretary of State 
of his impression of the conversation with the t wo diplomats. 
I gave him [Buchanan] my opinion of their vain conduct •••• Ire-
marked that they have been long enough abroad to have their heads 
turned, that I had been, up to the visit, a good friend of Mr. Carr, 
but that I thought it was almost time for him to remain at home, and 
let some other take his place. 0 
Perhaps this was the beginning of the State Department's policy of rotation 
to the United States so that foreign service officers can be reoriented. 
On another occasion when an envoy about to sail for Brazil requested 
permission to stop at the Madeira Islands, Polk suspected for the intent of 
stocking up on vdnes, the President utilized the telegraph to inform the 
envoy that he must sail at once for Brazil with no stop-over at Madeira.7 
James K. Polk became President during a period of great ferment in 
international affairs. The Maine boundary had just been settled by the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, leaving the last remaining boundary dispute between 
England and the United States, the Oregon boundary, to be settled during his 
administration. Only days before he took office President Tyler, acting 
under the Congressional joint resolution, had dispatched an a.gent to Texas 
to conclude the negotiations that were to admit Texas into the Union. The 
5polk, Diary, I, P• 90. 6rbid.' p. 91. 7Ibid., III, p. 66. 
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Mexican War loomed on the horizons w'fi. th its accompanying territorial expan-
sion, which was to extend the boundaries of the United States from ocean to 
ocean. This ferment which was taking place in the United StE'.tes wa s 
equaled by the unrest and change in Europe; the Irish, French, and German 
revolts were all to take place before the end of his administration, and 
the Lnited States was to begin to exercise a world influence. The remain-
der of this chapter shall consider the actions of the President in each of 
these areas of international relations, i.e., Texas annexation, the Oregon 
Settlement, Mexican negotiations, and the United States in world affairs. 
Texas 
On March 4, 1844, when Polk became President, the annexation of 
Texas was ~ fait accompli; for three days earlier President Tyler had 
signed the joint resolution, by which Texas had been invited to become a 
State of the Union. This resolution had passed Congress by a vote of 
120 to 98 in t he House and 27 to 25 in the Senate. It should be noted 
that the Senate vote was far below the necessary two-thirds vote which 
would have been necessary for 6. treaty ratification. It was charged late 
in Polk's administration that he had played a significant role in achieving 
even this narrow measure of Senate support. 
Briefly, the facts of the situation were that prior to the elec-
tion of 1844, on June 8, 1844, a treaty to annex Texas was defeated by a 
vote of 35 to 16. Tyler, not to be stopped in his ultimate objective, 
laid before the House all the papers dealing with the annexation of Texs.s, 
accompanied by a message v.nich stressed that "The power of Congress is, 
however, fully competent in some other form of proceeding to accomplish 
everything that a formal ratification of the treaty could have accomplished.n8 
Baichardson, QE.• cit., IV, p. 323. 
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After the election of Polk, vdth its clear implications of a mandate for 
the annexation of Texa.s, Congress acted. The House, acting first, passed 
a joint resolution on January 25, 1845, which declared that by the passing 
of this resolution Congress consented to the annexation of Texas.9 
The Senate was reluctant to agree to such a resolution, feeling that 
it was an infringement upon their constitutional treaty-making powers. Fin-
ally Senator Walker proposed a compromise which provided that the House 
Resolution be amended to provide "That, if the President of the United 
States shall, in his judgment and discretion, deem it most advisable, in-
stead of proceeding to submit the foregoing resolution to the Republic of 
Texas ••• negotiate [a treaty] with that Republic •••• nlO As this measure 
did not pass the Senate until February 27, 1845, all members presumed that 
the decision as to which alternative to use would be made by the incoming 
President, Mr. Polk. The President-elect's role in securing the Senate's 
acceptance of this compromise was recorded by Mr. Blair, editor of the 
Washington Globe, and Senator Tappan of Ohio. Senator Tappan alleged as 
follows: 
Mr. Polk was in the city; it was understood that he was very 
anxious that Congress should act on the subject before he came 
into office; it was also understood that the proposition to amend 
the House resolution originated with Mr. Polk •••• 
••• I would not vote for the resolution, and it was well ascer-
tained that, without my vote, it could not pass. Mr. Haywood, who 
had voted ?;i th me, and was opposed to the House resolution, under-
took to conver3e VJith Mr. Polk on the subject, and did so. He after-
wards told me he was authorized by Mr. Polk to say to myself and 
other Senators that, if we could pass the Resolution with the amend-
9 House Journal, 28th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 265. For the text of the 
resolution see pp. 259-260. 
10senate Journal, 28th Cong., 2nd Sess., P• 215. 
ment proposed to be made, he would not use the House Resolution, 
but would submit the Senate amendment as the sole proposition to 
Texa.s •••• 11 
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Tyler, upon receiving the joint resolution, acted immediately and 
only two days before Polk took office dispatched an agent under the author-
ity of the House Resolution to Texas to conclude the arrangements. There-
fore, when President Polk took office he was faced vdth the accomplished 
f'e.ct of a special agent already on his way to Texas, plus the knowledge, 
surely, that this method was the only practical scheme to fulfill his elec-
tion promise and deep personal desire for the annexation of Texas . It wa.s 
readily apparent that there was no chance that a treaty of annexation could 
receive the necessary two-thirds vote. Whether Polk ever gave the assur-
ances implied in the Tappan letter is uncertain. Polk denies in his diary 
having done so, although acknowledging that he did have conversations with 
Senator Haywood and other Senators on the subject in whi ch he had urged 
Congress to act positively before it adjourned.12 Most likely his sts.te-
ments were carefully couched to allow the listener to draw what conclu-
sions he desired. (Recall the similar technique employed by Polk in the 
"Kane" letter on tariff legislation.) It should be stressed that the Tappan 
and the Blair letters were not v~itten until three years had passed since 
the Senate action, and not until, as Polk notes in his diary, they had both 
split with the Democratic party and thrown their support behind the candi-
dacy of Van Buren in 1848 on the Free Soil ticket.13 
1~ational Intelligencer (Washington) August 1, 1848; see also letter 
of Francis P. Blair, i.Qid. See also ~ !2!:1£ Evening Post, July 28, 31, 1848. 
l2tetter of Polk to Buchanan, Sept. 50, 1848, requesting Buchanan's 
recollection of any conversation regarding Texas. See also, Polk to ex-Gov-
ernor Brown of Tennessee, Sept. 6, 1848. Polk to Marcy, Sept. 50, 1848. Polk 
Papers, Library of Congress. 
15polk, Diary, IV, p.38-49, p. 127. 
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Whatever the truth of the allegation might be, Polk did success-
fully utilize the only practical means of achieving his campaign promise. 
By December 29, 1845, less than a year after his inauguration, Polk had 
achieved his first objective; Texas was the .t wenty-eighth State of the 
Union. 
Oregon 
The newly-elected President fo·und himself in an untenable position 
in relation to the Oregon territory. The history of the negotiation regard-
ing Oregon is a history of President Polk's maneuvers to extricate himself 
from this perilous position. It will be recalled that the Democratic pl at-
form called for the "reoccupation" of the whole of Oregon. Polk, iim his 
inaugural address, reaffirmed the ca.mpaign promise, stating: 
Nor will it become in a less degree my duty to assert and main-
tain by all constitutional means the right of the United States to 
that portion of our territory which lies beyond the Rocky Mountains. 
Our title to the country. of the Oregon is "clear and unquestionable," 
and already are our people preparing to perfect that title by occupy-
ing it with their wives and children.l4 
It is worthy of note that the President did not mention the boundary of 
1154-40," although it was generally assumed that in laying claim to the 
Oregon Territory he meant the territory as far north as that line. 
In July 1845, in a carefully prepared note from Buchanan to the 
British ambassador, Pakenham, the administration presented very fully the 
claim of the United States to the whole of the Oregon Terri tory to the 
11 54-40 11 boundary but very significantly ended by offering to settle on the 
basis of the 49th parallel because the President felt "embarrassed, if not 
14 Richardson, QR• cit., p. 581. The quoted phrase is from the 
Democratic platform. 
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committed, by the acts of his predecessors." Pakenham missed the opportunity 
for a quick settlement, replying in detail to each of the arguments set forth 
by Buchanan and then presumptuously rejected the proposed settlement on the 
49 degree line, without even referring that offer to his superiors in London.l5 
At that time President Polk became determined that the best way to 
secure a settlement of the Oregon Boundary was by firmness or, as he told a 
Congressman, "The only way to treat John Bull was to look him straight in 
the eye; that I considered a bold & firm course on our part the pacific 
one ••• .ril.6 In pursuing this new course Polk was constantly opposed by his 
Secretary of State. Polk ordered his Secretary of State to withdraw the 
offer to settle on the basis of the 49th parallel; Buchanan argued for delay 
but the President wa.s firm and insisted that Buchanan prepare the notice for 
the consideration of the cabinet at a special ca.binet meeting.17 Polk main-
tained his firm attitude in the face of information from our ambassador in 
London that the British Foreign Secretary regretted Pakenham's rejection of 
our proposal of the 49th parallel. Polk recorded in his diary: 
We had made a proposition which had been rejected, in terms not very 
courteous. The Brittish [sic] had afterwards been informed, in the 
note of Mr. Buchanan of the 30th of August, that our proposition was 
withdrawn and no longer to be considered as pending.... If the 
Brittish [sic] Minister made the inquiries suggestion [suggested:b 
all that could be said to him was, that if he had any further propo-
sition to make on his part, it would be received and considered. This 
was all that could ¥dth propriety be said to him. No intimation 
15Jesse S. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyle~ and Polk (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1907), pp. 250-254. 
16rolk, Diary, I, p. 155. Polk to A. P. Nicholson of Tennessee, 
April 23, 1846; the exact phrase was used in a letter to General Pillow 
on February 4, 1846. ~ Papers, Library of Congress. 
17Polk, Diary, I, PP• 2-8. 
should be given to him of "Y'Iilat our viev.'S or intentions of the 
administration were •••• l8 
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In October of 1845, Pa~enham approached Buchanan vdth a proposi-
tion which attempted to ameliorate his earlier abruptness, but request ed 
that it be considered unofficial for the time being. The cabinet held 
t wo meet i ngs to discuss the proper reply to this latest inquiry, but when 
t he President learned that the British note was an unofficial co~munication, 
he refused to let Buchanan read the reply mtil Pakenham placed his message 
on an official basis. The President stated: 
••• let him make it officially, and then we ~~11 answer it;_but_ 
that I would not permit him to write a note, and after he _had_ 
heard our answer to it withdraw his note & consider all that had 
occurred, both note and answer, to be unofficia~ & not to go on the 
record; that I would not e:xhibit our hand to him in any such way.l9 
The President was to speak out publicly even more forcefully in 
his first annual message to Congress. In this message he satisfied the 
most violent of the "54-40 or fight" men, reste.ting our claim to the 
whole territory and requesting that the Congress act to abrogate the 
existing treaty of joint occupancy, which by its terms provided for abro-
gation after a year's notice. 20 But, while brandishing the big stick before 
Congr ess the President advised his minister in London that if the British 
government saw fit to offer a settlement based on the 49th parallel, the 
President would feel bound to submit the proposal to Congress. 21 
18Ibid., p. 65. 19Ib" 8 1d., p. o. 
20Richardson, QE• cit., pp. 592-597. By this action Polk estab-
lished the precedent that Congress and not the President has the authority 
to terminate a treaty. However, since that time court decisions have 
indicated that the President a.lso shares in this right. See Edward S. 
Corvdn, The Presidential Control of Fore~ Relations (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1917), pp. 112-116. 
21 Reeves, 2E• cit., pp. 260-261; Report of Ambassador McLsne speech, 
National. Inte1ligencer, Sept. 11, 1846; New York Hera~d, Sept. 8, 1846. 
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However, the President felt tha t before Britain would yield or make 
an offer that Congress must act by giving notice of the abrogation of the 
treaty, stating: 
••• if Congress faultered or hesitated in their course, John Bull 
would immediately become arrogant and more graspi~ i~ his demands; 
& that such had been the history of the BrittishLsicj Nation in all 
their contests w~th other Powers for the last two hundred years.22 
While waiting for Congressional action upon his proposal, Polk con-
tinued to look for a way out of the deadlock which had developed over the 
Oregon boundary. In January of 1846 he considered making a proposal to 
England based on tariff concessions and the payment of an indemnity which 
Britain could use to satisfy the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company.25 
I stated that I did not know this was feasible, but it would re-
lieve Great Brittain [sic] of the point of Honor in the controversy, 
and that possibly she might acceed to it, because she esteemed her 
commerce vd th the U. s. e.s of infinitely more value than she did 
the Oregon territory.24 
But eventually Congress acted and served notice on Britain that !fue 
convention of 1827 on the joint occupany of the Oregon territory was to be 
abrogated. Upon receipt of that notice in England, the British Foreign 
Secretary Aberdeen formally instructed Pakenham to offer the line of 49 
degrees as a basis for settlement. 25 Upon receipt of the British offer, Polk 
called his cabinet together to ascertain their position. It was then that 
2~olk, ~' I, p. 155. 
25rhe London Times maintained that Polk was a reasonable man and, 
therefore would be more interested in tariff reform than obtaining all of 
Oregon. April 14, 1846, p. 7, col. 4. 
24polk, DiEJI,Z, I, p. 191-192. It will be recalled that this was a. 
period of great agitation in England for the repeal of the Corn Laws. 
25Reeves, ~· cit., p. 262. The convention and protocol submitted 
by Britain is printed in Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., App. 1168-1178. 
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Mr. Buchanan, who previously had constantly opposed Polk's strong stand, 
reversed himself. Polk records the discourse as follows: 
Mr. Buchanan held back his opinion and was the last to express 
himself and not then liD.tU I asked his opinion... He said the 
54°40 1 men were the true friends of the administration and he wished 
no backing out on the subject. I felt excited at the remark, but 
suppressed my feelings and was ~erfectly calm. Mr. Walker made 
an animated remark in reply •••• 6 
The President dectded to submit the British proposal to the Senate 
for their advice and requested the assistance of his Secretary of State on 
two occasions to aid him in drafting a message to Congress on the subject, 
but Buchanan in his new frame of mind refused to cooperate. This situation 
resulted in the strongest words which Polk ever had with a member of his 
cabinet. Polk recorded the exchange as follows: 
He [Buchanan] then said; Well! when you have done your message I 
will prepare such an one as I think ought to be sent in. I felt 
excited at this remark, as he had on Saturday and on this morning 
refused t o aid me in preparing my me ssage, and I said to him, for 
~hat purpose vdll you prepare a message? You have t~Qce refused, 
though it is a subject relating to your Department, to give me any 
aid in preparing my message; do you wish, after I have done, to 
draw up a paper of your own to make an issue with me? He became 
excited and said that remark s~r~ck him to the heart, and asked 
me if I thought thim capable of doing such a thing? I replied, you 
have twice refused to give me any aid in pr~paring my message 
though requested to do so, and notwithstanding you see that I am 
overwhelmed with other important public duties and have been sub-
jected to constant interruptions, and now you say tha.t after I have 
done you ~Qll prepare a. message such as you think ought to be sent 
in; and I asked him for viha;y purpose will you do this, and he re-
plied to submit it to you.2 
This last statement mollified the President somewhat, although still 
undoubtedly of the opinion that Buchanan desired to escape all responsi-
bility for the submission of a settlement based on less than the whole of 
Oregon to the Senate. On the lOth of June, 1846, President Polk submitted 
26 Polk, Diary, I, p. 453. 27 Ibi~., PP• 459-460. 
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the proposal to the Senate for its advice28 and on the 12th of June the 
Senate voted to accept the British proposal by a. vote of 38 to 12 -- t wo 
more than the t wo-thirds vote which Polk had required in his message.29 
Polk had at last extricated himself from the perilous position in 
which he harl been placed by the Democratic party platform of 1844 and by 
his election campaign. This feat was accomplished none too soon, for a 
month prior to the settlement of the Oregon boundary dispute the formal 
recognition of war between Mexico and the United States had been declared 
by the American Congress. Polk had demonstrated his determination t o 
settle the Oregon dispute by first relying on the offers made by the preced-
ing administration as an excuse to offer a compromise of the boundary issue. 
When that attempt was rebuffed he had taken personal leadership in opposi-
tion to his Secretary of State in pursuing a policy of firmness toward the 
British while still leaving the door ajar for an overture from them to com-
promise the issue. When the proposal whi ch he sought finally came, he once 
again found himself in opposition to his Secretary of State, who fearing 
the opposition of western Democrats, was afraid to accept the offered com-
promise. How Polk managed to avoid the dilemma which frightened his Secre-
tary of State was an even greater feat and called for all his political 
astuteness. This maneuver will be examined in some detail in a. later 
chapter. 
Mexico 
On March 4, 1845, when Polk assumed the duties of President of the 
28 Richardson, 22• £ii., IV, P• 449. 
29
'Ihe discussion of this almost unique reliance on the Senate for prior 
adv1.ce on a treaty is to be found in Chapter V, "Polk a.s Chief of Legislation." 
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United States, he was faced with a rapidly deteriorating relationship with 
the Republic of Mexico. Relations between the two nations had been strained 
for a number of years, ever since the United States had recognized the 
Republic of Texas as an independent nation. In addition, there existed the 
matter of claims of United States citizens against the Mexican Republic 
which Mexico, although, recognizing the validity of the claims, had been 
unable to pay. Mexico, furthermore, had repeatedly warned that the annexa-
tion of Texas by the United States would be regarded as a warlike act. When 
President Tyler, two days before his term of office ended, signed the joint 
resolution of annexation, Mexico broke off all diplomatic relations with the 
United States. Of even greater concern to Mexico than the annexation of 
Texas was the claim b¥ Texas that its boundary, which as a province of Mexico 
had never extended beyond the river Nueces, now extended all the way to the 
Rio Grande. If the United States were to insist upon this boundary, then in 
addition to the loss of Texas, which after all had had an independent exist-
ence from Mexico for nine years; Mexico stood to lose still further terri-
tory. It is with this background that the new President took over the task 
of directing the nation's foreign policy toward Mexico. 
Our relations with Mexico during the Polk administration can be sub-
divided into two distinct phases. During the first phase which lasted less 
than a year, Polk endeavored, by a mixture of diplomacy and force, to secure 
for the United States the additional territory of New Mexico and California. 
George Bancroft records that on his inaugural day the President informed him 
of the four great measures of his administration: two were domestic, the 
establishment of the independent treasury and the reduction of the tariff, 
the other two were the settlement of the Oregon boundary dispute and the 
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acquisition of California.50 It has often been said of Polk that he was the 
only President who entered the White House with a well-defined program and 
left four years later with his entire progr am accomplished. 
The second phase of our relations with Mexico during the Polk a.dmin-
istration was conducted during the existence of war between the t wo nations. 
Its object was to bring about a peace without losing the ultimate goal of 
adding California and New Mexico to our nation. The attempts to secure peace 
took some unusual turns, including the negotitations with Santa Anna, while 
he was in exile, which certainly had the net result of prolonging rather then 
shortening the war, and the Gilbert-and-Sullivan-like Trist mission, which 
in spite of .its peculiar circumstances, did produce the desired settlement 
in the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 
The joint resolution which provided for the annexation of Texas 
gave Polk the opportunity Which he sought, as the resolution left to the Pres-
ident the task of adjusting the ultimate boundary of Texas. Using this as 
a wedge, the President hoped to be able to purchase the territory of Cali-
fornia and New Mexico from Mexico. His desire to commence such negotia.tions 
was hampered by the fact that diplomatic relations had been broken off be-
t ween Mexico and the United States during the last days of the Tyler admin-
istration, when Tyler had signed the joint resolution for the annexation of 
Texas. Polk, however, wasted no time. The same ship which bore the Mex-
ican minister back to his country carried a secret agent of the United States 
with instructions to convince the Mexican officials that the United Sts.tes, 
while determined on the reunion of Texas, was desirous of friendly relations. 
30 George Bancroft, "James K. Polk," Appleton's Cyclopedia of Amer-
ican Biography, V, p. 55. 
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The secret agent was to determine whether the Mexican government was will-
ing to receive an envoy from the United States. Finally, on the 26th of 
August, Parrot, the secret agent, wrote to Buchanan that he thought Mexico 
ready to receive an envoy and added, "An Envoy possessing suitable quali-
fications for this Court might with comparative ease settle~~ break-
fast the most important national question •••• 1• 31 Upon receipt of this 
message on the 16th of September Polk called his cabinet together and dis-
closed to them the objective of his planned Mexican negotiations: 
One gree.t object of the Mission, as stated by the President, would be 
to adjust a permanent bounda.ry between Mexico and the U. States, and 
that in doing this the Minister would be instructed to purchase for a 
pecuniary considers.tion Upper California and New Mexico... The Pres-
ident said that for such a boundary the amt. of peeuniary considera-
tion to be paid would be of small importance. He supposed it might 
be had for fifteen or twenty millions, but he was ready to pay forty 
millions for it; if it could not be had for less.52 
Acting upon the advice of his secret agent, Polk prepared to send a min-
ister to Mexico, selecting Mr. Slidell for the task. Polk's instructions 
to Slidell were to remain as the official position of the administra tion 
t0Ward Mexico throughout. The same demands were included in the instruc-
tions sent with Trist a year and a half later. Slidell was to negotiate 
for New Mexico and California, using the claims of American citizens against 
Mexico, which MeY~co had previously recognized as valid, as a bargaining 
tool. Slidell was a.uthorized to state that the United States would assume 
liability for the claims and pay in addition twenty-five million dollars 
for California. 33 
Polk's expectations that Mexico was willing to receive a minister 
31Reeves, 22• cit., p. 271. 3~olk, Diary, I, pp. 34-35. 
53Text of the instruction to Slidell may be found in Senate 
Executive Doc. 52, 30 Gong., 1 Sess., p. 71. 
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from the UW.ted States were not fulfilled, because for the existing gov-
ernment in Mexico to do so would be tantamount to acknowledging that its 
threats about war if Texas were annexed were only empty gestures. Mex-
ico's refusal to negotiate was used as justification by the President to 
deploy his military forces so as to occupy the country in dispute between 
the Nueces and the Rio Grande. Slidell remained in Mexico from November 
1845 until the following spring in the hope that he might eventually be 
received, but in spite of a revolution and a change in administration 
Slidell was never received by the Mexican government. On the 8th of April 
1846, the President received the final news that Slidell had asked for 
his passport and was returning to Washington. 
From that time on Polk was determined to gain by force what he had 
failed to win by negotiations. 54 On May 9, 1846 the cabinet met to con-
sider sending a message to Congress asking for a declaration of war. The 
President said, "that in my opinion we had ample cause of war, and that it 
was impossible that we could stand in statu guo, or that I could remain 
1 1 u55 si ent much onger •••• Four hours after the cabinet meeting adjourned 
the President received the long-awaited message from General Taylor that 
the Mexican forces had attacked, an event which Reeves characterized most 
aptly as "one of those strange happenings that result in the concealment 
of man 1 s real motives. a 56 
On the 13th of May 1846, the day Congress declared war on Mexico, 
Polk held a meeting with his cabinet which he described as: "The discussion 
54Reeves, 22• cit., p. 295; Polk, Diary, I, P• 319. 
3~., I, p. 584. 56Reeves, 22• cit., P• 297. 
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to-night was one of the most earnest & interesting Which has ever occurred 
in my Cabinet.n 37 The substance of this discussion was a proposal by 
Buchanan that the British and French governments be advised that the United 
States had no territorial designs upon Mexico • . Polk countered by saying: 
that though we had not gone to war for conquest, yet it was clear 
that in making peace we would if practicable obtain California and 
such other portions of the Mexican territory as would be sufficient 
to indemnify our claimants on Mexico, and to defray the expenses of the 
war which that power by her long continued wrongs and injuries had 
forced us to wage.58 
Buchanan replied that to follow such a course would surely involve us in a 
war against both France and Engla~d and would prevent the settlement of the 
Oregon boundary dispute. Polk responded wi~h righteous indignation: 
I told him that before I would make the pledge Which he proposed, 
I would meet the war which either England or France or all the 
Powers of Christendom might wage, and that I would stand and fight 
until the last man among us fell in the conflict. I told him that 
neither as a cit~zen nor as President would I permit or tolerate 
any intermeddling of any European Power on this Continent.39 
The President eventually closed the discussion which had lasted for more 
than two hours by going to his writing desk and drafting a substitute which 
he instructed Buchanan to use in his dispatch in place of Buchanan's own 
message. 40 
The subject of war aims lay dormant for about a month, but on the 
50th of June, Buchanan once again returned to the subject. This time in 
a heated exchange with the Secretary of the Treasury, Walker, Buchanan 
maintained that the United States must renounce any territorial cla.Lms or 
win the animosity of the world. Polk, after listening to the heated ex-
change between his two cabinet members, stated that as a min~num "we must 
37Polk, Diary, I, p. 399. 
39Ibid., p. 398. 
3Bibid., p. 397. 
40 
Ibid., p. 399. 
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obtain Upper California and New Mexico in any Treaty of Peace we would make ,n41 
a position which was constantly maintained throughout the war. 42 
Polk's efforts to negotiate a peace continued throughout the war, 
and this desire to terminate hostilities as soon as possible led him into 
one of the most unusual affairs in our nation's history. As early as 
February 13, 1846, three months prior to the declaration of war, Polk had a 
conversation with Col. Atocha, a confidant of the exiled Mexican leader 
Santa Anna. Col. Atocha stated that Santa Anna, if he~~were only in control 
in Mexico, would be willing to settle all boundary questions between the 
United States and Mexico f or a sum of thirty million dollars. He went on 
to say that only through a show of force would it be possible to persuade 
Mexico to ·settle the boundary question. 43 That this conversation had a 
decided effect upon the President is indicated by the fact that he discussed 
the meeting with his entire cabinet on the next day and decided to adopt a 
firmer policy toward the Mexican government. On the day that Congress recog-
nized that a state of war existed between Mexico and the United States, 
orders were issued to the American naval commander in the Gulf not to ob-
struct the passage of Santa Anna from his exile in Cuba back to Mexico.44 
These instructi.ons were followed by,~the ;' dispatching of a personal repre-
sentative, Alexander Slidell McKenzie, a naval officer, to confer with Santa 
Anna in Cuba. Santa Anna impressed McKenzie with his desires for peace and 
vdth his willingness to settle on terms agreeable to the United States, and 
41Ibid., P• 497. 
42Letter of Polk to Senator Raywood, October 10, 1846. Polk Papers, 
Library of Congress. 
45rolk, Diary, I, PP• 222-225. 44rbid., III, p. 290. 
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in return McKenzie informed Santa Anna of the arrangements which had been 
made to pass the Mexican general through the American blockade. 45 
Santa Anna accepted the opportunity and arrived in Vera Cruz early 
in August, where he received a hero's welcome; by the middle of August he 
was in control of the entire country. Buchanan immediately made an overture 
to begin the peace negotiation which General Santa .Anna just as promptly 
refused.46 The net result of these unusual negotiations was to provide the 
Mexicans with their ablest military c~~ander and to prolong the war for an 
indefinite period. 
In most constitutional matters President Polk was a strict construe-
tionist. Regarding the collection of duties in Mexico, however, Polk ndopted 
a broad constructionist ~ew~ He insisted that the Army collect import 
duties on all goods shipped to the ports of Mexico which were under United 
States control. The revenue from such duties was to be used to defray the 
expenses of the war.47 In this manner the President, without authorization 
from Congress, established a system of duties and expended the monies col-
lected in that manner for the prosecution of the war. He justified his action 
as follows: 
••• that such duties should be collected, as a condition upon v;hich 
foreign commerce as well as commerce from our own country should be 
admitted at such ports as were in our military possession. The impo-
sition of such duties results as one of the incidents of war belong-
ing to the conqueror of a town or province. They are not to be im-
posed under our constitution and laws, but under the power which 
belongs to a belligerent over a conquered town or place.48 
45aeeves, 22• cit., PP• 299-508. 46rbid.' p. 308. 
47 Polk to Secretary of War, Marcy, March 31, 1847. ~Papers, 
Library of Congress. · 
48polk, Dia~, II, pp.437-438. 
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This justification certainly provides the President with an ample degree of 
latitUde in dealing with a conquered nation or terri tory and admits of no 
legal or constitutional restrictions whatever. In the area of foreign rela-
tiona, Polk evidently subscribed to a doctrine of "inherent powers." 
In the spring of 1847, the President began considering the desira-
bili ty of having someone with the army in Mexico with the authority to 
negotiate a treaty should the Mexicans be willing to do so. 
The President, with his usual political adroitness, felt that it 
would be best to appoint a commissioner who, if the mission should prove 
successful, would not be able to make too much political capital o~ of his 
success. He recorded in his diary: 
The embarrassment in carrying it out consisted in the selection of 
a sui table commissioner ••• who would be satisfactory to the country. 
This was a great difficulty. Such is the jealousy of the different 
factions of the Democratic party in reference to the next Presidential 
Election towaa§s each other that it is impossible to appoint any prom-
inent man •••• 
It was for this reason that Polk turned to Nicholas P. Trist, Chief Clerk in 
the Department of State. Trist had a long r ecord as a reliable Democrat. 
He had married Jefferson's granddaughter, studied law under his tutelage, 
been named an executor of Jefferson's will, and much later had been a secre-
tary to Andrew Jackson. Certainly a record to satisfy the -most partisan 
Democrat; and in addition he brought to the task a knowledge of Spanish .. 50 
After being instructed with the intent of his mission and the necessity 
49 Il2!!1·, P• 466. 
50Robert Arthur Brent, Nicholas Phili-g Trist (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Virginia, 1950), 251 pp. A detailed account 
of the Trist mission is to be found in PP• 127-254. 
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for the utmost secrecy, Trist departed for Mexico.51 Within a week after 
his departure difficulties began to beset the mission. The press had 
learned of the secret mission.52 Polk suspected everyone and although the 
leak of news to the press did not directly affect the success of the mission 
it did serve as a basis for the breakdown of confidence between the Pres-
ident and his emissary.55 
The difficult circumstances under which the mission had begun soon 
grew worse. Almost immediately after Trist's arrival in Mexico there 
occurred a complete rift in relations between General Scott and Trist. In 
fact, for weeks the two men never met but carried on an acrimonious cam-
paign of letters. Finally, in the first week of July, after a lapse of 
over two months, Scott and Trist ·.met for the first time and as suddenly as 
the quarrel had begun they became the strongest of friends. Polk, during 
this period, became more and more exasperated at both men. In August Trist 
met with the Mexican commissioners to discuss peace terms, but it soon 
became apparent that Mexico was unwilling at that time to sign a treaty which 
would extend the boundaries of Mexico from the river Nueces to the Rio Grande. 
Trist1 s instructions had made the boundary line of the Rio Grande sine qua non 
on ~Y settlement. Therefore, when Trist agreed to submit the Mexican pro-
posal for the Texas boundary to Washington, Polk decided that he had exceeded 
his usefulness as well as his authority, and ordered him recalled.54 
Buchanan, in advising Trist of his recall, left the door ajar just a 
5~olk, Diar..Y, II, P• 468. 
52National Intelligencer, April 22, 26, 1847; Niles National Register, 
April 24, 1847. 
5~olk, Diary, II,pp.485-487. 54- . -~., III,pp.l85-186, 196-197, 200. 
120 
bit to further negotiations by adding in his letter that if he, Trist, had a 
treaty written When he received his notice of recall he might bring the treaty 
back with him.55 Buchanan followed this official letter with a personal one 
which assured Trist of Buchanan's kind personal regard and that the Secretary 
of State wanted him again in the Department. 56 What Buchanan and Polk did 
not know was that While they were dismissing Trist as a negotiator, Mexico 
City had fallen and the fighting was all but over. 
Trist, after some ~esitancy, decided to ignore the order of recall 
and remain in Mexico City and negotiate a peace if that were at all poss-
ible. Perhaps he was encouraged by the tone of Buchanan's personal letters 
and by the knowledge that Polk had once expressed a willingness to accept 
a treaty even if it were negotiated by an American newspaper man in Mexico. 
This unusual event occurred at the time Buchanan was preparing the instruc-
tions for the Trist mission, and it is quite probable that Trist had knowl-
edge of the situation. The facts were that in April 1847, Buchanan read to 
Polk a letter whiCh he had received from Moses Beech of the New York ~. 
The letter was written in Mexico City and indicated that the Mexicans were 
ready to sign a treaty and that he, the newspaper reporter, would negotiate 
it. The reporter had been made a secret agent of the American government 
but was not given any diplomatic power. Polk's reaction to this information 
was as follows: 
It .is clearly to be inferred from his letter that he will make a 
Treaty with them if he can. Should he do so, and it is a good one, 
I vd.ll waive his authority to make it, and submit it to the Senate 
for ratification. It will be a good joke if he should assume the 
55 Brent, 22• cit., P• 176. 5~bid., PP• 176-178. 
authority and take the whole country by surprise & make a Treaty. 
Mr. Buchanan's strong impression is that he may do so.57 
121 
Trist gave as his reasons for disobeying the order of recall four 
points which he felt justified his action: (1) a belief that his govern-
ment still desired peace, (2) that time was of the utmost importance, (5) 
that Mexico would not surrender an,- more territory beyond the boundary 
which his original instructions had called for, and ( 4) that the President 
had ordered his recall ~~rough an unawareness of the situation.sa 
The President, -quite naturally, became very indignant upon hearing 
of Trist•s decision to remain in Mexico and negotiate a treaty in spite of 
his order of recall. Polk expressed his amazement and indignation in no 
uncertain terms. 
His [Trist•s] despatch is arrogant, impudent, and very insulting 
to his Government, and even personally offensive to the President. 
He admits he is acting without authority and in violation of the 
positive order recalling him... • He has acted worse than any man 
in the public employ whom I have ever known. His despatch proves 
that he is destitute of honour or principle, and that he has proved 
himself to be a very base man. I was deceived in · him. 59 
Yet in spite of these strong terms the President less than a fort-
night later stated that he would not automatically reject a treaty sub-
mitted by Mr. Trist, but would decide that question only after seeing the 
treaty. 60 
This debate over whether a treaty signed by Trist could or should 
be accepted continued in the cabinet until the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
57 ~., II, P• 477. 
SBsrent, 22• ~., p. ~96; paraphrase of a letter of Trist to 
Buchanan, 6 December 1847. Tri-a-t Bapers, Library of Congress. 
59polk, Diary, III,pp.B00-501; Trist's reply was a letter 65 pp. long. 
Brent, ge. £!!., p. 198. ' 
60tbid., P• 511. 
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was received in Washington on February 20, 1848. By that time the lines 
in the cabinet were clearly drawn with Buchanan and Walker opposed to the 
treaty, both advocated seizing more Mexican terri tory, while Marcy, Mason, 
Johnson and Clifford favored accepting the Treaty.61 Polk, in his third 
annual message to Congress, had expressed ~imself as opposed to seizing 
all of Mexico. 
It has never been contemplated b,y me, as an object of the war, 
to make a permanent conquest of the Republic of Mexico or to 
annihilate her separate existence as an independent nation. On 
the contrary, it has ever been my desire that she should maintain 
her ne.tionali ty, and under a good government adapted to her con-
dition be a free, independent, and prosperous Republic.62 
Polk, however, did not commit himself on the Treaty on the day it 
arrived, but summoned his cabinet together again on the next day. Be then 
informed them of his decision to submit the treaty to the Senate. Be 
stated his reasons for his decision as follows: 
I assigned my reasons for my decision. They were, briefly, that 
the treaty conformed on the main question of limits & boundary to 
the instructions given to Mr. Trist in April last; and that though, 
if the treaty was now to be made, I should demand more terri tory, ••• 
yet it was doubtful whether this could ever be obtained by the con-
sent of Mexico. I looked, too, to the consequences of its rejection. 
A majority of one branch of Congress is opposed to my administra-
tion; they have falsely charged that the war was brought on and is 
continued by me with a view to the conquest of Mexico; and if I were 
no to reject a Treaty made upon my own terms, as authorized in April 
last, with the unanimous approbation of the Cabinet, the probability 
is that Congress would not grant either men or money to prosecute 
the war. Should this be the result, the army now in Mexico would be 
constantly wasting and diminishing in numbers,
1
and_): might at last 
be compelled to withdraw them, and thus loose LSicj the two Provinces 
of New Mexico & Upper California, which were ceded to the u. s. by 
this Treaty. Should the opponents of my a.d.rninistration succeed in 
61 Report of Special Cabinet Meeting, 20 February 1848, Polk Papers, 
Library of Congress, notes b,y J. Knox Walker, Presidential Secretary. 
62Richardson, ~· cit., IV, p. 544. 
125 
carrying the next Presi~nti~ election the great probability is that 
the country would loose Lsicj all the advantages secured by this 
Treaty. I adverted to the immense value of Upper California; and con-
cluded byee.ying that if I were now to reject my own terms, as offered 
in April last, I did not see how it was possible for my administration 
to be sustained.63 
After the President concluded his statement, Secretary of State 
Buchanan took issue with him, and remarked that the United States ought 
to reject the Treaty in favor of securing a settlement which would give the 
United States greater territory. Polk reminded Buchanan of his previous 
stands in which he, Buchanan, had urged the necessity of the President 
making a declaration to the countries of the world that the United States 
had no intention of securing any territorial concessions from Mexico. 
Buchanan acknowledged that he hB.d so advised but stated that he had now 
changed his opinion. Polk took accurate measure of Buchanan's motives and 
recorded in his diary the following: 
My conversation with Mr. Buchanan was unpleasant to me, but I thought 
I ought to rebuke him, and let him understand that I understood the 
motive that governed him. He wished to throw the whole responsibili~ 
on me of sending the Treaty to the Senate. If it was well received 
by the ,country, being a member of my administration, he would not be 
injured by it in his President;Lal aspirations, for these govern all 
his opinions & acts lately; but if, .. on the other hand, it should not 
be received well, he could say, "I advised against it.u64 
Two days after this tempestuous rlcabi net meeting on February 25, 
President Polk sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification. From the 
25rd of February to the lOth of March Polk made comments daily in his diary 
on the progress of the treaty, generally to the effect that its acceptance 
by the Senate seemed very doubtful. He often recorded having spoken with 
various Senators to urge them to support the treaty. When the Chairman of 
65polk, Diary, III, pp. 547-548. 6~., P• 550. 
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the Committee on Foreign Relations called to inform the President that, 
although the Committee approved of' the substance of the treaty, they were 
going to recommend that it be rejected because it was drafted by Mr. Trist 
after his recall, Polk informed the Chairman, Senator Sevier of Arkansas, 
that he strongly disapproved that action. Polk wisely observed that the 
treaty might be defeated by the union of two opposing forces; those who did 
not want the United States to gain any territory and those who wanted the 
United States to take over the whole of Mexico. He stated the axiom that 
nExtremes sometimes meet and act effectively for negative purposes, but 
never for affirmative purposes." But, as the days passed and the President 
continued to comt the number of votes which he felt the opposition might 
get, he gradually became more confident that the treaty would be ratified. 
He felt that perhaps eight, ten, or even as many as twelve Democrats might 
oppose the treaty and that they might be joined by as many as six or eight 
Whigs. With nineteen Senators being able to defeat the measure, it is poss-
ible to mderstand his great concern. On the lOth of March Polk received 
the news that the treaty had been ratified by a vote of 58 to 14 with four 
Senators not voting.65 
Polk capped this victory when he was able to persuade the Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to resign from the Senate and take 
the Treaty of Mexico to secure that nation's ratification.66 It is a measure 
of' the importance he attached to the successful conclusion of this treaty, 
that when Senator Sevier became ill and couldn't depart for Mexico immedi-
ately, Polk persuaded his Attorney General, Mr. Clifford, to resign his 
65 
. ~., pp. 551-577, passim• 6~bid., PP• 578-581. 
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cabinet post and take the treaty to Mexico.67 
The commissioners did their work well and on the 9th of June 1848, 
Polk learned that Mexico had ratified the treaty on May 25th.68 Peaceful 
relations with Mexico were once more established and the President had 
realized his dream of adding the territory of New Mexico and California to 
the domain of the United States. He had remained faithful to this end 
throughout the long negotiations with Mexico. First, he had seized upon the 
wording of the Joint Resolution annexing Texas, which had provided that the 
boundary difficulties between the two Republics be settled by negotiations, 
and had sent an emissary, Mr. Slidell, to Mexico with but one purpose in 
mind, the purchase of California and New Mexico. Secondly, when the Slidell 
mission failed and war came, Polk still attempted to find a way to achieve 
his goal, and the abortive scheme with Santa Anna, which brought that Mex-
ican leader from exile in Cuba to control in Mexico was entered into with 
the single purpose of securing California and New Mexico. Finally, when pre-
sented with a treaty which had been negotiated by the discredited and re-
called envoy, Mr. Trist, Polk accepted it and sent it to the Senate, in spite 
of the opposition of members of his own cabinet, including his Secretary of 
State. When the treaty ran into opposition in the Senate he stood firm and 
worked hard for its acceptance, and after it was ratified he used his per-
suasive powers to have both the Chairman of the Senate' s Commi ttea of Foreign 
Relations and his own Attorney General resign their posts to t ake the tres.ty 
to Mexico so that they might insure that the treaty would be accepted by the 
Mexican government. Adding the territory gained under this treaty to that 
67 Ibig., pp. 589-591. 68Ibid., 485 p. . • 
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already gained under the Oregon settlement, Polk had added terri tory to the 
United States which was to include the states of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, 
California, New Mexico, }.rizona, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Colorado, Montana, 
and Wyoming. "Who is James K. Polk?" He is the President who, except for 
Jefferson, brought more territory under our domain than any other President. 
When he left office, the United States was he~f again larger than when he 
became President. 
! World View 
Polk was President during a period of great unrest in Europe and he 
followed the attempts there of the people to secure a more democratic govern-
ment with great interest and hope for the success of the revolutionary move-
ments. The President, upon learning of the French Revolution which de-
throned King Louis Philippe and established a republic, remarked, 11!t is 
the most remarkable, as well as the most important event of modern times.n69 
He continued to observe that the success of the French Revolution was already 
encouraging the people of the German States and of Italy to make more demands 
of their sovereigns. These demands, the President felt, must either be met 
by the establishment of more liberal institutions throughout Europe or there 
would be general war.70 
When a revolt occurred in Ireland the President was nevertheless 
determined to enforce the neutrality laws of the United States. He stated, 
"All my sympathies are with the oppressed and suffering people of Ireland ••• 
I sincerely wish the Irish patriots success, but though this is the case, it 
69 Ibid·, p. 415. 70 Mq., p. 414. 
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would be my imperative duty to see our neutrality la\i'JS faithfully executed. n71 
A very short time after this Polk decided not to appoint Mr. McKeon as a 
District Attorney when he learned that he was a member of the Irish Directory 
of New York. 72 Polk observed that the District Attorney might well be called 
upon to prosecute some of his friends for violation of the neutrality laws.73 
Upon learning that the Irish were not successful in their revolt, he once 
again expressed his regret and instructed Ambassador Bancroft to do ·what he 
could to support the rebels under arrest in England. He recorded his views 
and instructions in his diary as follows: 
I had also directed him to instruct Mr. B. [.Ambassador Bancroft] to 
interpose in a delicate way, & intimate to t,lle ,Etittish Government 
that it would be very gratifying to the Gov: ~rnjnent & people of the 
u. S. if that Govern~ent could, consistently with its o~~ sense of 
duty, extend a general amnesty or pardon to English subjects in Ire-
land •••• We have no right to make such a demand, but simp~ ~o request 
it and to appeal to the magnanimity of Great Brittain not Ltoj exe-
cute Mr. Smith 0 'Bryan and other Irish Patriots.... The whole American 
people with rare exceptions deeply sympathize with the oppressed and 
suffering people of Ireland, and if by interposing our good offices 
the lives of O'Bryan and other leading patriots can be saved, I am sure 
we will do an act of humanity, and discharge a duty which >vill be ac-
ceptable to our own country and in~eed, to the civilized world, wherever 
liberal principles are cherished. 7 
In other European matters of lesser significance President Polk also 
played a part. Polk refused, for example, to continue to pay a toll to Den-
mark for all American goods which moved on the Baltic, bc.sing his refusal to 
pay such tolls on the laws of nations; and blamed the European powers for 
having submitted to the tolls for centuries past. 75 On another matter he 
7~bid., IV, P• 108. 
72Polk to Marcy, August 25, 1848. ~PaRers, Library of Congress. 
Polk had earlier agreed to leave the appointment in Marcy's hands. 
73polk, Diary, IV, pp. 107-114. 74rbid., pp. 118-119. 
75~., pp. 152-153. 
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succeeded in negotiating a Postal Treaty with Great Britain ~hich won for 
the United States equal status with the other nations of the world. After 
the signing of this treaty in January 1848, he was able to correctly remark 
that, "My successor ~dll be relieved of all existing questions of difficulty 
with Foreign Nations •••• His situation in this respect will be very differ-
ent from mine when I assumed the administration of the Government on the 4th 
of March, l845.n76 
Mr. Dexter Perkins, in the second volume of his distinguished three-
volume work on the Monroe Doctrine, so ably covers the "Polk Doctrine" and 
the relations of the United States with I;atin America that it is wmecessa.ry 
to do more than add a brief note to describe Polk's handling of foreign rela-
tions in this area.77 
President Polk reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine in his first annual 
message delivered to the Congress on December 2, 1845.78 Perkins says of 
this message, that it was " ••• beyond all doubt, the most important single 
document intended to give renewed and greater weight to Monroe's principles 
between the date of the original message and the despatch of Secretary of 
State Richard Olney of June 20, 1895.79 It has generally been acknowledged 
that the "Polk Doctrine," as it has often been called, went beyond the Monroe 
Doctrine in that it (1) forbade not only armed intervention and colonizations 
but diplomatic intervention as well, and (2) prevented even the willful 
76:rbid., P• 267. 
77nexter Perkins, ~Monroe Doctrine: ~1867 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 62-252. 
78 Richardson, .2£• ill·, IV, pp. ' '598-599. 
79 Perkins, !m• ill• , P• 89. 
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transfer with the consent of the governed of a territory in the New World 
to a European power. The most obvious application of these new doctrines 
occurred during theiuc~an episode and the attempt of the United States to 
purchase Cuba. 
The Yucatan problem first came to Polk's attention in March of 1848. 
An agent of the Yucatan government applied to the American government for 
permission to let a ship being loaded in New York with 10,000 pounds of 
powder land in Yucatan so that the population of that province could defend 
themselves against the savage attacks of the Indians. Polk saw the diffi-
culties of the situation to be that although Yucatan had been neutral in the 
war wi~~ Mexico it was, nevertheless, a Mexican province and that the powder 
might come into the possession of the Mexican army. Polk did, however, 
authorize the ship to sail with orders to report to Commodore Perry, who 
would be invested with discretionary authority to decide whether it was safe 
or not to land the cargo. This policy, which once again found Buchanan in 
opposition, was decided on in a cabinet meeting. Polk observed that Buchanan 
moved his seat to one of the windows and spent his time looking out with his 
back toward the President. Polk characteristically remarked, "He sometimes 
becomes petulant when his views are thwarted.~ 
On the 25th of April another message was received from the Yucatan 
government. This message was an urgent plea for assistance and carried the 
ominous note that the government was ready to surrender their country and 
their sovereignty to any country that aided them, and that the same terms 
had been offered to both Spain and Great Britain. Polk stated, "We could 
00 Polk, Diary, III, PP• 575-574. 
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never agree to see Yucatan pass into the ha.nds of a foreign monarchy to 
be possessed and colonized by tham •••• n8l He began immediately to prepare 
a message for Congress to secure the authority to come to the aid of Yucatan. 
In a special message delivered to the Congress on April 29, 1848, which is 
a model of combining an appeal to humanity with an appeal to nationalistic 
interests, Polk expressed in terms of the Monroe Doctrine of 1825 and in 
terms of his own message of December, 1845, an appeal for authority to aid 
the Yucatan. The President conclUded his message as follows: 
I submit to the wisdom of Congress to adopt such measures as in 
their jUdgment may be expedient to prevent Yucatan from becoming a 
colony of any European power, which in no event could be permitted 
by the United States, and at the same time to rescue the white race 
from extermination or expulsion from their country.82 
After what is probably the most significant debate ever held on the 
merits of the Monroe Doctrine, the Congress authorized temporary occupation 
of Yucatan by the United States. But, by the time Congress had acted, the 
Yucatan government had signed a peace treaty with the Indians and any need 
for intervention was over.85 
During a discussion of Cuba, President Polk restated the strongly 
held view that Cuba must not be permitted to fall into the hands of another 
European power. 84 With increasing talk of a revolution in Cuba and of its 
desire to free itself from the Spanish ties, Polk felt it expedient to offer 
to purchase Cuba, e.nd did so through our minister in Madrid, offering one 
hundred million dollars for the isla.nd. In June, the President was informed 
that prominent Cuban planters were in the United States to obtain aid for a 
81~., p. 455. 82Richardson, 2R• cit., IV, p.585. 
8SoPerY~ns, 22• £11., pp. 172-192. 84polk, Diary, III, PP• 469, 487. 
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planned revolution in Cuba. He was also informed that a distinguished 
General of the United States Army, who was in Mexico, intended to resign 
his commission and take charge of an army to be formed by enlisting the 
services of discharged American soldiers. This army would then become the 
spearhead of the Cuben revolt. Polk's response, in contrast to that of Pres-
ident Pierce in 1854, was "that as President of the U. S. I could give no 
countenance to such a step, a.nd could not wink at such a movement. n85 Polk's 
att empt to secure Cuba came to naught when the Spanish government dismissed 
the attempt at purchase as a contemptuous affront. 
In summation then, President Polk's direction of foreign affairs 
had been both energetic and fruitful. Without vrishing to detract from Pres-
ident Tyler's role in the annexation of Texas, there does exist evidence 
that Polk used his influence as President-Elect to secure passage of the 
joint resolution of annexation. That he seized upon the method of annexa-
tion provided by the joint resolution and rejected the Senate amendment is 
beyond question. President Polk was quick to realize that the avoidance of 
the use of a tree.ty was the only prs.ctical way of accomplishing his main 
campaign pledge of annexing Texas. 
Polk held steadfastly to his objective of adding California and New 
Mexico to the dominion of the United States. To this end he was quick to 
seize upon the statement in the joint resolution of annexation which pro-
vided that the eventual settlement of boundaries between the Republic of 
Mexico and the United States should be accomplished by negotiation by the 
President of the United States. Polk used this as a pretext to send an 
85Ibid., pp. 476-477. 
152 
envoy to Mexico, Mr. Slidell, with the power to purchase both New Mexico 
and California. With the outbreak of war and the failure of the Slidell 
mission, Polk became involved in the abortive attempt to win a peace by nego-
tiating with the exiled Mexican leader Santa Anna. Although a dismal fail-
ure which certainly strengthened the Mexicans, it serves as a good illustra.-
tion of the lengths to which Polk was prevared to go to achieve his goal. 
He confirmed his singleness of purpose when he accepted the treaty o£ Guada.-
lupe Hida.lgo, which had been negotiated by a discredited agent of the United 
States who was personally very obnoxious to the President. He furthermore 
stood off the opposition of those who wanted to reject the treaty in favor 
of obtaining all or more of Mexican territory. Professor Bourne, in his 
study of the proposed absorption of Mexico, credits President Polk's opposi-
tion as one of the chief factors which stopped the movement to absorb all of 
.. , 
Mexico, stating n ••• there was the opposition of President Polk, who effectu-
ally controlled the policy of the Government ••• ~n86 
President Polk expertly maneuvered himself o~t of an awkward posi-
tion regarding the Oregon boundary. He first took the opportunity to offer a 
compromise based on the actions of his predecessors. \\ben that attempt 
failed, he took it upon himself to force the Congress to terminate the exist-
ing treaty of joint occupation and by taking a strong attitude convinced 
the· British that the United States would back down no further. At the same 
time that he was taking the firm stand and brandishing the big stick in the 
American Congress, he let it be kno~n through diplomatic channels that he 
was still receptive to an offer from England to settle the dispute on the 
8~dward G. Bourne, "The Proposed Absorption of Mexico in 1847-48, n 
~1 E.eport of the American Historical Association f!2I. 1899, I, p. 169. 
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basis of the compromise of the 49th parallel which he had offered earlier. 
He revived the Monroe Doctrine of 1825 and added two additional 
fes.tures to it. He broadened the Doctrine so that it forbade diplomatic 
interference by European nations with the internal affairs of Western Hemi-
sphere countries and he interpreted the Doctrine so that it disallowed the 
transfer of territory in the Western Hemisphere to a European power even 
with the consent of the inhabitants. 
If the dictum that nothing succeeds like success is accepted as the 
criterion, then Polk was an outstanding chief of foreign affairs. During 
his one term of office he had settled every major dispute between the United 
States and foreign nations, and had at the same time expanded the nation so 
that it spanned a continent. Perhaps the President himself best expressed 
his accomplishment when, spe~king of the pending ratification of the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, he stated: " ••• there will be added to the u. S. en 
immense empire, the value of which 20 years hence it would be difficult to 
calculate •••• 11 87 
87Polk, Diary, III, P• 566. 
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CHAPTER V 
POLK AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United 
States provides that "the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States •••• " 
That this grant of authority was in accordance with the prerogatives of ~~e 
crown in England is shown in Blackstone's Commentaries, in which it is 
stated: 
The king has ••• the sole prerogative of making war and peace. 
For it is held by all writers on the law of nature and nations, 
that the right of making war, which by nature subsisted in every 
individual, is given by all private persons tha~ enter ~to soci-
ety, and is vested in the sovereign powers... LThe kingj is 
considered ••• as the generalissimo, or the first in the military 
com:mand, within the kingdom •••• 1 
It is apparent, however, that the Constitution did not intend that 
the President should exercise all the above-mentioned authority of the 
king, for in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution of the 
United States, it is expressly provided that the "Congress shall have the 
power ••• to declare war." It seems evident that it was the intention of 
the framers of the Constitution that the President's powers as Commander-
in-Chief would be as Hamilton so ably expressed in ~Federalist: 
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of 
the United States. In this respect his authority would be nomin-
ally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in sub-
stance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than 
1 
Blackstone, Commentaries, I, pp. 257-262. 
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the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, 
as first General and admiral of the Confederacy •••• 2 
Polk subscribed to Hamilton's view and to the view expressed in 1850 
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States who said: 
His [the President's] duty and his power are purely military. As 
commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of 
the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to 
employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and 
conquer and subdue the enemy.5 
In contrast to President Lincoln, Polk consistently viewed his author.ity 
as conmander-in-ehief as only a grant of military power. 4 However, within 
this interpretation of his constitutional authority, he acted with great 
vigor and exploited this power to its utmost limits. He so deployed the 
armed forces that Congress was placed in the position that its authority 
to declare war amounted, in fact, to no more than the right to recognize 
that a state of war existed. 
Military Actions PreciR,i tating ~ Mexican War 
In order to understand the provocative nature of the military s.ctions 
carried out by the United States prior to the actual commencement of hostili-
ties, it is necessary briefly to review the relations that existed between 
Mexico and tbe United States at that time. Texas after defeating a Mexican 
force in 1856 had declared its independence of Mexico and had maintained 
its independence from Mexico from that date on. MeXico had never officially 
2 The Federalist, No. 69. 
5 Fleming v. Page, 9 How 603, 615 (1850). 
4 James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (New 
York: D. Appleton and Co., 1926), pp. 54-55. Randall specifically excludes 
military power from consideration, choosing to deal with "war powers" as 
they have a 'bearing upon civilians." 
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recognized the independence of Texas and had often stated that annexation 
of Texas by the United States would be an act of war on the part of the 
United States. In the last da.ys of the Tyler a.dlninistration when Congress 
passed the joint resolution, Texas had enjoyed nine years of independence, 
snd Mexico's reaction was limited to the breaking off of diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States. There was, however, one point of difficulty 
which was of major importance. Texas, prior to its independence, While a 
province of Mexico, had extended South and West only to the Nueces River-:· 
but after its independence had laid claim to the territory extending to the 
Rio Grande. Congress, recognizing this disagreement in boundary, had 
inserted in its joint resolution that the eventual boundary between the State 
of Texas and the Republic of Mexico should be subject to negotiation between 
the President of the United States and the Republic of Texas. Polk, even 
before Texas had ratified the annexation, had instituted plans to have the 
army occupy Texas, including the disputed territory which by the very reso-
lution of annexation was to have been a matter of negotiation. 
As early as June 15, 1845, 11 months prior to the actual declaration 
of war, General Taylor was alerted that the United States expected Texas to 
approve annexation on the 4th of July, and that when he was certain that 
they had done so, he should proceed at once to move his troops into Texas 
with the Rio Grande as the eventual destination. 5 This order had been pre-
ceded by two earlier orders, one on March 21, 1845, and the other on May 28, 
1845, which had kept Taylor informed of developments regarding the annexa-
tion of Texas and the possibility of hostilities with Mexico.6 On July 11, 
5aouse Executive Document, 60, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 81-82. 
~., pp. 79-80. 
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similar orders were sent to Commodore Commer.7 
The first direct order to General Taylor to cross the Nueaes River 
and occupy the disputed territory between the Nueces River and the Rio 
Grande occurred on the 50th of July. The significant section of this 
o~der reads as follows: 
While avoiding, as you have been instructed to do, all aggressive 
measures towards Mexico, as long as the relations of peace exist 
between that republic and the United Sta.tes, you are expected to 
occupy, protect and defend the territory of Texas to the extent 
that it has been occupied by the people of Texas. The Rio Grande 
is claimed to be the boundary between the two countries, and up to 
this boundary you are to extend your protection, only excepting any 
posts on the eastern side thereof, which are in the actual occu-
pe.ncy of Mexican forces, or Mexican settlement over which the repub-
lic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of annexa-
tion or shortly before that event. It is expected tha.t, in select-
ing the establishment for your troops, you will approach as near the 
boundary, the Rio Grande, as prudence ~~11 dictate. With this view, 
the President desires that your position, for a part of your forces 
at least, should be west of the river Nueces.8 
Twice during the month of August 1845, Taylor was notified of the 
danger of war with Mexico and advised that he had authority to call upon 
Texas and other neighboring states to furnish troops of volunteers if he 
had need of them.9 
On the 29th of August, Polk called a special meeting of the cabinet 
to discuss the deterioration of the United States' relations with Mexico. 
Polk records in his diary that he submitted propositions to the cabinet 
which were agreed to unanimously. The most significant part of these pro-
posals was as follows: 
If Mexico should declare War or actual hostilities should be commenced 
by that power, orders to be issued to Gen'l Taylor to attack and drive 
her back across the Del Norte [Polk's expression for the Rio Grande]. 
Gen'l Taylor shall be instructed that the crossing of the Del Norte 
7Ibid., pp.252-233. Brbid., pp.82-83. 9Ibid., pp.85-81; 84-86. 
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by a Mexican army in force shall be regarded as an act of War on her 
part, and in that event Gen'l Taylor to be ordered, if he shall deem 
it advisable, not to wait to be attacked but to attack her army first.lO 
An order to that effect was sent the following day to General Taylor.ll 
Polk considered the situation so serious that he considered calling 
Congress into session, but did not do so after receiving advice from Sena-
tor Bagby of Alabama, Who stated that he didn't think CongressShould be 
called even in the event that Mexico declared war or invaded Texas.l2 
On the 15th of January, 1846, Taylor was ordered to advance to the 
Rio Grande and after receipt of these orders in February, proceeded to put 
them into effect. On March 28 he reached his objective, establishing his 
camp on the bank of the Rio Grande opposite the town of Matamors.s. On the 
6th of April Taylor reported to Washington the following: 
On our sid& a battery for four 18-pounders will be completed, 
and the guns placed in battery today. These guns bear directly 
upon the public square of Matamoras, and within good range for 
demolishing the town. Their object cannot be mistaken by the 
enemy •••• 
• • • the Mexican authori ti.es persist in considering our march as an 
act of war in itself;- and I believe they would so treat it, a.nd 
10Polk, Diary, I, P• 9. 
lleouse Executive pocument, 60, 50 Cong., 1 Seas., pp. 88-89. 
1
'2poU:, Diar.:v:, I, pp. 12-15; unfortunately Polk failed to record 
what reasons Bagby gave for his advice. Professor Corvdn makes the follow-
ing observation concerning Lincoln's decision not to call Congress into 
session at the beginning of the Civil War: " ••• Lincoln's failure to bring 
Congress together for four full months after he took office involved inev-
itably a 'gigantic exaltation of the executive power, 1 and 'amazing assump-
tion of responsibility,' from which our Constitutional System has never 
recovered." The President; Office and Powers, pp. 156-157. See also Carl 
Brent Swisher, A!nerican Constitutional Development (Boston, Houghton Miff-
lin Co., 1945), pp. 275-276. Professor Swisher concludes that Lincoln was 
aware that most Presidents had considered it a disaster to have to summon 
Congress into session at the beginning of their administration. 
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attempt to drive us from o~ position, if they felt sufficient con-
fidence in their strength. · 
After a series of conferences between Mexican and United States officers, 
General Ampudia, the Mexican General, on April 12 ordered Taylor to retire 
to the River Nueces. Taylor refused and reciprocated by blockading the 
Rio.::,Grande, which act cut off supplies to the town of Matamoras. Finally 
on the 24th of April, 1846, the inevitable explosion occurred. Taylor 
reported to Washington: 
I regret to teport that a party of dragoons, sent out by me on the 
24th inst., to watch the CC?urse of the river above on t his bank, 
became engaged w1 th a very: large force of the enemy, and after a 
short affair,, in Which some sixteen were killed and wounded, appear 
to have been surrounded and compelled to surrender •••• 
Hostilities may now be considered as commenced •••• l4 
By the 6th of May, 1846, Polk was in possession of dispatches from 
General Taylor dated as late as April 15 and newspaper accounts covering a 
period as late as April 17. From these reports the President had ample 
reason to believe as he did that the outbreak of hostilities was near at 
hand.l5 The day following his discussion with Slidell, the American minis-
ter to Mexico Who had returned to the United States to report his failure 
even to be received by the Mexican government, Polk held a cabinet meeting 
to consider asking Congress for a declaration of war. He stated: 
I then propounded the distinct question to the cabinet and took their 
opinion Cndividually, whether I should make a message to Congress on 
tuesday sic] and whether in that message I should recommend a decla-
ration of war against Mexico.l6 
15 
House Executive Document, 60, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 153. 
l4rhi.d., p.l41; see also !J2i!i., pp.ll6-141, and pp. 1204-1206. 
15 Ibid., pp. 158-140; Polk, Diary, I, p. 380. 
lSpolk, Diary, I, P• 584. 
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The Cabinet, with the exception of Bancroft, agreed that a Declaration of 
War was desirable, although Buchanan said he would prefer to have Mexico 
commit an act of hostilitr-• Bancroft, too, had expressed a willingness to 
ask for a Declaration of War, if Mexico should commence hostilities. This 
Cabinet meeting adjourned at 2 p.m. with no decision expept that the Secre-
taries of State and War should assemble their documents which would accompBl)y 
a message if one were delivered on Tuesday. At 6 p.m., Polk received a dis-
patch from General Taylor, the one already noted, which informed the Pres-
ident of the attack of the Mexican forces upon the American unit. Polk 
immediately reassembled the cabinet at 7:50p.m., and it was agreed that a 
message asking for a declaration of war should be sent to the Congress on 
Monday, May 11, 1846.17 
Thus, while the President and his cabinet were considering recommend-
ing to Congress a declaration of war, there arrived from General Taylor the 
long-expected message which relieved the President and his cabinet of all 
doubt. Polk stated in his war message: 
In further vindication of our rights and defense of our terri tory, 
I invoke the prompt action of Congress ~ recognize the existence of 
.the ~' and to place at the disposition of the Executive the means of 
prosecuting the war with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration of 
peace.l8 
The President's message met with quick action, and ?dthin two hours 
of receipt of it the House, by a vote of 174 to 14, passed a bill which auth-
19 orized the President to prosecute the war. The Senate took a day to debate 
17 Ibid., pp. 385-586. 
18James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents: 1789-
1897, IV, p. 445. {Italics mine) 
19 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 795. 
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the measure, but then supported the President by a vote of 42 to 2.2° 
With the approval by the Senate, Polk had in effect succeeded, by 
utilizing his authority as Commander-in-Chief, to direct the military forces 
of the United States, in presenting Congress with a fait accompli Which Cong-
ress had no choice but to accept. The Supreme Court, when called upon to pass 
on Lincoln's blockade, saw fit to refer to the Mexican War, stating: 
The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma had been fought 
before the passage of the Act of Congress of May 13, 1846, which recog-
nized n~ state Qf ~ ~ existing .Qx the act of the Republic of Mexico. n 
This act not only provided for the future prosecution of the war, but 
was itself a vindication and ratification of the Act of the President 
in accepting the challenge without a previous formal declaration of war 
by Congress.21 
EdwardS. Corwin's conclusion regarding the power to declare war is: 
It thus appears that the power of Congress to declare war has in 
actual exercise been the power to recognize an existing state of war, 
but that the President alone may also exercise this power, at least in 
the case of invasion or of insurrection.22 
Polk, who was to prove exceptionally able as a Commander-in-Chief for 
the duration of the war, did commit an immediate blunder when, instead of ask-
ing for an increase in the regular army, he requested the call-up of volunteer 
regiments of State militia. This error was to plague him throughout the war 
and often stall or seriously enaanger pending military operation. Polk evi-
dently decided on the policy of using volunteers as a matter of principle, 
for in his first annue~ message to Congress he stated: 
20lli.fi., p. 804; see Braine.rd Dyer, Za.chary Taylor (Bat on Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1946), pp. 154-183, for a detailed account 
of General Tyler's actions which p:recipitated the Mexican War. 
•21 
· The Prize Cases, 2 Black, pp. 635, 658. 
22Edward S. Corwin,~ President's Control of Foreign Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1917), p. 141. 
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It has never been our policy to maintain large standing armies 
in time of peace. They are contrary to the genius of our free institu-
tions, would impose heavy burdens on the people and be dangerous to 
public liberty. Our reliance for protection and defense on the land 
must be mainly on our citizen soldiers who will ever be ready, as they 
ever have been ready in times past~ to rush with alacrity, at the call 
of their country, to her defense.2~ 
However, there were supporting reasons which re-enforced Polk's principles, 
namely, Polk knew that a policy of using volunteers would be more favora.bly 
received by Congress because it (1) surrendered patronage, as the use of 
the State militia left the power to appoint the officers for these regi-
ments in the hands of local political leaders ; (2) the use of volunteers 
was considered cheaper than regular troops, as the volunteer was required 
to furnish his clothes and his horse if mounted24; and finally it was felt 
that volunteers could be more quickly assembled. Polk recognized his error 
and in December of 1846 requested an increase in the regul ar army, ~,_e "ten 
regiment billn25; but his previous reliance on volunteers encouraged Gong-
ress to delay i n acting upon this recommendation. On the 11th of February, 
1847, however, the Congress passed the ten regiments bill approximately as 
it had been requested. 
Polk Directs Grand Strategy 
The general outlines of the Mexican War as it was to develop are 
25Richardson, 2£• ~., P• 415. 
2~e Secretary o.f War in 1838 had advised Polk, Speaker of the House, 
that "difference of expense between militia or volunteers and regulars is at 
least four to one." Houma Executive Document, 271, 25 Gong., l Sess., p. 1. 
25House Executive Document, ~ 29 Gong., 2 Sess., pp. 55-54. 
26~ Statutes at Large, p. 123. 
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suggested by geography. The northern provinces of Mexico were to be taken 
and held; New Mexico was to be taken and held by the army which had as its 
ultimate destination California, which territory would also be seized by 
naval forces; and finally Mexico City itself was to be taken by a landing at 
Vera Cruz and an invasion inward from that point. Polk was active in making 
each of these decisions. 
War for ~ Northern Provinces 
On the 14th of May, just two days after the declaration of war, Polk 
summoned his Secretary of War and his commanding general, General Scott, into 
conference; Polk states the result of that conference as follows: 
I gave it as my opinion that the first movement should be to march 
a competent force into the Northern Provinces and seize and hold 
them until peace was ma.de. In this they concurred. 27 
Polk followed this conference up by advising the cabinet of his decision: 
"My plan was to march an army of 2000 on Santa Fe & near 4000 men 
on Chihuahua and at once conquer the Northern Provinces, leaving Gen 1 1 Scott 
to occupy the country on the lower Del Norte and in the interior.n28 For 
reasons which will be discussed later, General Scott never did take command 
of the armies in the Northern Provinces, e.nd General Taylor was permitted to 
remain in command. General Taylor, "Old Rough and Ready," soon captured 
Matamoras and proceeded to advance on Monterrey. Polk indicates that Taylor's 
failure to provide the War Department needed information ma.de it difficult to 
direct his forces properly. In reporting a cabinet meeting devoted to a dis-
cussion of the manner of prosecuting the war, Polk states: 
Great embarrassments exist in directing the movements of our forces, 
for want of reliable information of the topography of the country, 
2~Polk, Diarx, I, p. 400. 28 Ibid., P• 403. 
the character of the roads, the supplies which can probably be 
drawn from the country, and the facilities or obstructions which 
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may exist in prosecuting the ce~paign into the interior of the country. 
Gen'l Taylor though in the country gives but little information on 
these points. He seems to act as a Regular Soldier, whose only duty 
is to obey orders. He does not seem to possess the resources & grasp 
o'f mind sui ted to the responsibilities of his position. He seems 
disposed to avoid all responsibility of making any suggestions or giv-
ing any opinions.29 
By the 25th of September, General Taylor's forces were in posses-
sion of Monterrey, and the first large-scale victory for the United States 
had been achieved. However, when Polk learned on the 12th of October, that 
Taylor had gra.nted the Mexican forces an armistice he was disheartened. From 
a military standpoint, it is very difficult to understand why General Taylor 
granted an armistice when it appeared that he could have captured the Mexican 
army intact. Taylor's biographer believes that Taylor was not moti va.ted by 
military necessity, but by the desire to avoid further bloodshed and that 
Taylor believed that leniency would induce the Mexicans to agree to peace 
terms.BO Needless to say, these non-military reasons, praiseworthy as they 
a.re, place Taylor in the position of mald.ng policy and political decisions 
which rightfully belong with the Commander-in-Chief. Polk felt that the 
quick victory upon which he had counted had been permitted to slip through 
his hands, and he immediately had an order sent to General Taylor to cancel 
the truce and continue the fighting.Bl One week later Polk reversed him-
self and decided that it would be best to have General Taylor's forces hold 
29Polk, Diar~, II, pp.l39-140. Dyer, Taylor's biographer, agrees 
with Polk's opinion of Taylor's executive ability, stating, nTaylor had 
proven himself a practical leader of men and a courageous fighter, but he 
had not demonstrated such strategical or tactical ability or such execu-
ti ve efficiency as to make him an indi spensE< ble general. n Dyer, S&• cit. , 
P• :225. 
50nyer, 212.• ill·, p. 206. 31Polk, Diary, II, pp. 183-186. 
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and fortify his position at Monterrey and not attempt any further advance. 
Polk's decision was based on information that Santa Anna intended to rein-
force the Mexican army facing Taylor and that it would then be four or five 
times larger than the U. s. forces. An additional reason for halting Taylor's 
advance was that it would then be possible to draw troops from his forces to 
be used in the pending attack on Vera Cruz and Mexico City.32 Taylor had 
other plans, however. Perhaps he suspected that part of the reason that Polk 
had forbidden him to advance was that Polk was alarmed about the fame which 
Taylor, a Whig, had received in the press after his victory at Monterrey. 
He decided to continue his advance southward toward Buena Vista. Taylor's 
reply to the order to halt his forward advance destroyed any remaining con-
fidence Which Polk had in him.55 
Gen'l Taylor's answer is in very bad taste and in worse temper.... I 
was very indignant at Gen 11 Taylor's letter & directed the Secretary 
of War to prepare a proper answer •••• He is evidently a weak man and 
has been made giddy with the idea of the Pres::l,dency. He is most un-
grateful, for I have promoted him, as I now think beyond his deserts, 
and without reference to his politics. I am now satisfied that he is 
a narrow minded, bigotted partisan, w:i. thout resources and wholly un-
qualified for the col'!!lland he holds.54 
. 
52Ibid., pp. 198-200. 
55
n ••• I feel that I have lost the confidence of the government, or it 
would not have suffered me to remain, up to this time, ignorant of its inten-
tions, with so vitally affecting interests committed to my charge. But, how-
ever much I may feel personally mortified and outraged by the course pursued, 
unprecedented, at least, in our ovm history, I will carry out in good faith, 
while I remain in Mexico, the views of the government, though I may be sacri-
ficed in the effort." Taylor to Winfield Scott, January 15, 1847, Executive 
Document 1!£. 60, House of Representatives: Mexican War Correspondence (Wash-
ington: Wendell and Van Benthuyan Printers, JJJ48), P• 865. 
~bid., pp. 249-250. Taylor was equally strong in his dislike of 
President Polk and on one occasion wrote "would as soon have heard of his 
[Polk's] death if true, as that of any other individual in the whole IJni:c:f>nlO'." 
Dyer, ~· cit., p. 252. 
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On March 21, 1847, Polk learned that General Taylor had advanced beyond 
Monterrey and that his forces were in grave danger by the overwhelming 
Mexican army. While Polk was planning to send troops to Taylor's rescue, 
Taylor had a month previously, on the 22nd and 25rd of February, extricated 
himself from his precarious position by soundly defeating the Mexican forces 
at Buena Vista. News of this victory was not received in Washington until 
the first of April, an excellent example of the communication problem which 
made planning the war in Washington so dif ficult and which resulted in so 
many misunderstandings both in terms of military orders and diplomatic 
directives. 55 Polk received the good news from Taylor with mixed emotions, 
recording in his diary: 
It was great rashness to take the position he did in advance of Saltillo. 
Having done so he [is] indebted not to his own gOOd generalship, but to 
the indomits.ble & intrepid bravery of the officers and men under his com-
mand for his succesa.56 
When, shortly after this, the Adjutant General of the army presented 
to the President a general order requiring all corps of the army to fire a 
salute in honor of General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista, Polk declined 
to sanction the order,stating that there was no precedent for such an order 
and recorded the following appraisal of General Taylor's victory: 
The truth is the indomitable bravery of our army saved Gen 11 Taylor, 
and not his good Generalship, at the battle of Buena Vista. Had that 
battle been lost, he would have been condemned by the whole country 
for his rashness in violation of his orders in taking the advanced 
position he did.57 
55In the light of these communication problems one might well ques-
tion the wisdom of Polk's insistence on making the major strategic decisions 
of the war himself. From the viewpoint of -the dissertation, however, we are 
concerned with the fact that the President as Commander-in-Chief did assert 
just such constitutional prerogatives. 
56polk, Diary, II, p. 452. 57~., p. 462. 
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The Battle of Buena Vista was the last opportunity that General Taylor had 
to win fame during the Mexican War, but it was enough. He ws.s established 
as the n~tional hero, which claim was to lead him to the White House in the 
next election. Justin H. Smith, an objective critic of General Taylor, main-
tained that Taylor's campaigns revealed no plan of strategy, no careful 
tactics, and little understanding of the art of war.38 
The Campaign for Mexico City 
Polk, even prior to the ca.pture of Monterrey by General Taylor, began 
making plans for the capture of Mexico City, which plans he proposed should 
go into operation if Mexico had not agreed to a peace by November 1846. The 
following extract from Polk's diary of his plans, as outlined at a cabinet 
meeting, for the new offensive is very revealing in that it shmvs the civilian 
President without the aid of military advisors describing in some detail how 
a military campaign is to be carried out. The campaign as it developed 
closely followed Polk's plan. 
I next brought up the plan of conducting the War, in the event peace 
should not be made before the setting in of the heal thy season (say 
in November next) and suggested the importance of taking Vera Cruz by a 
land force to be landed out of reach of the fortress, who could invest 
the town of Vera. Cruz in the rear and by cooperating with the blockad-
ing squadiiion by sea, and submitted whether by these means the Fortress 
of San Juan de Ulloa would not be compelled to surrender for want of 
supplies in a very few days. I suggested further that if this could 
be done the fortress after surrendering could be dismantled and blown 
up, and that our troop on land might then march on the City of Dexico. 
These sugg~st±otis.:met with favorable consideration in the Cabinet. 
The propriety of taking Tampico was also considered, and the impression 
of all was that it should be done if peace was not made before the 
healthy season set in.39 
On September 21, less than a month after Polk had outlined the 
38Justin H. Smith,~ With Mexico. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1919), 
I, pp. 208, 463; II, P• 516. 
59Polk, Diary, II, P• 104. 
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general plans for an attack on Mexico City, he initiated the first step in 
those plans, namely, the drafting of orders for an advance on Tampico.40 On 
the following October 10, 1846, Polk recorded "The expedition to Tampico hav-
ing been heretofore resolved upon, the question of extending that expedition 
to Vera Cruz was discussed. n4l A week later a meeting was held at the White 
House attended by the Secretary of War, Secretary of State, and an ex-consul 
at Vera Cruz who had been summoned from Rhode Island to Washington. At the 
President's request, the ex-consul drew up a detailed diagram of Vera Cruz 
and the surrounding country and from this diagram the detailed plans for the 
landing and capture of the port city of Vera Cruz were drawn.42 
After the planning stage had been completed and the actual campaign 
was in operation the President continued to express and press his views on 
how the operations should be conducted. Often he became impatient at the 
painstaking methods of his commander, General Scott, stating: 
. I expressed the opinion that if I had a proper co~ander of the army, 
who would lay aside the technical rules of war to be found in books, 
which required a long train of baggage wagons; one who would go light 
& move rapidly, I had no doubt Santa Anna & his whole army could be 
destroyed or captured in a short time.43 
Polk did, however, take personal charge of seeing that General Scott had 
sufficient troops under his command tocontinue his march to Mexico City 
after Vera Cruz had been taken; the following ~dll indicate his close super-
vision of these activities: 
Between the hours of 12 and 1 O'Clock the Secretary of War & the 
adj't Gen'l of the army called in pursuance of a previous appointment. 
The adj't Gen1 1 reported the forces and their distribution now in the 
40Ibid., p. 148. 4lrbid., P• 179. 42rbid., P• 196-
45rhid., p. 432. Once again it is not a question of the wisdom of 
Polk's attitude, but rather his willingness to make and act upon such judg-
ments 'Which is our primary concern. 
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field in Mexico, and also those which are either en route to the .;seat 
of War, or are expected shortly to be so.... Some additional forces 
were ordered to Vera Cruz to join Gen 11 Scott's column. A Detachment 
of Marines which can be spared from the Navy, as I am informed by the 
Secretary of the Navy, I will also order to join the land forces at 
Vera Cruz.44 
The initial landing was made at Vera Cruz on March 9, 1847 and six months 
later on September 15, 1847, Polk 1 s initial plans for the capture of Mexico 
City were completed. 
~ Mexico and California Campaign 
The conquest of New Mexico and California were insignificant contri-
butions to the winning of the Mexican War, but they were by no means insig-
nificant in settling the terms of the peace. As has already been noted, 
even before hostilities had begun both military and naval commanders had 
been notified of the possibility of war between the two powers. The naval 
forces in the Pacific were under the command of John D. Sloat, who was oper-
ating under instruction to take possession of San Francisco as soon as he 
heard that Mexico had declared war on the United States.45 I~ediately 
after the declaration of war, Sloat received additional instruction for him-
self and for his successor, Commodore R. F. Stockton.46 On the 7th of July, 
1846, Conunodore Stockton took the port of Monterey in California and two 
days later, a captain under his command occupied San Francisco. Shortly 
before the capture of San Francisco, there occurred a revolt of American 
residents in California against Mexican rule; this group soon came under 
the leadership of the pathfinder, Fremont. Later, Fremont joined forces 
44rbid., III, PP• 22-25. 
45 House Executive Document, 60, 50 Gong., 1 Sass., p. 231. 
46Ibid., PP• 232-241. 
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with Commodore Stockton and in fact, was appointed by Stockton as Military 
Governor of California. But, about this time, General Kearney, who had been 
acting under directives originating in the White House, arrived in Cali-
fornia.47 As early as May 50, 1846, approximately t wo weeks after the decla-
ration of war, Polk had stated:· 
••• that if the war should be protracted for any considerable time, it 
would in my jUdgment be very important that the U. S. should hold mili-
tary possession of California at the time peace was made.... I finally 
submitted a distinct proposition to the cabinet •••• Immediately after 
the act declaring war against Mexico was passed (May 1.5th, 1846) orders 
had been given to Col. Kearney with his Regiment to move to Santa Fe to 
protect our traders •••• The proposition which I submitted was, that 
Col. Kearney should be ordered as soon as he took Santa Fe, if he thought 
safe to do so & practicable for him to reach California before ~~nter, 
to leave Santa Fe vd th a sufficient force to hold it, and proceed towards 
California with the balance of his command •••• 48 
General Kearney had acted under orders issued shortly after the May 
50th Cabinet meeting49 and captured Santa Fe on the 18th of August, 1846 
without a struggle. He then continued to California, only to find t hat most 
of it was already in American hands. In spite of difficulties of command,50 
California was under American possession many months before Scott had sub-
dued Santa Anna on the plains before Mexico City. 
47 . Letter from Polk to Secretary of War Marcy with draft of instructkons 
to be given General Kearney, June 2, 1846. ~Paper~, Library of Congress. 
48polk, . Dic.ry., I, PP• 437-439. 
49House Exec_u_tive Docment, 60, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 241-245. 
50General Kearney asserted his authority over both Col. Fremont and 
Commodore Stockton. The Commodore after some hesitation accepted his subord-
ine,te position, but Col. Fremont remained defiant, and eventually was t aken 
back to Washington under arrest for insubordination and mutiny. He was found 
guilty· of insubordination and ordered dismissed from the service. President 
Polk revoked his sentence of dismissal from the service, but, nevertheless, 
Col. Fremont resigned his commission. See Allen Nevins, Fremont, !he West's 
Greatest Adventurer, for a sympathetic treatment of Fremont's court-martial. 
151 
PresiQ.ent Po·lk Cont;r:ols Mili t.ar.z Operations51 
Probably of greater lasting significance for the institutionalization 
of the Coi!l1llander- in-Chief's functions of the Presidency than Polk 's direction 
of gr and strategy was the f act that he insisted on being the controlling and 
decisive authority in all matters military. He demonstrated that a civilian 
without previous military experience, ~·· supported by a cabinet of which only 
one member had had any previous military experience,52 could personally at tend 
to the many military details and could constantly and successfully assert his 
own absolut e authority. 
One of our central democratic tenets is that the civilian aut horities 
should be superior to the military-- that military command must be subserv-
ient to civilian-determined policy. President Polk was the first Commander-
in-Chief vd thout previous military experi ence to clearly demonstrate that 
the President could, in fact, be the Commander- in-Qhief.55 
Simultaneously with his message to Congress asking for a declar ation 
of war, Polk, vdth some misgivings, tendered General Scott)a s the senior offi-
cer in the army, the command of the army. 54 Scott and Polk had difficulties 
almost from the beginning. On tqe 21st of May, 1846, only t wo weeks after 
giving him command of the army, Polk received a copy of a personal letter 
which Scott had written, the offensive part of ~hich read: 
-----------------------------------·--------------- -----------------
51Attention is directed to Leonard D. ~bite's excellent treatment of 
this topic in ~ Jack.E.Q_nians (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954) Chapter III, 
pp. 50-66. 
52
secretary of War Marcy had had limited service in the state militia. 
55For a brief account of Madison's failure as Commander-in-Chief, see 
supra Chapter I, p. 26, especially footnote no. 27. White, Jeffersonians, 
PP• 219-220. 
54polk, Diary, I, P• 596. 
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With the officering of a new corps I Bill sure I should not be allowed 
the least possible agency except in favour of a democrat, a.nd the 
proposed Riflemen are intended by western men to give Commissions or 
rather pay to western democrats. Not an eastern man, not a graduate 
of the Milita~ry Academy and certainly not a whig would obtain a place 
under such proscriptive circumstances or prospects. You may be cer-
tain. I shall not dishonor myself by recommending any individual what-
ever, a.nd so I have already replied to hundreds of' applicants, most of 
them democrats.55 
This offensive letter was followed on the same day, May 21, by a letter 
wri tten by Scott to Marcy, the Secretary of War. In this let ter Scott made 
the rather well-known comment, "that he did not desire to place himself in 
the most perilous of all positions: a fire upon my rear, from Washington, 
and the fire, in the front, from the Mexicans.n5S This was the final straw.57 
Polk was already disturbed since he had learned that Scott did not intend to 
go to the front until September 1846, end had directed his Secretary of War 
to "take the matter into his own hands; to issue his orders and cause them 
to be obeyed.n58 On the 25th of May, after having called a specie~ meeting 
of the cabinet to consider Scott's letter, the President issued orders whi:ch 
excused Scott from command of the army against Mexico and ordered him to 
remain in Washington, D. c.59 
Polk was faced with a dilemma, however, when he decided it was neces-
sary to open a new attack at Vera Cruz ~~th Mexico City as its ultimate goal. 
Wfio could connnand such a force? By this time the President had lost all 
55 Ibid., p. 414, footnote. 
56senate Docmnent, 578, 29th Cong., lst Sess., p.5 (May 21, 1846). 
57Charles Winslow Elliott, Winfield Scott (New York; Macmillan Co., 
1957), pp. 417-432. Major Elliott, a most sympathetic biographer of Scott, 
discusses this episode in a chapter entitled "General Scott Comes Near to 
Committing Suicide ~~th a Goose Quill.u 
58polk, Diary, I, p. 408. 59Ibid., p. 424. 
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confidence in General Taylor. 
Eventually, Polk felt that he was forced to offer the command to 
General Scott, but before doing so he began to consider a plan to appoint 
Thomas Hart Benton to the position of Lieutenant General. A rank which had 
not existed in the army since George Washington had held it, this new rank 
would be higher than all existing ranks, and thus the holder would be the 
military commander. On the lOth of November, Benton suggested to Polk that 
a new commander with the rank of Lieutenant General should be created by 
Congress, and if such a rank were created he would be willing to accept the 
command himself. 6° Colonel Benton stated that he would not accept a lesser 
tank. 
By the 19th of November, Polk felt that he must accept General Scott 
as commander of the new expedition, end called Scott to the Vfuite House to 
advise him of his new command, and for the short time of this conversation 
there appeared to be harmony between General Scott and the President. 
I then intimated to him that if I was satisfied that he had the proper 
confidence in the administration & would cordially cooperate vdth it, 
that I was disposed to assign him to the command. He appeared to be 
much affected and said at once that he had the utmost confidence in the 
administration & in myself, and that he would cordially cooperate with 
me in carrying out my views in the prosecution of the war. He said that 
he surrendered his whole confidence to me •••• He left, apparently the 
most delighted man I have seen for a long time, and as he retired ex-
pressed his deep gratitude to me.61 
By the 5rd of December, however, Polk was again considering asking 
Congress to create the new position of Lieutenant General with the intention 
of appointing Colonel Benton to that post and as such to command the army in 
the field. 62 Before Congress met Polk was active in lining up support for 
60Ibid., II, PP• ~27, 251. 6lrbid., PP• 244-245. 
62Ibid., p. 262, for Benton 1 s account see Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty 
Years View (New York: D.Appleton & Co., 1858), II, pp. 678-67~~ 
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his new measure, the creation of the Lieutenant General position.65 By the 
22nd of December, Polk was of the opinion that Congress would not grant his 
request and advised Benton of that fact. It appears that Polk would have 
liked to drop the entire project, but could not do so without losing the 
support of the influential Benton.64 The plans came to nothing when the 
bill, although having passed the House, was defeated in the Senate by a vote 
of 29 to 28.65 
Polk's relations with Scott continued to deteriorate. Polk records 
his dissatisfaction with General Scott, both because of his lack of vigor in 
prosecuting the war and for his inability to keep a military secret, in his 
diary: 
Gen'l Scott has acted with so little discretion since he assumed the 
co~~and that the confidential plans of the Government which were con-
fided only to himself have been made so public that every Mexican may 
know them. I have no doubt the Mexican Government and Military commander 
are as well apprised of the secret instructions which were given to Gen'l 
Scott when he left Washington as he is himself. His ve~ity is such that 
he could not keep the most important secrets of the Government which were 
given to him. He is, moreover, wasting himself in most extravagant prep-
arations, and is making such a parade before the public in all he does 
that there is danger that the objects of the campaign may be entirely 
defeated •••• My situation is most embarrassing. I am held responsible 
for the War, and yet I am required to entrust the chief command of the 
army to a Gen'l in whom I have no confidence.66 
After the dispute between General Scott and Mr. Trist, the govern-
ment agent sent to Mexico to negotiate a settlement, the President became 
exceptionally disturbed by the General's conduct, saying: 
The truth is that I have been compelled from the beginning to conduct 
the war against Mexico through the agency of t wo Gen'ls highest in rank 
65rbid., PP• 273, 276, 277. 64xbid., P• 286. 
65House Journal, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., p.434 (Feb. 26, 1847); Senate 
Journal, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., p.l04 (Jan.l5, 1847) Bill l aid on the table. 
6Cpolk, Diary, II, pp.395-594. 
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l'lh.o have not only no sympathies with the Government, but are hostile 
to my administration. Both of them have assumed to control the Govern-
ment. To this I vdll not submi,:t. & will as certainly remove Gen' l Scott 
from the chief command, as she Lhe] shall refuse or delay to obey the 
order borne to him by Mr. Trist. My doubt is whether I shall delay to 
remove him until I can hear further from him.67 
From then on it was merely a matter of time until General Scott was to 
be removed from command of the army. The President maintained a constant 
confidential correspondence with General Pillow, upon whom the President 
relied for unbiased information from the various theatres of war. The Pres-
ident describes the unusual situation as follows: 
This letter is not written in the official character assigned by the 
constitution of "Commander-in-Chief of the Army." It is unofficial 
and you will regard it, as from a personal friend.68 
The President then continues to relate battle plans and gener~ strategy to 
his confidant, conclUding his remarks with the following instructions: 
I reque~t that you will write to me fully -- Giving much information 
as you Lcan:Jin relation to the topography ••• characteristics of the 
population, difficulties to be encountered & any other information or 
suggestions you may think proper to be made.69 
Polk's receipt of information delivered in confidential letters from the 
ubiquitous Gener~ Pillow did much further to undermine General Scott's posi-
tion with the President.70 Polk was, however, reluctant to permit General 
Pillow to assume command of the armies if "any accident should happen to 
67Polk, Diary, III, pp.58-59. 
68polk to General Pillow, Sept. 27, 1846. Polk Paper§_, Library of 
Congress. 
69ll:liJi., other correspondence between Polk and Pillow on the conduct 
of the war occurred on July 2, 1846 - Pillow appointedif:rl.i;. Genere.l July 7, 
October 27, 1846; April 14, 15, May 18, 25, 25, 1847; examples of the extended 
communications of the President vii th General Pillow. Polk Papers, Library of 
Congress. 
7°This is the same ex-law partner of Polk, who was so influential in 
securing the President's nomination in Baltimore at the Democratic Convention 
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General Scott, or he should leave the anny or be recalled •••• n71 Therefore, 
Polk arranged that General Butler should be sent to General Scott's command 
so that he would be second in command.72 
The final break came when General Scott preferred court-martial 
charges against three officers on his staff, General Pillow, General Worth, 
and Colonel Duncan.75 Reports had appeared in papers in the United States 
greatly stressing the courageous roles played in the assault uwn Mexico 
Ctty by General Pillow and playing do~~ General Scott's contribution. These 
articles signed "Leodias" were obviously VITitten by someone on General Scott's 
staff. Scott charged the accused officers of betraying cohfidential military 
information. President Polk had attempted to caution Pillow by advising him 
to "keep guiet and be not too anxious to put down your prosecutors and to do 
justice to yourself, let your military achievements speak for themselves.n74 
Scott's charges were too much for the President, and he decided to remove 
Scott from command; this decision was facilitated by General Worth's prefer-
ring counter-charges against General Scott. 75 Polk records in cabinet 
of 1844. Polk secured for him a General's Commission and used him as his 
personal confidant, first with General Taylor and then, a f t er the fighting 
shifted, ¥dth General Scott, both assignments being the direct result of the 
President's intervention. There are many letters in the fQ1! Papers from 
General Pillow advising Polk of the ineptitude of the commanding officers. 
71Polk, Diary, III, P• 112. 
72Had General Butler not been incapacitated due to wounds, it seems 
probable that Polk would have replaced Scott as the comma.nding officer much 
earlier than he did. See correspondence of Polk to Butler, March 11, May 12, 
August 7, and August 30, 1847. ~Papers, Library of Cohgress. 
73polk, Diary, III, pp.266-296, passim. For an account of this episode 
from the viewpoint of General Worth, see Edgar S. Wallace, General William 
Jenkins Worth (Dallas: Southern Methodist Univ. Press, 1955), pp.l72~184. 
7~olk to Pillow, December 21, 1847. Polk Papers, Library of Cong-
ress. See Plate VI, Political Cartoon entitled "Self-Inflating Pillow. " 
75Rather than instituting court-martial proceedings against the dis-
tinguished officers, Polk authorized a Court of Inquiry consisting of Generals 
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meeting his determination to replace Scott with General Butl er. 
I repeated that the Cabinet had ~en unanimous in the opinion that 
General Scott should be supersed~ in the command, that the Atto. 
Gen'l at the last meeting had concurred with me that Gen 11 Butler & 
not Gen'l Taylor should succeed him; that the other members of the 
Cabinet had inclined to the opinion that Gen 11 Taylor should succeed 
him; that I had decided against their opinion and now repeated that 
decision, and directed that the command should be devolved on Gen 11 
Butler. I said to the Secretary of War that I would take the whole 
responsibility of this decision. He responded that of course the 
Cabinet would support me in whatever decision I made in the matter.76 
It was not only with his chief commanding officers that Polk had 
difficulty. He was equally vigorous in his contempt for the professional 
soldier, who he felt had been made soft and lazy by {!arrison life. After 
directing the Secretary of War to take immediate steps to locate the reason 
for a. dela.y in a certain ship sailing from New York, including the immediate 
arrest and court-martial of any negligent officer, the President observed: 
••• that the country had been so long at peace, and that many of the 
officers of the Navy and Army had, he apprehended, become so fond of 
their ease & personal comfort that it was necessary that the~ should 
be taught their duty by enforcing the most rigid discipline. 7 
Almost exactly a year later, the President reiterated those views: 
I told him that many of the officers of the regular army had, I appre-
hended, been serving so long in peace that they had become gentlemen of 
entirely too much leisure for a period of war, and that some of them 
required to have a coal of fire put on their backs to make them move 
promptly.78 
On another occasion Polk, upon learning that the United States had just 
Nathan Townsend, Caleb Cushing, and Lieut. Colonel W. G. Belknap. All charges 
except those against General Pillow were dropped and General Pillow was exon-
erated by the Court of Inquiry on all major counts. A finding which Scott's 
biographer, Charles W. Elliott, regards as a white-wash. For an account sym-
ps.thetic to General Scott, see Charles W. Elliott, Winfield Scot_t, pp. 564-590. 
76polk, Diary, III, PP• 293-294. 77Ibid., I, pp. 14-15. 
78Ibid., II, p. 117; once again Polk threatened court-ma.rtial, Ibid., 
p. 147. 
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achieved another victory in Mexico, stated: 
The truth is our troops, regulars & ,YOlunteers, will obtain victories 
wherever they meet the enemy. This Lthey] would do if they were without 
officers to command them higher in rank than Lieutenants. It is injustice, 
therefore, to award to the Generals all the credit.79 
The problems of supply were constantly receiving the President's 
personal attention. One month after the war began he spoke t o both the Com-
missary General and the Quartermaster Genera~ warning them that he would hold 
them personally responsible for any failure to keep the army in the field 
properly supplied and equipped. 80 This was merely the first of many contacts 
betv;een Polk and his top two supply officers. In July of 1847 Polk heard 
through his usual confidant, General Pillow, of alleged abuses in the Quarter-
master and Commissary branches of the army at Vera Cruz. Upon the sugges-
tion of the Secretary of War the President summoned the two officers to his 
office. General Jesup, the Quartermaster General, had the courage to ask 
who the complainant was. Polk replied with great feeling: 
I opened one of the letters & was about to read, premising doing so 
by stating that they were from officers in whom I had confidence, and 
that it was unnecessary to give their names. Gen'l Jesup seemed to be 
excited and spoke very petulantly, and required the names, and seemed 
to be averse to hearing the letters without the names. I promptly re-
plied in an emphatic and spirited tone that I was the judge of that, 
and that it was his duty, if the President of the u. s. gave him in-
formation of alleged abuses by the subordinate of ficers of his depa.rt-
ment, to take prompt steps to correct them. I told him that the names 
of my informants were not necessary to enable h~ to do this; that if 
false information had been given to me and I as~rtained the fact to be 
so, I would judge of the propriety of arresting and trying officers who 
gave the information. 81 
Polk at one time resorted to the expedient of sending the Quarter-
master General to the front in his "staff character" in an effort to iron out 
79.!11id·' P• 482. 80rbid., I, pp. 485-486. 
81Ibid., III, PP• 80-81. 
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and advise the President on problems of supply. 82 Yet the supply problems 
continued. One problem that proved exceptionally vexing to the President 
over a. long period of time was the purchase of mules, horses, a.nd wagons for 
use in the field. Polk favored the use of mules without wagons and the 
seizure or purchase of such animals as was necessary i n Mexico, where they 
could be obtained cheaper than in the United States. 
I expressed the opinion strongly that this was great folly, as well as 
involving the country in a vast expense. I asked them why horses & 
mules in Mexico, which were t o be had in great numbers & which were 
accustomed to the climate & which could be had at one-fourth the price 
'Which must be paid in the U. S., were not procured. To this he could 
give no satisfactory answer, except that he thought the horses & mules 
in the U. S. larger & better than those in Mexico. I was much vexed 
at the extravagance & stupidity of purchasing t hese animals in the U. s. 
and transporting them at vast expense to Mexico.... The truth is that 
the old army officers have become so in the habit of enjoying their ease, 
sitting in parlours and oh carpeted floors, that most of them have no 
energy, and are content to jog along in a regular routine without know-
ing whether they are taking care of the public interest or not. I shall 
find it to be necessary to give more of my . attention to these matters 
of detail than I have heretofore had it in my power to do.85 
The problem of coordination and control on the army in war time 
required the President to use almost all his energies seeing that the details 
of administration were carried out, as the following excerpts will indicate: 
I am devoting all my time & energies to these matters, & pm ~amining 
all the details of everything that is done, as far as it Lis~ possible 
for me to do so.84 
Several matters of public business were considered & disposed of, most 
of them relating to our military operations. I find it ·to be necessary 
to give my personal attention to the minute details of these opera tions, 
as far as the other indispensable duties of my office will permit me to 
do so.85 
82rbid., II, pp. 158, 165\ • 
8~., pp. 450-451; see also Ibid., pp. 87, 118-119. 
84rbid., III, p. 91. 85rbig., p. 54. 
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While Polk was not himself seeing to the details of military operations, he 
was urging and assisting his department heads to keep after their subordin-
ates.86 One week after war was declared, Polk conferred with his Secre-
taries of Navy and War, stating: 
I had however a long and full conversation with the Secretaries of 
War and of the Navy in relation to the prosecution of the war with 
Mexico, and urged upon both the necessity of giving their personal 
attention to all matters, even of detail, and not confiding in their 
subordinates to act without their supervision. I required of them, 
too, to keep me constantly advised of every important step that was 
taken.87 
Polk's lack of confidence in his officer corps and his feeling that most of 
them were motivated by political partisan feelings were the usual reasons 
given by him for his need to pay such close attention to detail. While it 
is to be doubted that the fact that most of the officer corps was composed 
of Whigs would cause these men deliberately to undermine the war effort, it 
was true that the army was greatly handicapped by many officers being too 
old to carry out their function properly. There was no retirement system 
and thus no way of relieving the aged officers of command, short of court-
martial. However, it must be remembered that it was part of Polk's nature 
to control even the smallest details of his administration • 
.•. I advised the purchase of two additional Steam Ships for the Gulf. 
I find that I am compelled to give some attention to these details or 
the movements of the army will be delayed and embarrassed. The Secre-
tary of War is overwhelmed with his labours and responsibilities, and is 
compelled to rely for the execution of many details of his Depart-
ment to [on] his subordinate officers some of Whom I fear do not feel 
that they have any responsibility, and others seem to act as though 
they were indifferent about the success of our military operations. 
Several of these officers are politically opposed to the administration 
Sspolk to Marcy, April 19, 1847, inquires why volunteers haven't 
been assigned to regiments and divisions, demands a report on action taken. 
~ Pap_ers, Library of Congress. 
87 Polk, Diary, I, p. 407. 
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and there is reason to apprehend that they would be willing to see the 
Government embarrassed. With these apprehensions I shall for the future 
give more attention than I have done to their conduct. Gen'l Scott is 
of no aid to the Department, but his presence at Washington is constantly 
embarrassing to the Secretary of War. I will observe his course, and if 
necessary will order him to some other post.88 
A year to the day after war had been declared, Polk made the same complaint 
of the necessity of supervising the subordinates closely, stating: 
Indeed I find it indispensable to give my attention to these details. 
The Secretary of War is greatly oppressed with the duties of his office, 
and some of his subordinates, I fear, are indifferent and are fully satis-
fied if they go through the ordinary routine of their offices, and seem 
to think that they have earned their salaries & done their duties if they 
appear in their offices the usual number of hours each day. They do not 
conceive that any responsibility rests upon them. On this account I aid 
the Secreta~ of War in giving all the attention to details that my time 
will permit. 9 
In case of a conflict of will between the President and his Secre-
tary of War, or bebreen the President and the military, Polk did not hesitate 
to insist that his own view prevail. On one occasion the Secretary of War 
reported to the President a conflict between three surgeons serving with the 
army in Vera Cruz. Polk quickly settled the dispute by directing that one 
of the surgeons be ordered to serve elsewhere, and Polk records that "The 
Secretary of War did not seem to concur in this opinion, but I had no doubt 
on the subject & issued the order aceordingly.n90 A more serious conflict 
occurred, which found the President opposed not only by his Secretary of War 
but by almost his entire cabinet. The reason for this conflict was . tA~t 
Polk had been informed that General Scott had placed Col. Harney, a Democrat 
and friend of General Jackson, under arrest and Polk had requested the 
8~., II, p.lS0-151. 
89lbld., II, p. 24; repeated on the following day with the additional 
complaint that subordinates are almost all Federalists. Ibid., p. 26. 
90Ibid., P• 181. 
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Secretary of War to direct an order reassigning Col. Har;ney to his command. 
Marcy, instead of writing the order, brought the matter to the attention of 
the entire cabinet at a cabinet meeting. The cabinet lined up with the 
Secretary of War in opposition to the President. Polk soon settled this con-
flict, sta.ting: 
I told the Cabinet that I had great respect for their opinions, but that 
in this case I was sure I was right, & would take the whole responsibil-
ity. I told the Secretary of War that if he was unwilling to write the 
letter which I had directed to be written I would do it myself. He said 
he would write the letter. I told him to state in it that it was writ-
ten by my order.91 
Another occasion WhiCh foUnd the President in ·opposition to his 
cabinet occurred when the newly formed German Confederation requested the 
use of a high~ranldng American naval officer to serve as commander of the 
German Navy. Polk replied to this unusual request as follows: 
In the first place an officer of the U. S. Navy would be in an anomalous 
condi:tiim1 if he held also a commission as commander (Admiral was the 
title which it was stated he was to hold) in the German Navy. In the 
second place he would continue to receive his pay as an officer of the 
u. S. whilst he was in a foreign service & was performing no service 
for the u. s.92 
When it was urged upon Polk that he could as Commander-in-Chief of the Army-
and Navy order an officer to perform any duty he pleased, Polk continued 
his reply: 
To this I replied that he might give an order to perform any duty in 
the service of the U. s., but not in that of a Foreign country. I then 
stated- th8.t the extent to which I could consent to go would be to say 
that the Secretary of the Navy might give leave of absence for six 
months to any officer of the Navy if' there were no services for such 
officer t .o perform at home; but that if such office~ should take a com-
mand in the German service he must either resign & Lor] Congress must 
pass a law authorizing the President to permit him Cto:Jperform such 
Foreign service. I stated that I was unwilling, without the previous 
authority of Congress, to give the order or permission proposed.93 
9~., II, p.586. 9~., IV, pp.l69-l70. 9Drbid.' p. 170. 
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Colonel Benton advised Polk that General Scott's order which had 
given command to brevet over lineal rank was opposed to the orders which 
President Jackson had issued in 1829. Polk, without hesitation, promptly 
replied that he would issue a countermanding order stating that all orders 
or opinions issued or expressed by General Scott or by others in conflict 
with President Jackson's order of 1829 were null and void. 94 Polk also 
directed regiments to combat in Mexico over the opposition of regular army 
officers who were insisting that they be retained in the United States 
until further trained.95 After much opposition, the President overruled 
the army's practice of appointing only West Pointers to commissions. 
I will now carry out my intention & appoint to' 2nd Lieutancies [sic] 
such meritorious privates in the army as have distinguished themselves. 
This is not only just to the gallant privates who have distinguished 
themselves, but is sound public policy.96 
President Polk's contributions to the presidential role as Commander-
in-Chief were numerous and sighificant, although not ¥dthout partisan moti-
va.tion. His distrust and dislike of all Whigs, whom he considered to be 
incompetent merely because they were Whigs, extended beyond the political 
arena into the military. His distrust of General Taylor increased with every 
victory which Taylor achieved in the field. Polk was quick to realize that 
the war was making a hero cendidate out of General Taylor, who would be a 
formidable foe for the Democrats to defe~t in 1848. Polk's partisan zeal 
often led him to act from mean and petty motives. For example, he refused to 
sign an order requiring the troops to fire a salute in honor of Taylor's 
victory at Buena Vista. The President's relations with General Scott were 
often char acterized by the same partisan outlook. His attempt to have 
9~., I, p.285. 95 ~., II, pp.428-429. 96rbid., III,pp.52-55. 
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Congress create a post of Lieutenant General so that Senator Benton could 
supersede General Scott as the commanding general represents the extreme 
folly toward which his political motives drove him. Fortunately for Polk and 
the country, the Senate by only one vote failed to support the President in 
this absurd plot. 
Undoubtedly the President's distrust of his leading generals' poli-
tics was a factor which influenced him in his determination to direct the war 
activities from his desk in Washington hundreds of miles from the scene of 
battle. Because of the primitive nature of communications he was often weeks 
behind in his knowledge of field conditions. It would have been ba.d enough 
had the President insisted upon directing overall strategy but often he was 
so unwise as to attempt to direct even local matters of tactics. It would 
be an, error, however, to place all the responsibility for this on Polk's 
distrust of his conmtanders. His insistence upon directing the minutest 
details of the military was, in part, just a further manifestation of his 
total approach to administration, i.e., his insistence upon being ~~e direct-
ing force behind each and every move of his subordinates. 
Nevertheless, when the meanness of some of his motives has been 
acknowledged and the doubtful >visdom of his attempts to command without ade-
quate communications recognized, the precedent was nevertheless established 
that a President without previous military experience could control and dom-
inate the military commanders. 
He also asserted, and in final analysis demonstrated, that the Pres-
ident as Commender-in-Chief could direct the overall military strategy of a 
large-scale operation. 
The Congressional power to declare war, which was desig-ned to be a 
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substantial check upon the executive, was to prove to be no check at all to 
a President who was determined to use his authority as Commander-in-Chief to 
direct the movements of the Army and Navy in such a manner as to present 
Congress with no other alternative than to exercise this power. 
Polk asserted the President's prerogative to know and decide even the 
minute details of military operations; establishing for all succeeding Pres-
idents the right and responsibility of the President to oversee the details 
of mill tary administration. He brought the Departments of War and Navy 
under his direct control, placing them in the same relationship to the Pres-
ident which the Department of State had had since Washington's administration. 
The fact that today no President could exercise the direct control of mili-
tary administration, because of the scale and complexity of modern mill tary 
organizations, merely increases the significance of Polk's achieving this 
control at a time when it was still physically possible and thereby effect-
ively asserting the principle of Presidential responsibility. 
Polk was able to prove that the Presidency had the capacity to conduct 
a war. As Polk had earlier indicated that h! intended himself to be Pres-
ident; in a like manner he insisted that ~ would himself ~ Commander-in-
Chie£. The clearest expression of this determination occurred when Polk 
was confronted by the Adjutant General, who attempted to withhold from the 
President some desired information. 
His presumption in with-holding the information which I had requested 
from me, and in attempting to control my action, vexed me, & finally 
I spoke shortly to him. Among other things I remarked that as I ·was 
constituted by the Constitution commander in chief of the Army, I chose 
to order him to furnish the list of vacancies from the records of his 
office which I had desired. I repeated to him that he must regard what I 
said as a military order & that I would expect it to be promptly obeyed.97 
97 Ibid., p. 51. 
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CHAPTER VI 
POLK AS CHIEF OF LEGISLATION 
As has been noted, the Constitution provides the President with a 
firm and broad base for his roles as "Chief Executive," "Chief of Foreign 
Affairs," and "Commander-in-Chief • 11 It is much less precise, however, in 
defining the President's role as "Chief of Legislation." The Constitution 
empowers the President to call special sessions of Congress, recommend legis-
lation, and withhold his approval of Congressional measures. As will be seen, 
Polk used, or threatened to use, all of these powers with the aim of domin-
ating the Congress. 
In actual practice Presidents have followed various courses in their 
relationShip with Congress. There have been those who have followed what 
Professor Holcombe has called "the ideal constitutional relation.nl Under 
this arrangement the President deals with Congressmen as individuals, 
attempting to secure their support on the basis of the merits of the issues 
and without consideration of party or partisan support. He makes no att~mpt 
to organize a united administrative faction or party within the legislature. 
Two Presidents, John Adams and his son John Quincy .Adams, ap:tempted to con-
duct the affairs of state on this basis as a matter of principle. Other Pres-
idents have attempted to apply this ideal constitutional relation as a matter 
of necessity; e.g., Taylor, Hayes, Cleveland, Johnson, and Tyler. 
All other Presidents, including Washington, depended on organized 
1Arthur N. Holcombe, Q!g: ~Perfect Union (Cambridge: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1950), p. 259. 
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partisan support for the success o.f their administrations. Some of these 
Presidents were able to dominate the partisan leaders in Congress while 
others were dominated by the Congressional leaders. Following Jefferson's 
successful domination of his Congressional supporters, the Presidency fell 
into a subservient position to "King Caucus" of the Congress until the Pres-
idency of Andrew Jackson. Jackson was able to reassert the dominance of the 
President over the Congressional leaders by becoming the master of local and 
state politics. From that time on it was necessary for the President to 
cultivate public opinion if he were to completely insure the success of his 
administration. Jackson's reassertion of the position of the President in 
relation to Congress was instrumental in the creation of the Whig party, which, 
as its name implies, asserted the principle of Congressional domination. The 
Whigs, due to exceptional misfortune, failed for any considerable period of 
time to control the Presidency. The philosophy which they espoused did, how-
ever, become the dominant view of Presidential-Congressional relationship 
from the time of Andrew Jackson to that of Abraham Lincoln. Fortune.tely this 
period of Congressional leadership was interrupted by the four years of the 
Polk administration.2 
President Polk, as it shall be noted in the following chapter, did 
not succeed in making himself the leader of popular opinion nor was he able 
to control completely or win the support of local party leaders; yet, 
despite these difficulties he was a successful party President in his rela-
tions with Congress. Professor Holcombe states that "Polk was the most 
2Wbile undoubtedly the slavery controversy contributed greatly to 
the dominance of Whig concepts of executive-legislative relationships, during 
the two decades from 1840 to 1860, yet the Polk Presidency illustrates that 
a strong and vigorous man in the Presidency could successfully resist the 
tendency. 
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suecessfuln of those Presidents who tried party government without becoming 
masters of their party in the Congress. 5 As early as March, 1846, Polk had 
warned the Congress that it had been in session for four months without act-
ing on the administration's measures and "that the Democratic party were in 
a decided majority in both Houses of Congress ••• and that the Democratic 
party -~ ould be held responsible to the country for the delay •••• n4 A few 
weeks later he again remarked, 
that the Democratic party were in a majority in Congress and would be 
held responsible for whatever was done, and that they should never 
adjourn until they had acted definitely on all the measures, Foreign 
and Domestic, which I had brought before them in my annual message.5 
Although functioning as a party President, 6 Polk was determined not 
to become subservient to the party leaders in Congress and he was very zeal-
ous in protecting the independence and integrity of the Executive branch. For 
example, on an occasion when Senator Calhoun implied that he would support an 
administration measure if the President would give a pledge or some assur-
ance that he would appoint "reliable" men to the positions which would be 
created, Polk was quick to sense what was being asked of him and replied that 
"I would do my duty ••• my friends ••• must have a 'generous confidence' that 
I would do so. n7 Polk remarked on another occasion when he had been besieged 
by a Congressman demanding a certain appointment, "It is not the first time 
that members o~ Congress have forgotten that they were sent to Washington 
~olcombe, ~· £ii., p. 250. 
4polk, Diary, I, p. 295. 5Ibid., p.575. 
&r.he London Times, in commenting on the election of Davis as Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, observed, "Mr. Davis, it seems, is a thor-
ough going Polk man." The Times concluded its report as follows: "On the 
whole, it may be said, that Mr. Polk has rode over all the counter currents 
in his own party, as well as the aggregate force of his opposition.n Dec.23, 
1845, p. 6, col. 6. 
7Polk, Diarx, IV, p. 21. 
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by their constituents to legislate, & not to usurp the functions of the 
Executive or to dictate to him in matters of appointment to office."8 
President Polk went to great pains in his fourth annual message to 
' Congress, which was delivered after the election of 1848, to wTite a detailed 
defense of his administration. It is clear from the discussion in the cab-
inet over the message that this was to be his last word for posterity, and 
therefore the President devoted much time and care to its preparation, begin-
ning the first draft months before the message was due.9 President Polk, in 
this message, became the first President to express clearly the view that 
the President rather than Congress was representative of the will of the 
people. It is true that Jackson had implied such a concept of the Presi-
dency in his bank veto message, but it was more thoroughly based upon a con-
stitutional argument of the equal and independent existence of each branch 
of the government under the separation of powers doctrine. 
Although his fourth annual message treated all phases of his admin-
istration, it was in a section which defended the right of Presidential veto 
that Polk discussed the constitutional relations between the President and 
Congress. To the Whigs, Who had just won the Presidential election of 1848, 
this view of Presidential independence and the view that the President was 
as much a representative of the people as was the Congress, must have seemed 
a strange doctrine indeed. The Whigs, steeped in the tradition of legis-
lative predominance, could not conceive that the people could look elsewhere 
8Ibid., PP• 29-50. 
9rbid., pp. 157-158, 167-168, 182-185, 217-225 • 
.......... 
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than to Congress for an eXpression of their will. 10 Yet already the Whig 
philosophy was losing strength td an increasingly popular and democratic 
view of the office of the President. "King Caucus" was dead. The people 
were determined to rule directly and the only person who was nationally 
elected was the President. The Whigs could win an election with a popular 
military general as their candidate, but that is not the same as saying 
that the people had given a mandate for a return to Congressional leadership. 
President Polk was expressing the will of the future; the Whigs were not. 
Polk in his message three times alluded to the fact that he was 
directly responsible to the people: 
The people, by the Constitution, have c·ommanded the President, as 
much as they have commanded the legislative branch of the Government, 
to execute their w111.11 · · 
If it be said that the Representatives in the popular branch of 
Congress are chosen directly by the people, it is answered, the people 
elect the President. If both Houses represent the States and the people, 
so does the President. The President represents in the executive depart-
ment the whole people of the United States, as each member of the legis-
ls.ti ve department represents portions of them.l2 
In the exercise of the power of the veto the President is respons-
ible not only to an enlightened public opinion, but to the people of the 
whole Union, who elected him, as the representatives in the legislative 
branches who differ with him in opinion are responsible to the people of 
particular States or districts, who compose their respective constitu-
encies.lB 
He continued, ~uch in the manner of a contemporary political scientist, to 
instruct Congress of the fact that Congress cannot claim to be representative 
lOThe Whigs' inability to learn from experience, either that of 
Andrew Jackson or James K. Polk, i~ a substantial contributing factor in 
their demise as a political party. See White, ~ Jacksonians, pp. 7, 27-28, 
46-48, and 565-566. See also Holcombe, op. cit., PP• 95-96, 254-255. 
11Richardson, 22• cit., IV, pp. 664-665. 12rbid., p. 665. 
171 
of the popular will. He pointed out that the vote of a Senator from Dela-
ware had just as much weight ·as the vote of a Senator from New York; that 
the Senators from sixteen of the least populated states with only fifty 
members in the House constituted a majority in the Sena.te.l4 He then went 
on to add that it was quite conceivable that even the House of Representatives 
could pass a bill without representing the will of the nation: 
It might happen that a quorum of the House of Representatives, consisting 
of a single member more than half of the whole number elected to that 
House, might pass a bill by a majority of a single vote, and in that case 
a fraction more than one-fourth of the peo~le of the United States would 
be represented by those who voted for it.l 
To clinch his argument he reminded the Congress that in most states the 
members of the House were chosen by pluralities.l6 
He concluded his discussion of the veto with a clear statement of 
the independence of each branch of the government: 
The executive, legislative, and judicial each constitutes a separ-
ate coordinate department of the Government, and each is independent 
of the others. In the performance of their respective duties under the 
Constitution neither can in its legi tima.te .action control the oth ers. 
They each act upon their several responsibilities in their respective 
spheres... during the short period which remains in which it will be my 
duty to administer the executive deps.rtment it will be my aim to main-
tain its independence and discharge its duties without infringing upon 
the powers or duties of either of the other departments of the Govern-
ment.l7 
It is interesting and significant that the Polk views of executive 
responsibility to the Whole people so permeated his administration that 
Vice-President Dallas, in casting the deciding vote on the tariff bill, 
utilized it in defending his actions. 
To my mind, ample proof has been furnished that a majority of the 
people, and of the States desire to change ••• the system ••• in 
14Ibid., P• 666. 
16Ibid., P• 667. 
15rbid.,pp. 666-667. 
17r,.,;· M ~., P• 669. 
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assessing the duties on foreign imports •••• In a ease free from con-
stitutional objection, I could not justifiably counteract, by a sort 
of official veto, the general will. 
Dallas continues by speaking of his obligations to the "national constitu-
ency.nl8 
The remainder of this chapter will be an examination of how Pres-
ident Polk did, in fact, conduct his relations with the Congress. In the 
first five sections will be discussed Polk's efforts to persuade Congress 
to enact his legislative program. To illustrate his role as sponsor of 
legislation, this section will concentrate on three separate legislative 
goals of the President: the Walker tariff of 1846, war measures, and Polk's 
attempt to resolve the question of territorial governments and thereby 
resolve the slavery issue which was dividing the country. A second section 
will examine Polk's relations with the Senate over the confirmation of 
appointments, while the third will deal with his relations with the Senate 
on treaty ratification, using the Oregon Treaty as a case study. A fourth 
section will describe President Polk's response to Congressional investiga-
tion of the executive branch of the government. A final section will de-
scribe in more general terms his techniques of persuasion and his reaction 
to the efforts of lobbyists to influence legislation. 
Polk Fights for His Legislative Program 
The President's legislative role in the nineteenth century was 
largely unresolved. Should the President merely propose legislative alterna-
tives, while leaving the Congress unguided to choose between the various 
alternatives, or does the President recommend certain definite legislative 
1~don TimeA, August 19, 1846, p. 3, col. 4. 
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programs to the Congress for its consideration, to accept or reject as it 
wishes? Or does the President not only recommend a definite program, but 
use every means at his disposal to insure the enactment of these proposals 
into the law of the land? The answer in the twentieth century seems to be 
assuredly the latter. But in Polk's day it was by no means as certain. His 
pre.de-<essor, President Tyler, had stopped the erosion of executive power by 
the use of his veto. Partly because of the manner of his becoming President 
and partly because of his view of Constitutional propriety, he had not 
attempted to go beyond the point of recommending a.nd then resigning himself 
to either accepting or vetoing the legislative enactments as they were pre-
sented to him. President Polk, however, a ccepted the responsibility of not 
only recommending but of placing his entire energy and power behind his legis-
lative proposals. He used every means at his disposal, including cajolery 
and threats to appeal to the people to have his measures enacted by the Cong-
ress. He kept up his relentless efforts on behalf o·f the a.dministration' s 
measures whether the Democratic party had control of both Houses of Congress 
or not. 
~ Walker Tariff 
Of his domestic measures, none was of greater importance to the Pres-
ident than the passage of a low tariff act. It has been observed that 
because of the significance he attached to tariff legislation he considered 
the post of Secretary of the Treasury to be of even greater importance than 
that of Secretary of State. Polk had long been an advocate of low tariffs 
and as Chairmen of the Finance Committee and later as Speaker of the House 
he had supported both Presidents Jackson and Van Buren in their attempts to 
lower the tariff. In his "Address to the People," which opened his campaign 
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in 1859 for the Governorship of Tennessee, he said that a result of' a pro-
tective tariff: 
was to take the property of one man and give it to another, without 
right or consideration. It was to depreciate the value of the product-
ive industry of one section of the Union and transfer it to another --
it was to make the rich richer and the poor poorer.l9 
In his first annual message to Congress Polk devoted four pe.ges to 
recommendations for a new tariff law, which certainly ended any doubts that 
might have existed regarding his views on tariff legislation. It was a 
well-reasoned proposal advocating a general lowering of tariff rates and the 
placing of the rates on an ad valorem basis.20 To the charge that Polk's 
views on the tariff were really the views of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
Robert J. Walker, Polk replied that he alone was responsible.21 
The President's task in pushing through a general tariff revision 
was not as easy as it might :Seem, for , e~though the Democratic Party enjoyed 
a majority of 66 over the Whigs in the House, in the Senate they only had 
a majority of 6;22 and it was generally known tha.t some of the northern, 
especially the Pennsylvanian, Democrats were not too favorably disposed 
toward a tariff for revenue only. Therefore, Polk was quite interested in 
hearing that his Secretary of State, Buchanan, who was a leader of one 
faction of the Pennsylvania Democrats, "was opposed to the modification of 
19James K. Polk, "Address to the People of Tennessee" in pamphlet 
form, ~Papers, Library of Congress. 
2°Richardson, .QQ.• cit., pp. 405-406. 
21Polk, Diary, I, p.43; see also Claude G. Bowers, Making Democrac;:z 
~ Reality, p. 59. 
22Historic§! Statistics of ~ United States: . .!.1..§g-1945 (Washing-
ton: Gov• t. Print. Off., 1949), p. 2.93 -- 29th Congress: House - 145 Demo-
crats, 77 Whigs, 6 others; Senate; - 51 Democrats, . 2.5 V\higs. 
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the tariff ••• and was using his secret influence to prevent a modification.n23 
Although the consideration of the tariff measure was long delayed 
in both houses, due to the pressure of foreign policy questions,24 its pass-
age in the House did not seem to be in doubt. The President, nevertheless, 
took the precaution of speaking to Senators Dickinson of New York and Chal-
mers of Mississippi and urged them to contact members of the House who might 
be doubtful supporters of the measure. Senator Dickinson assured the Pres-
ident that he would do what he could t.o see that the New York delegation 
s tayed in line and supported the tariff bill, and Senator Chalmers said he 
would spea.k with Col. Tibbats of Kentucky, Vl'hose vote was in doubt. In a 
short time they returned with the good news that the measure had passed the 
House with a majority of nineteen votes.25 Polk received the news with much 
pleasure, recording in his diary: 
I was much gratified to hear the result, as this was one of the leading 
and Yi tal measures of my administration. It was in truth vastly the 
most important domestic measure of my administration, and the vote of 
the popular branch of Congress, which had fully endorsed my opinions and 
recommendations on the subject of the tariff, could not be othervdse 
than highly grHtifying.26 
With Polk's usual thoroughness he had observed from the published 
account of the Senate's proceedings that Senator Lewis, Chairman of the 
Finance Committee, pl~mned to postpone action on the t e.riff bill until two 
25polk, DigrY, I, p.26l. 
2~ariff legislation was forced to wait for a settlement of the Oregon 
boundary dispute, which was closely associated with the repeal of the Corn 
Laws in England. See Charles M. Wiltse, John Q. Calhoun, Sectionalist, ~-
1850 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1951), pp. 247-272; esp. 
pp. 262-265. "Both Secretary of the Treasury Walker and President Polk de-
liberately had the Tariff Bill held in committee until the fate of the Corn 
Laws were known." 
25polk, Diary, II, pp.l0-11. 26 Ibid., P• 11. 
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other minor matters had been acted on. '!he President summoned Senator Lewis 
and informed him of the necessity for immediate action on the tariff legis-
lation, stating: 
I then told him that I had great anxiety for the passage of the Consti-
tutional Treasury Bill and the reduction of the Tariff, ~nich I had 
recommended in my annual message. I told him that I considered them as 
administration measures and that I intended to urge them upon Congress 
as such, and that I considered the public good, as well as my o~n power 
and the glory of my administration, depended in a grea.t degree upon my 
success in carrying them through Congress.27 
With this urging on the part of the President, the Senate soon 
brought the tariff measure before them for consideration. While the subject 
was before the Senate, the President was busily engaged in seeing Senators 
about whose vote he was doubtful. He kept in constant touch with Senator 
Lewis, who led the Senate fight for the measure. He recorded in his diary, 
nr considered the passage of the bill before the Senate the most important 
domestic measure of my administration, and therefore, I take so great an 
interest in it.n28 The Washington Union engaged in a major campaign in sup-
port of the measure.29 
After following the progress of the bill closely, Polk became con-
vinced that its passage depended upon the vote of Senator Haywood of North 
Carolina. Polk was aware that although Haywood was a Democrat and his per-
sonal friend, he was, nevertheless, personally opposed to a tariff reduction 
and was a man of strong character. Polk requested Col. Benton, a close 
27Ibid., I, pp.568-369. 
28:rbid., II, p. 28;. for contacts with individual Senators see ibid., 
pp. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 50. 
29washington Union, April 14, 1846 et seq., esp. April 25, May 6, 
May 28, June 15. 
177 
friend of Senator Haywood, to persuade Haywood to support the tariff meas-
ure. 50 Polk stressed the importance of Haywood's vote, stating, "Upon Mr. 
Haywood's vote, I am satisfied, depends the fate of the tariff-bill or 
rather the -Bill to reduce the tariff, and therefore the great solicitUde 
I feel on the subject.n51 When the President was informed that it seemed 
certain that Senator Haywood would vote against the measure, the President 
requested him to call. After a long afternoon conversation during which he 
tried to persuade Haywood to support the tariff measure, Polk, being still 
doubtful of his vote, asked him to return again in the evening. Polk then 
appealed to his party loyalty, saying, 
I told him that if he voted against it, he would be the only Democratic 
member of either House from the South who would do so, that the 6 Demo-
cratic members from his own State had voted for it. I told him that if 
he voted against it he would strike a severe blow upon my administra-
tion, inflict great injury on the country, and as a friend I must say to 
him that I thought he would ruin himself. I begged him for his own sake, 
for the sake of the country, and for the success of my administration to 
consider well before he voted against it.52 
Two days later, Senator Haywood resigned his seat in the Senate.55 
Polk was greatly concerned over the effect that this act would have on the 
passage of the bill. He did not, however, give any credence to rumors that 
Sen& tor Haywood had been bought off by the powerful lobbyists. Polk, with 
what was for him an unusual degree of charitableness, recorded: 
I give not the slightest heed to the painful insinuations which I learn 
this evening are made by illiberal persons as to the motives & causes 
which have induced his course. I differ with him in opinion and think 
he has erred in resigning, but that he has done so from good motives and 
from the causes stcted above I have as little doubt. 
~ 51 ~~~olk, Diary, II, pp.52-55. Ibid •• p. 53. 
52Ibid., pp. 44-45. 5Dwashington Union, July 25, 1846. 
54polk, Diary, II, pp.48-49. Polk did not, however, prevent the 
Washington Union from printing an editorial attacking Haywoods motives. Polk 
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Polk had quite genuine cause for concern, as the fate of the bill 
now rested in the hands of Senator Jarnagin of Tennessee, who not only was a 
Whig and an advocate of protective tariff but was also a bitter political 
and personal enemy of Polk in the State of Tennessee. There was still reason 
for hope, however, for the legislature of Tennessee had instructed Senator 
Jarnagin to vote for the tariff measure. Polk considered it a point of honor 
that a Senator must vote as instructed by his state legislature, but consid-
ered Jarnagin to be so unreliable that he might violate his instructions.35 
Senator Jarnagin, after frightening the Democrs.ts by not voting on various 
amendments and thereby causing a tie and forcing the President of the Senate, 
Mr. Dallas, to rescue the bill, 56 finally followed his instructions snd voted 
for the measure. Thus the tariff bill passed the Senate by a vote of 28 to 
27.37 On the following day the House approved the amendments whiCh had been 
added by the Senate and the Walker Tariff had passed the Congress. 58 
did, in 1849, express regret to Haywood that this editorial had been printed. 
See Washington Union, July 25, 1846. Letter of Polk to Haywood, January 17, 
1849; Haywood to Polk, December 18, 1848. ~Papers, Library of Congress. 
55po1k, Diaty, II, pp. 51-52. Upon Jarnagin's voting for the bill, 
Polk changes his opinion of him and writes to Governor Brown of Tennessee a 
year later praising J arnagin and noting that not many men would have been so 
honourable. Polk to Brown, Aug. 25, 1847. ~ Paper§, Library of Congress. 
56vice-President Dallas did not hesitate to break the tie in favor of 
the administration measure, in spite of the fact that he was from Pennsyl-
vania, which was strongly opposed to a revenue-only tariff. See Charles M. 
Wiltse, 22• cit., PP• 270-272. 
57cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sass., p. 155. 
58william R. Riker in his text Democracy in the United State~ (New 
York: Macmillan Co., 1955), makes an interesting observation on the practice 
of naming acts after their chief legislative sponsor. He emphasizes that it 
has been quite common to name treaties after members of the administration, 
but quite rare for domestic legislation to be so named, citing only two 
examples of such evidence of executive control and responsibility, the Walker 
Tariff and the Marshall Plan Act, pp. 166-169. 
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~Measures 
Congress, in the first fluSh of excitement following receipt of the 
President's message asking Congress to recognize the existence of a state of 
war between Mexico and the United States, 59 enacted four military laws 
within ten days. 40 The first of these measures provided for the use of the 
state militia in what surely must have been understood to have been a foreign 
war. This was done in spite of the Constitutional provision which states, 
"The Congress shall have Power ••• to provide for calling forth the Militia 
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.n41 
Quincy Wright has characterized this act as unconsti tutiona142 and it is eer-
tainly contrary to the generally a.ecepted view that the service of the militia 
is of a domestic character.45 
Polk did not always find Congress so cooperative. As has been prev-
iously noted, the President ran into consider&ble opposition when he decided 
to ask for an increase of ten regiments in the regular army, rather than to 
continue to rely upon volunteers. Early in January 1847 Polk remarked that 
his ten regiment bill was about to be defeated by the vote of dissident 
59Richardson, ~· ~., pp. 427-445. For a discussion of the power to 
declare war, see supra, Chapter V, pp. ~ 13$""'· f t;.~ 
40~ St&tute.s. at Large 9, ll, 12, 15. 
41u.s. Constitution, Article 1, sec. 8, clause 15. 
42Quincy Wright, "Military Administration" Report 2£ the Efficiency 
~Economy Committee, State of Illinois (1915), p. 899. 
45c1arence A. Berdahl, War Powers £1. ~Executive in ~ Uni tea 
States {Urbana: University of Illinois, 1920), Studies in the Social Sci-
ences, Vol. IX, Nos. 1 and 2; Howard White, Executive Influence in Determin-
ing Military Policy i,n ~ Uni teg. States . (Urbana.: University of Illinois, 
1925), Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XII, Nos. 1 and 2; Opinio~ of 
~ Attorney~-General g[ ~ United States, pp. 325-324. 
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Democrats. He stated in his diary: 
The causes of their disaffection are petty griefs at not having their 
~~shes gratified in appointments to office for themselves, or not 
getting petty offices for their constituents and friends.... I con-
sider their course at the present session more hostile to my adminis-
tration and calculated to do more harm than if they were open poll t-
ical opponents.44 
The President continued to record the desertions of certain members of the 
Democratic party in his diary. He expressed his bitter disappointment at 
the lack of party loyalty. Of one such Democrat he said: 
He therefore showed his patriotism by voting against his country, and 
the furnishing the means to enable the Government to fight its battles 
against a foreign enemy. It is sickening to the heart of the patriot 
to witness as I have done during my term, the numerous instances which 
have occurred in which members of Congress elected as Democr~ts have 
voted against the measures of the Government •••• Many of them are 
Governed by no fixed principles, but are sordid & selfish, if not worse, 
in all they do. Fortunately the combination in the House to-day failed 
by one vote to effect the defeat of this indispensable war measure of 
the Government.45 
President Polk was once more sorely troubled when after the ten regiment bill 
had passed both houses, the Senate rejected the report of the Conference Com-
mittee. Polk placed the entire blame upon Senator Calhoun, who had with his 
supporters united with the entire Whig membership of the Senate to defeat 
the Conference Report. Polk expressed a view of Calhoun from which he never 
retreated during the remainder O·f his life. 
I now regard Mr. Calhoun to be in opposition to my administration ••• I 
now consider him the most mischievous man in the Senate to my administra-
tion. The people must be made to understand this State of things. With 
a nominal majority in each House, I am in truth in a minority in both.46 
The ten regiment bill was saved when the Senate voted to reconsider and the 
subject was again referred to a conference committee. This time both houses 
44polk, Diary, II, pp. 518-519. 
46Ibid., pp. 571-572. 
45 !Q!g,., P• 320. 
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accepted the conference report and passed the bill. 
During the 50th Congress, with the House of Representatives now 
lmder the control o.f the Whig party, 47 the President came in for some severe 
reprimands. Abraham Lincoln in his maiden address before Congress deliv-
ered on the 22nd of December, 1847, challenged the President to indicate the 
exact nspot" on which the war had begun, and for proof of ownership of that 
spot.48 On January 5rd the House, disregarding their vote of 174 to 14 a 
year earlier, which had authorized the war,49 passed a formal declaration 
by a vote of 85 to 81, that the war had been "unnecessarily and unconstitu-
tionally begun by the President of the United States. n50 
Territorial Government and Slave~ 
The President's policy of territorial expansion brought along with 
it the problem of governing the added territory. This problem became insep-
arably entwined with the issue of slavery. Polk has often been accused of 
favoring the acquisition of territory for the sole purpose of acquiring a 
renewed basis for slavery. In this view he is generally cast as either the 
cohort or dupe of. his Secretary of the Treasury, Robert J. Walker. That both 
were expansionists, even imperialists, cannot be denied, but to claim that 
they were advocates ::of a slavocracy is to ignore most of the salient facts. 
It is a fact that Polk ,was a slave holder and a plantation owner in Missis-
sippi and that his sympathies were with the South, yet he was first and fore-
47Historical Statistics .2£ ~ Q.. s., p. 293. 30th =:Congress: House: 
115 Whigs, 108 Democrats, 4 others; Senate: 56 Democrats, 21 Whigs, 1 other. 
48cong. Globe, 50 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 64. 
49Ibid., 29 Cong., 1 Sess., P• 795. 
50 Ibid., 30 Cong., l sess., P• 95. 
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most a Union man. It is to his credit that he saw the danger to the Union 
of the approaching division over slavery and his whole policy was to find 
and enact a compromise which would avoid the establishment of geographical 
parties, which he felt would destroy the Union. It is even more difficult 
to understand how Robert J. Walker can be accused of being a party to the 
slavery conspiracy. He was an advocate of expansion, even opposing the 
President in that he favored acquiring all of Mexico. He was also a Missis-
sippi politician, but it must not be forgotten that as a Mississippi poll-
tician he was constantly in opposition to that other Mississippian, Jeffer-
son Davis, and that when the final decision had to be made, Walker chose 
the Union and served the Lincoln administration in Europe, where he was 
instrumental in preventing the European nations from granting credit to 
the Confeder4cy. In the examination of Polk's attempt to have Congress pro-
vide for territorial governments, Polk's strong .attachment to the Union will 
be clearly demonstrated. 
In A~gpst 1846 there was introduced by Representative Wilmot of 
Pennsylvania an amendment to an appropriation bill Which would prohibit 
slavery in any territory to be acquired from Mexico. The Senate adjourned 
without acting upon the measure. Shortly after Congress reconvened in 
December, the President summoned Wilmot for a conversation on his proviso. 
Polk informed him that: 
••• [he] did not desire to extend slavery, that ••• [he] would be satis-
fied to acquire by treaty from Mexico the Provinces of New Mexico & the 
Californias, and that in these Provinces slavery could probably never 
exist •••• 51 
5~olk, Diapy, II, P• 289. 
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In addition the President pointed out that the question of slavery 
was a domestic one and ought not to enter into our relations with foreign 
nations .• ~ For the time being, Wilmot seemed to be satisfied that it would 
be inappropriate to introduce his proviso. However, shortly after the 
first of the year, Congress was again considering legislation which encom-
' 
passed the Wilmot proviso. At that time Polk clearly saw the danger of 
the slavery question to the very existence of the nation, remarking: 
The movement ••• will be attended with terrible consequences to the 
country, and cannot fail to destroy the Democratic party, if it does 
not ultimately threaten the Union itself. 52 
The President persuaded his Attorney General, Mr. Clifford, who was from 
Maine, to see if his friends from the North in Congress could be persuaded 
to modify their position. Polk concluded by recording in his diary: "I 
deplore the state of things; I will do all I can to correct it; I vdll do 
my duty and leave the rest to God and my country.u55 
Although discussion of slavery continued in Congress throughout the 
Mexican War, Polk was not called upon to take a definite stand until the 
problem was presented in the form of providing territorial governments for 
the newly added territories. During the Spring and early Summer the Cong-
ress was considering a bill introduced in January, 1848 by Senator Douglas 
for a territorial government of Oregon. In the President's eyes the need 
for a compromise and settlement had immeasurably increased as already the 
Barnburners of New York had broken with the regular Democratic party and 
had held their own convention in Utica. The President therefore decided to 
support the Missouri compromise, recording in his diary: 
52 ll?id·, P• 305. 5~., p. 306. 
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If the question can be thus settled harmony will be restored to the 
Union and the danger of forming geographical parties will be avoided. 
For these reasons I am using my inf luence with members of Congress to 
have it effected.54 
By the end of July the Congress had still failed to provide for gov-
ernment in the Territories of Oregon, California, and New Mexico. A bill 
providing for a government had passed the Senate, af ter what Polk st~ted 
was an unprecedented all-night session, only to be defeated in the House by 
15 votes.S5 On this occasion Polk wrote: 
The result of leaving the slavery question an open one, to be a~itated 
by ambitious political aspirants & gamblers and their friends, Lwill be] 
to produce an organization of parties upon geographical lines, which 
must prove dangerous to the harmon~ if not the existence of ~~e Union 
itse1f.56 
By August the subject of a territorial government for Oregon was separ a ted 
from that of California and New Mexico and t he President thought that its 
chs.nces of passage were greatly improved. Having accepted the Missouri 
Compromise line as a basis for settlement, the President felt that he ought 
to sign the Oregon bill even though it contained a provision prohibiting 
slavery, but felt that he must indicate i.Tl a message that he did so only 
because all of Oregon lay above the Missouri Compromise line. In ta...king t his 
position the President was confronted with the opposition of many southern 
Senators, the most notable of whom was Senator Calhoun. But the President 
remained firm, stating once more his concern for the welfare of the nation. 
I expressed the opinion, in which the Cabinet all concurred, that if 
the Oregon Territorial Bill with the slavery restriction in it passed 
5~., III, PP• 502-505. 
55senator Calhoun in his last attempt at compromise had played a lead-
ing role in getting this version through the Senate. See Charles M. Wiltse, 
g£. £i!., PP• 349-555. 
5~olk , Diary, IV, pp. 53-34. 
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and was presented to me for my approval and signature, I ought not to 
with-hold my signature, and that I could not do so without arraying 
the country into geographical parties on the slavery question and 
greatly increasing the excitement, already great, which existed in end 
out of Congress upon that question.57 
As debate on the bill continued and the Congress had set a time for 
adjournment, it became doubtful if the Oregon bill as well as other important 
measures, including an army appropriation bill, would get through the Congress. 
The President informed several Senators that if the Congress adjourned ~~th-
out acting that he would "feel it my duty forth;v.ith to issue my Procla~ation 
con~en:Jng an extra Session of Congress to meet on to-morrow.n58 
At about 10:45 p.m. the log jam was broken and the Oregon Bill, along 
with the other measures, was given to the President, who, as was the custom 
in those days, was waiting in the Vice-President's room. 59 The President 
signed the measures, inclUding the Oregon Bill, Which contained the slavery 
restriction. Polk wrote to the Democratic Presidential nominee, Lewis Cass, 
his views on the Session of Congress which had just ended, stating that he: 
;;·deeply regretted that the delicate and agitating question concerning 
sle.very, could not have been settled by Congress, upon principles of 
conciliation and compromise, and territorial governments have been 
established also over New Mexico and Calif9rnia. In view of the 
excitement which existed threatening to array the country into geograph-
ical parties which could not fail to des~y the harmony and might prove 
dangerous to the existence of the Union La settle~t of this vexing 
question is the most urgent one before the countryj. 60 
57 . 
Ibid., P• 67. 5~., P• 76. 
59Until the Wilson administration it was believed necessary that the 
President must sign all bills prior to Congressional adjournment, if they were 
to become law. So for that reason the President on the last day of Congress 
waited to receiveG the bills in the Capitol. The President was human enough 
to enjoy the excit ement of the closing hours of Congress. Letter of Polk to 
Lewis Cass, August 24, 1848. Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 
6~etter of Polk to Lewis Cass, August 24, 1848. Polk Papers, Library 
of Congress. 
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On the last day of September the cabinet assembled, it being the 
first cabinet meeting since the 14th of August at which all members were pres-
ent. The President immediately launched a discussion of the problem of terr-
itorial governments for New Mexico and California. He was especially dis-
turbed by a public letter which Senator Benton had sent to the people of Cali-
fornia and which was to be delivered by his son-in-law, Col. Fremont. This 
letter a~peared to be an invitation to the residents of California to form 
their own commonwealth with Col. Fremont as their Governor. Polk was alarmed. 
Was he to lose California now after all this difficulty? Polk was deter-
mined that it was necessary to address a letter to the people of California 
counteracting the Benton letter. The President was in doubt concerning the 
contents of such a letter. By what right did the President govern over the 
territory now? Did the military government established during the war still 
exist, legally, now that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo had been signed? 
Mr. Polk's Attorney General was no help, stating that the sovereignty of the 
terri tory rested in the people, and t hat in the absence of Congressional 
action they could govern themselves as they chose. After five hours of 
debate in the cabinet the President outlined the substance of the message to 
be sent. 61 
That the inhabitants should be informed that California was now a part 
of the u. S., that the constitution of the U. s. extended over them & 
was in force, that Congress had failed to establish a Territorial Gov-
ernment over them, that the President would strongly recommend the estab-
lishment of such a Government at the next Session, and that there was 
every reason to believe that it would be done, and that in the mean-
time they were advised to consent to the existing Gover~ment ~ facto, 
so far at least as the rights of person & property were concerned •••• 
I proposed further that he should inform them that they had no right, 
under the Constitution, to meet in Convention and abrogate the present 
61Polk, Diary, IV, pp. 135-145. 
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Government ~ facto and form a. new one, that if this was done it would 
not be by viDtue of any authority derived from the constitution, and 
could only be justified by the extreme necessity of their condition.62 
After the Presidential election in November, which a s sured tha t the 
control of the Executive would next March pass into the hands of the Whigs, 
Polk became very anxious that the problems of slavery and territorial gov-
ernment be settled by the next session of Congress before he left office. 
Therefore, in his fourth annual message to Congress delivered on December 5, 
1848, the President delivered an impassioned plea for tolerance and compromise 
to settle this disturbing ~uestion: 
With the opening prospects of increased prosperity and national great-
ness which the acquisition of these rich and extensive territorial posses-
sions affords, how irrational it would be to forego or to reject these 
advantages by the agitation of a domestic question which is coeval with 
the existence of our government itself, and to endanger, by internal 
strifes, geographical divisions, and heated contests for political power, 
or for any other cause, the harmony of the glorious Union of our confeder-
ated States - that Union ?hich binds us together as one people, and which 
for sixty years has been our shield and protection against every danger. 
In the eyes of the world and of posterity how trivial and insignificant 
will be all our internal divisions and struggles compared with the pres-
ervation of this Union of the States in all its vigor and with all its 
countless blessings! No patriot would foment and excite geographical and 
sectional divisions. No lover of his country would deliberately calculate 
the value of the Union. Future generations would look in amazement upon 
the folly of such a course.... Ours is the great example of a prosperous 
.and free self-governed republic, commanding the admiration and the imita-
tion of all the lovers of freedom throughout the world. Row solemn, there-
fore, is the duty, how impressive the call upon us and upon all parts of 
our country, to cultivate a patriotic spirit of harmony, of goad-fellow-
ship, of compromise and mutual concession, in the administration of the 
incomparable system of government formed by our f athers in the midst of 
almost insuperable difficulties, and transmitted to us with the injunc-
tion that we should enjoy its blessings and hand it down unimpaired to 
those who may come after us. 
In view of the high and responsible duties which we owe to ourselves 
and to mankind, I trust you may be able at your present session to approach 
the adjustment of the only domestic question which seriously threatens, or 
probably can ever threaten, to disturb the harmony and successful opera-
tions of our system.65 
·B2rbid. ,pp.l42-145. 65aichardson, ~· cit., pp. 659-640. 
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The President followed this plea for reason by outlining three modes 
of settlement which would be acceptable to him. These were (1) pass no legis-
lation on the slavery question, leaving the problem to be settled by the 
territories when they applied for admission as states, (2) extend the Missouri 
Compromise line to the Pacific, or (5) provide for the settlement of the 
issue by a judicial tribunal. He also advised the Congress that if none of 
these modes was adopted then Congress should find a solution in some other 
manner. He concluded his remarks on the new territories by pointing out 
that evidence of an abundance of gold and silver had been found in ~~ese 
territories. 54 
Not being content to leave the matter in the hands of Congress, the 
President continued to seek a means of settling this vexing question. A 
week after the President had de~ivered his message to Congress he addressed 
his cabinet on the seriousness of the situation. He remarked that he was 
afraid that if the situation were not settled before his term expired that 
when the Whigs took office they would allow California to separate f rom 
t he nation. He continued: 
I then stated that I thought [it] indispensable that we should agree upon 
a plan of settlement (for Congress seemed to have no plan) and exercise 
what influence we might possess to carry it through at the present Session. 
All present agreed that this would be proper and, indeed, our duty. It 
is ~ question rising above ordinary party considerations. We have a coun-
try as well as a party to obey.65 
Having come to the conclusion that none of the proposals previously consid-
ered by Congress could be adopted, the President recommended that all throw 
their support behind Senator Douglas's bill to admit California into the 
Union as a State. This would have the advantage of permitting the residents 
64rbid•, PP• 640-645. 65polk, Diary, IV, P• 252. 
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of California to decide the slavery issue for themselves. As further evi-
dence of Polk's not being a part of the slavocracy, is his support of the 
admission of California directly as a State, for it is certain that he was 
aware that the California State Constitution would never be pro-slavery. 
In response to Calhoun's plans to organize the congressmen from 
slave-holding states regardless of party affiliation, Polk's position toward 
the extremists of his party became unmistakably clear. Polk's first advice 
was to a congressman who was considering attending a meeting of all southern 
congressmen. 
He asked me what I would advise him to do. This it was natural he 
should do as he represents the District in Tennessee in which I reside, 
and is ·a citizen of the same village •••• I told him that as President 
of the U. S. it would be my duty to allay any sectional excitement which 
might arise, and to do all in my power to prevent any violent proceed-
ings which might endanger the harmony of the Union •••• 
The agitation of the slavery question is mischievous & wicked and 
proceeds from no patriotic motive by its authors.... And this they seem 
willing to do even at the hazard of disturbing the harmony if not dissolv-
ing the Union itself.66 
On the following day the President recorded in his diary a statement 
from which it might be implied that he felt the danger to the Union was near 
at hand, and if the situation took that turn he would act to preserve the 
Union. 
My opinions as [to] the wickedness of agitating the subject in Congress 
are well settled, & events may occur which will make it my duty to incur 
high and vast responsibilities. I will meet them, but am resolved to 
give no favour to violent or disunion movements, but on the contrary to 
do everything, consistently with my sense of constitutional duty, to pre-
serve the Union & its harJHony. 67 
Polk continued to express his opposition to the proposed plan to 
have the southern congressmen make an "Address of Southern Congressmen to 
-?.6:rbid., PP• 250-251. 67 Ibid., P• 255. 
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Their Constituents." On the fourteenth of January he told a deleg~tion of 
southern Congressional leaders, 11 ••• to attend the meeting to-morrow night 
& endeavor to prevent anything from being done; but not themselves sign sny 
address. n68 During the day of the meeting, Polk continued to give the same 
advice to the large .number of congressmen who called.69 
The meeting voted to send back to committee Senator Calhoun's address 
to the people by the very narrow vote of 41 to 40.70 On the following day 
Calhoun presented himself to the President. Polk recorded, "I anticipated 
his business from the moment he entered my office, & I was not mistaken." 
He was there to argue the slavery question. Polk met his arguments by 
stressing ~is fondness for the Union and the desirability of a compromise to 
settle the issue. Specifically, the President urged upon him the necessity 
of supporting Douglas's plan for admitting California to the Union as a 
State. Calhoun characterized this plan as a betrayal of the South. Polk's 
impression of Calhoun was now at a new low. 
I became perfectly satisfied that he did not desire that Congress should 
settle the question at the present Session, and that he desired to in-
fluence the South upon the subject, whether from personal or patriotic 
views it is not difficult to determine. I was firm and decided in my 
conversation vrith him, intending to let him understand distinctly that I 
gave no countenance 1£ any movement which tended to violence or the dis-
union of the States. 
68Ibid., pp. 279-282. 69Ibid., pp. 282-284 
70washington Union, January 28, 1849. This issue carried a very com-
plete report of the entire series of meetings of southern congressmen. The 
meetings were as follows: first assembly of southern congressmen, Dec. :?3, 
1848 -- committee of 15 appointed; 60mmittee met on Dec. 30, 1848, and Janu-
ary 10 and 13, 1849. On the 13th the committee by a vote of 8 to 7 came out 
in favor of an address. Address read to entire assembly on January 15; recom-
mitted to committee by a vote of 41-40. New address was accepted on January 
20, after a motion not to deliver an addre ss was rejected 59-18. For a de-
tailed account of Calhoun's role in this affair, see Charles M. Wiltse, Qg. 
cit., PP• 374-592. 
71Polk, Piary, IV, P• 288. 
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'l'he President continued to urge the members of Congress to "exert 
their energies in Qggg~, [rather] than to agitate the slavery question 
in caucus out of Congress." When it was suggested to the President that he 
might throw the entire slavery question upoh the shoulders of the incoming 
President, Mr. Taylor, Polk replied that there ~~s " ••• a country to save as 
well as a party to obey," and that it was " ••• the solemn duty of the present 
Congress to settle the question. 1172 The President considered addre s sing a 
special message to Congress to urge their action, but decided instead to pub-
lish in the Union the disturbing reports from California describing a state 
of anarchy. 73 On the 20th of January, Polk addressed himsel f to his cabinet 
on the slavery issue, stating: 
I expressed my disapprobation of any further proceedings of the southern 
members of Congress on the slave question in caucus. I thought they had 
much better direct their energies in Congress instead of in caucus.... I 
stated that a proposition was now made by a Northern Senator (Mr. Doug-
lass) to admit California as a state ••• and that no Southern man ought 
to object to it. I thought it was wholly unjustifyabl:e ' for Southern 
members of Congress, when a fair prospect was represented of settling the 
whole .question, to with-hold their co-operation •••• · I added that I 
feared there were a few Southern men who had become so excited that they 
were indifferent to the preservation of the Union. I stated that I put 
my face alike against southern agitators and Northern fanatics, & should 
·dO everything in my power to allay excitement by adjusting the question 
of slavery & preserving the Union ••• it was agreed that each member of 
the Cabinet would be active in seeing members of Congress & urging them 
to support the Bill to admit California at once as a State. Each mem-
ber of the Cabinet agreed to do this. At my suggestion each member of 
the Cabinet agreed to visit and converse with the members of the Congress 
from particular states, and was to report at the next meeting of the 
Cabinet.? 
Polk continued his efforts to line up support for the Douglas bill, 
including the support of Whig congressmen, stating "I regarded the subject 
72Ibid., p. 293. 75Ibid., P• 297. 
74rbid., IV, PP• 298-299. 
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above mere party considerations, and wished it settled, I cared not by whose 
votes.~75 But in spite of his urgings Congress failed to act. On the 3rd of 
March the President went as usual to the Capitol still hopeful that Congress 
might enact a statehood bill for California. About 4 a.m. on the 4th of 
March the President returned to his hotel, where he had taken up residence 
in snticipation of Taylor's taking over the White House. Without undress-
ing, the President waited there until 6 a.m. at which time the final bills 
of Congress were presented to him for his signature. There was not among 
them a bill to admit California as a state.76 
In spite of his inability to prod Congress to act on the admission 
of California as a State, he did succeed'in presenting the southern congress-
men with a stern reminder of their duty and responsibility to the Union. Had 
he failed in this duty, or had he encour~ged Calhoun and his supporters, it 
is quite likely that the secession which was to come eleven years later 
would have been upon the nation then. If that had happened, it is more than 
likely that the North would have permitted the South to leave the nation 
and the Union might have been permanently destroyed. 
Senatorial Confirmation 2£ Appointments 
The general discussion of President Polk's use of the appointing 
power will be considered in the next chapter. As Polk inherited and fol-
lowed the Jacksonian tradition toward patronage, it seems more appropriate 
to consider the appointing power in connection with an evaluation of the Pres-
ident as a political leader. A consideration at this time, however, of 
75rbid., pp. 308-509. 
76 Ibid., pp. 249-268, passim; throughout these pages is an account 
of Polk's attempt to find a solution to the slavery question. 
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Senatorial confirmation of appointments during the Polk administration will 
be helpful in an understanding of his relations with the Congress and the 
degree to which he expected party support pf his appointments. Polk exhib-
its an attitUde, unusual for the times although evidenced earlier by Andrew 
Jackson, of expecting Whig opposition as normal, but regarding any Demo-
cra.tic defection as tantamount to treason. 
During the first session of Congress, Senator Cass, a strong Demo-
cra.t, advised the President that he was considering voting against a Pres-
idential nominee. The President, after assuring Cass of the qualifications 
of the man in question, said: 
••• that the rejection of my prominent nominations by the Senate at the 
opening of my administra.tion was calculated to weaken my administration 
before the cotmtry, and destroy my power to carr~ ou_:t. any of my recom-
mendations of measures before Congress. I told Lhimj the Senate of 
course had a right to reject any of my nominations, and I would not com-
plain; but if they were good men & qualified, and were rejected by a few 
democrats uniting with the whole Vfuig party, he could well see the embar-
rassment to all the measures of my administration which it would produce.77 
Mr. Polk's reaction to the rejection by the Senate of the President's 
appointment of Henry Horn as collector of the Port of Philadelphia provides 
an excellent example of the President's tenacity. As has been noted, the 
Democratic Party in the State of Pennsylvania was divided into t wo factions. 
Secretary of State Buchanan was the leader of one and Vice-President Dallas 
the leader of the other. The President's nominee Mr. Horn came to him well 
recommended. He had been a member of Congress at the same time as the Pres-
ident and had the unqualified support of General Jackson. But, in spite of 
these recommendations Polk delayed nominating him out of deference to the 
opposition of Secretary of State Buchanan. Eventually, Buchanan withdrew 
77 I.J;Wi., I, p. 207. 
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his objection and the President sent Horn's appointment to the Senate. 78 
His nomination was immediately opposed by Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania. 
Senator Cameron, seizing an opportunity which presented itself when a number 
of Democratic Senators were absent attending a funeral of a son of one of 
the members, moved to take up the nomination. Senators Calhoun, Cameron, 
and Wescott voted with the solid Whig membership to defeat the nomination. 
Polk was bitter and remarked in his diary: 
Cameron of Penn. was elected by the Whigs to the Senate, is a managing, 
tricky man in whom no reliance is to be placed. He professes to be a 
Democrat, but he has his own personal and sinister purposes to effect, 
& I consider him little better than a Whig. Wescott, though elected 
as a Democrat, I consider a Whig. Of Mr. Calhoun I -forbear to express 
an opinion, further than to sa.y that his ambition is destroying him. 79 
The President, after seeing Senators ?mo had been absent when the vote was 
taken and after securing numerous promises or· support, decided to renom-
inate ~~. Horn. Prior to his doing so, Senator Cameron, having heard of his 
intention to renominate Mr. Horn, called on the President to protest the 
renomination. He promised the President that he would vote for Mr. Horn 
for any other post. To this acknowledgment the President replied: 
••• that if he would vote for him for any other office, it was conclusive 
evidence that there was no public ground upon which as a Senator he had 
voted against him, and proved that he ought not to have been rejected. 
I told Mr. Cameron that himself & two other Senators elected as Democrats 
(Wescott & Calhoun) but neither of whom had by their course given any 
evidence of their Democracy lately, had left the balance of the Demo-
cratic party, joined the United ~big party, and taking advantage of a 
thin Senate when six or eight Democratic Senators were absent had voted 
against Mr. Horn and rejected him. He said he was a Democrat & a sup-
porter of my administration. I replied that this vote did not look 
much like it. Mr. C. left me apparently dissatisfied with the results 
of this interview.so 
But once again the President was to be disappointed when the Senate 
78 Ibid., pp.218-220. 79Ibia., pp.426-427. BOI llill·, PP• 435-456. 
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for the second time rejected the appointment of Mr. Horn. The President 
noted in some detail why each Democrat who voted against the nomination did 
so. He stated in his dia.ry: 
The selfishness of some members of Congress who make their ,public duties 
bend to their personal interests, proves at least that they are not 
better or purer than the mass of other men.... The sooner such pa.rty 
men go into the ranks of the Whig party the better.81 
Polk remained~ determined, however, that no one who opposed the 
appointment would receive any benefit from his opposition. To that end he 
nominated Col. James Page to the post. This nomination brought from Buchanan 
the comment that the President could not have appointed but one man in the 
State of Pennsylvania more opposed to him; he continued by stating to the 
President that he should have consulted the Pennsylvania Congressional dele-
gation. To this advice the President replied: 
••• that this was a peculiar case, and that my consideration and inde-
pendence as President of the U. S. required that I should show to Mr. 
Cameron and other ••• that by their rejection neither they nor their 
friends should be profited by it.82 
On e.nother occasion the President found himself placed in sn emba.r-
rassing posi tio·n by the withdrawal of a nomi nation. The President had nom-
inated a Mr. Tate of Mississippi to be consul at Bueaos Aires. Secretary 
of the Treasury Walker, also of Mississippi, approached the President with a 
letter signed by the t wo Senators from Mississippi which advised him to vii th-
draw the nomination. The reasoning given in the letter and by M.r. Walker 
was that Tate's nomination was being opposed and was subject to charges to 
Which only Mr. Tate could reply. Polk therefore agreed to the request and 
withdrew the nomination. The following day the President was informed that 
the Senate, in executive session, had considered a resolution which proposed 
8~bid., pp.486-487. 82rbid.' p. 488. 
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to call Mr. Walker to testify before the Senate regarding the charges against 
Mr. Tate. Polk had not seen the Executive Journal of the Senate, but quickly 
appreciated that it placed him in the position of appearing to shield his 
Secretary of the Treasury from questioning. The President's first action 
was to send for Mr. Dickins, Secretary of the Senate. Polk explained that 
his failure to see a copy of the Executive Journal of the Senate, which 
according to the Senate rules should be furnished the President, had greatly 
embarrassed him. When the Secretary of the Senate appeared to be indiffer-
ent and failed to assure the President that he would in the future receive 
his copy, Polk became annoyed. 
So great was his apparent indifference that I felt indignant, a~d became 
a little excited. I then told him in an earnest manner that [!~had no 
authority over him, and pretended to exercise none; but that if I was 
entitled to a copy of the Executive Journal of the Senate, I demanded 
that it should be furnished to me, and that if he did not furnish it I 
would communicate that fact to the Senate and request that he should be 
required to do his duty.85 
After a conversation ~~th Mr. Walker, who, although professing all 
innocence of the charges to be made in the Senate, offered to resign his 
cabinet post if the President felt his presence there embarrassed the admin-
istraticn, Polk decided to renominate Mr. Tate. Mr. Tate unexpectedly re-
turned to Washington and when he did so the charges i n the Senate against him 
were VTi thdravm and his nomination was approved by the Senate. Previous to 
this action, Mr. Walker had replied in writing to the Senate's charges and in 
Polk's eyes had vindicated himself. 84 
Treatx Ratification - Oregon 
In Polk's first annual message to Congress, delivered on the 2nd of 
8Drbid., PP• 173-174. 
8~bid., pp. 166-182; 259-240; 529; a full account of the Tate 
nomination. 
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December 1845, he devoted considerable space to the question of the Oregon 
boundary. After revie~~ng the history of the negotiations that had taken 
place in 1818, 1824, 1826, 1844, and his own offer to compromise on the basis 
of the 49th parallel, he proceeded to advise the Congress that they should 
act to terminEl.te the Convention of Joint Occupancy of 1827. He stated: 
The faith of treaties, in their letter and spirit, has ever been, and, I 
trust, will ever be, scrupulously observed by the United States. Under 
that convention a year 's notice is required to be given b,y either party 
to the other before the joint occupancy shall terminate and before either 
can rightfully assert or exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any portion 
of the territory. This notice it would, in my judgment, be proper to 
give, and I recommend that provision be made by law for giving it accord-
ingly, and terminating in this manner the convention of the 6th of Aug-
ust, 1827.85 
The follovdng passages in his message gave even greater encouragement to 
the 54040 1 men in his party: 
At the end of the year's notice, ••• we shall have reached a period 
when the national rights in Oregon must either be abandoned or firmly 
maintained. That they can not be abandoned without a sacrifice of both 
national honor and interest is too cl~ar to admit of doubt • 
••• [A compromise on British terms~ can never for a moment be enter-
tained by the United States without an abandonment of their just and 
clear territorial rights, their own self-respect, and the national honor.B6 
In spite of the strong language in his message, the President, within 
the month of December, had informed his Secretary of State that, should Eng-
land offer a compromise, he n ••• would consult confidentially three or four 
Senators from different parts of the Union, ~~d might submit it to the Senate 
for their previous advice.n87 On the 24th of December the President held a 
long conversation with Senator Allen of Ohio, Chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, on the Oregon question. Senator Allen was the leader ~~d 
85Richardson, 212.• cit., p. 595. 86Ibid., pp. 597-398. 
87 Polk, Diary, I, p. 135. 
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the most vocif erous of the 54040' men. Polk took him into his entire confi-
dance, showing him the dispatches vlhich had been sent and received from Eng-
land up until t~at time. Allen was advised that the President expected that 
Britain would make a compromise offer based on the 49th parallel. Allen, con-
fident that such a proposal could never muster a two-thirds vote in the Sen-
ate, advised the President to submit such a proposal to the Senate for their 
previous advice.88 The course which the United States should follow regarding 
the Oregon question had split the Democratic party wide open, with t he men 
from the South favoring any concession to avoid a conflict while those from 
the North counseled that it meant certain defeat for their party if the admin-
istration ever accepted a compromise. To all inquiries the President main-
tained that his views were as he had stated in his annual message. 
Mr. Calhoun led a fight on the floor of the Senate to force ' the Pres-
ident to reopen negotiations. Mr. Haywood called on the President on a num-
ber of occasions to inform him of the developments taking place in the Senate, 
and to advise him that, although he favored compromise, he did not favor the 
movement being led by Calhoun to force the President's hand. The President 
maintained the most friendly relations with Haywood and failed to express any 
opposition to the position which he took. Polk gradually let it be known, 
however, that if a compromise were offered he would submit it to the Senate 
for its prior advice; he even went so far as to inform lhlb.ig Sene.tor Archer 
of his intention to do so. 89 
The debate which had been going on for some time in the Senate on t he 
88_rbid., p. 159; Ibid., IV, p. 526. 
89IQid., pp. 244-261, ~passim. 
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President's proposal to give notice to Britain, severing the joint occu-
pancy of Oregon, reached its peruc in a speech delivered by Senator Hayv1ood. 
The Senator argued that the notice was really peaceful and that it invited 
a compromise offer from the British. He made the point that when Polk had 
used the expression "reoccupy the Oregon Terri tory" that he must have meant 
to claim only the territory extending as far as the 49th parallel for that 
was as far as American citizens had ever occupied the territory. Senator 
Hannagan of Indiana and Senator Allen were incensed at the speech and 
demanded of Senator Haywood whether he spoke for the President or not. Hay-
wood refused to answer this question and turned the question back on Senator 
Allen, remarking in doing so " ••• that had he occupied the station of chairman 
of a very important committee, placing him in confidential intercourse with 
the President, and had attributed opinions to the President, which he could 
not establish, when interrogated, he would quit.n90 
This Senate debate brought the interested parties to the White House 
immediately to inquire if the President had authorized Haywood to speak in 
his behalf. The President's reply to this inquiry when addressed to him by 
Mr. Hannagan was that "· •• no one spoke ~ cathedra for me •••• n9l However, 
when other Senators spoke in favor of Haywood's speech and in opposition to 
the stand taken by Mr. Allen, the President answered them by ~ng, in addi-
tion to denying that anyone spoke for the Presiden\that he n ••• did not regard 
the notice as war measure ••• [and] it would prove to be pacific.n92 A few 
days later Senator Hannagan returned to the White House and demanded of the 
90 ~· Globe, 29th Cong., l Sess. 459-460; for an interesting account 
of this Senate debate which states that Haywood was speaking at Polk's urging, 
see Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years View, II, pp. 662-667. 
91Polk, Diary, I, P• 262. 92lb1d., P• 265. 
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President whether he stood for the whole of Oregon up to 54040 1 or whether 
he would compromise at 49°. Polk recorded his response as follows: 
I answered him that I would answer no man what I would do in the future; 
that for What I might do I would be responsible to God and my country 
and if I should hereafter do anything which should be disapproved by 
himself or others, it would be time enough to condemn me. I am charged 
with the Foreign relations of the country, and it was unheard of that 
the President should declare in advance to any one out of his Cabinet 
his intentions in reference to them.95 
Mr. Hannagan had no sooner left the President than Senator Allen arrived in 
a very excited state. Polk was unable to calm the Chai!'!Ilan of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and he left still disturbed, only to return on the next 
night. At that time Senator Allen presented a statement to the President for 
his approval, which contained the remarks he proposed to make in the Senate. 
The substance of the paper was that he (Allen) was authorized to say by the 
President that he still stood for the entire territory of Oregon up to the 
54040 1 line, and that he had not authorized Haywood to express any other 
opinion. The President refused to authorize Senator Allen to make such a 
statement on his behalf; he informed the Senator that he could say what he 
chose but must take the whole responsibility himself.94 
The debate over the form of notice to be given continued in the 
Senate. The debate rapidly drew to a close, however, after the Senate had 
accepted an amendment to the notlce which added a preamble which stressed 
that the goverbment of the United States was still anxious to find a peace-
ful solution to the difficulty. Senator Allen rose to oppose the whole 
notice now that it contained the preamble, but Senator Crittendon contempt -
uously asked of Senator Allen, "By what authority does he speak so? Is it 
the little petty office of Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
95Ibid., p. 275. 94rbid., p. 279. 
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which warrants him, in his own opinion, to put on these airs of authority?"95 
Shortly thereafter the Senate voted, by a vote of 40 to 14, to ps.ss the notice, 
including the preemble.96 
A week was needed to adjust the differences between the two houses. 
During this time Polk had occasion to advise Calhoun of the significance he 
attached to the passage of notice. 
I told him that as long as Congress hesitated and refused to give the 
notice he need not expect a settlement of the Oregon questiQP; that 
until Congress authorized the notice of Great Brittain [sic_lwould cal-
culate largely on our divisions & would make no proposition. I ex-
pressed the opinion also that if Congress had given the notice in the 
early part of the Session & shown that we were united & firm, I thought 
it probable the question would have been settled before this time.97 
The day before the notice was passed by both Houses, by the comfort-
able majorities of 142-46 in the House and 40-10 in the Senate, 98 the Pres-
ident summarized his reaction to the strenuous debate which had divided the 
Democratic Party in the Senate. 
The truth is that in all this Oregon discussion in the Senate, too 
many Democratic Senators have been more concerned about the Presidential 
election in 148, than they have been about settling Oregon either at 
49° or 54040 1 • "Forty-eight" has been with them the Great question, and 
hence the divisions in the Democratic party. I cannot but observe the 
fact, and for the sake of the country I deeply deplore it. I will how-
ever do my duty whatever may happen. I will rise above the interested 
factions in Congress, and appeal confidently to the people for support. 99 
As the President had expected, the passage of the notice was soon 
followed by a compromise offer from the British offering a settlement based 
on the 49th parallel. As has been previously noted, Polk had decided to 
submit the proposal to the Senate for their prior approval. Before doing so, 
95cong. Globe, 29th Cong., l Sess., p. 1)81. 96rbid., P• 685. 
97Polk, Dia.r.:l, I, p. 558. 
98cong.Globe,29th Cong., l Sess.,pp.717,721. 99Polk,Diary,I,p.345. 
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he advised Senators Cass and Allen of his intention. Senator Allen urged 
him to reject the proposition and not submit it to the Senate at all. Evi-
dently the vote of notice, which had passed the Senate by more than two-
thirds majority, had caused him to doubt the certainty of his earlier belief 
that the Senate was bound to reject such a compromise. Senator Cass, who 
had also been a "54°4().l or fight" man, informed the President that he felt 
that ~~e President was bound to submit such a proposal to the Senate. Fur-
thermore, Senator Cass informed the President that although compelled to vote 
against the British proposition that " ••• if it was accepted by the Senate he 
would never be heard to utter a word afterwards on the subject.nlOO 
On the lOth of June Polk delivered his message containing the British 
compromise proposal to the Senate. The message we.s a short one but one which 
showed careful piannihg. The first part of the message traced the early his-
tory, especially alluding to Washington, of asking the Senate for prior ad-
vice on a treaty. He said of this practice that: 
••• though rarely resorted to in later times, [it] was, in my judgment, 
eminently wise, and may on occasions of great importance be properly 
revived. The Senate are a branch of the treaty-making power, and by con-
sulting them in advance of his own action upon important measures of 
foreign policy which may ultimately come before them for their consider-
ation the President secures harmony of action between that · body and him-
self. [He then sign,ificantly continued by stressing the war-making power 
lodged in the Senate:} The Senate are, moreover, a branch of the war-
making power, and it may be eminently proper for the Executive to take 
the opinion and advice of that body in advance upon any great guestion 
which may involve in its decision ~~e issue of peace or war.lOI 
In his message the President did not reiterate his own views but 
merely referred the Senate back to his position as expressed in his annual 
message to Congress the previous December. Although he added that his views 
were unchanged, it was a known fact that he had signed and favored the 
100~., pp.462-465. lOlRichardson, on. it 449 = .£..__.' p. • 
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notice of termination even though it contained a preamble which invited the 
British to make a compromise offer. This phase of his message was followed 
by a paragraph which masterfully shifted the responsibility from his shoulders 
on to the Senate's. 
Should the Senate• by the constitutional majority required for the rati-
fication of treaties. advise the acceptance of this proposition, or ad-
vise it with such modifications as they may upon full deliberation deem 
proper, I shall conform my action to their e.dvice. Should the Senate, 
however, decline by such constitutional majority to give such advice or 
to express an opinion on the subject, I shall consider it my duty to 
reject the offer.l02 
The Senate went into executive session almost immediately and two 
days later on Friday the 12th of June the President was advised that the 
Senate by a vote of 58 to 12 had voted to accept the British proposa1.103 
Vfuen the Senate reconvened on Monday, Chairman Allen of the Senate's Foreign 
Relations Committee, tendered his resignation from the Committee. Senator 
Cass then informed the Senate that he would retain his seat on the Committee 
but although he had seniority that he would not accept the chairmanship.l04 
Earlier in the day Senator Cass informed the President that Senator Allen 
had requested that Senators Lewis, Atherton, and he (Cass) resign their 
seats also, but that they had refused to do so.lOS 
There is evidence that President Polk did not let himself become 
bound by any precedent which might have been established by his ~~llingness 
to submit to the prior advice of the Senate. In 1848 the Senate advised the 
President to negotiate a treaty of extradition with Prussia, and Polk refused 
to follow their advice.l06 A second occasion arose when the President was 
102 Ibid., p. 450. 105polk, Diarx, I, p.467. 
104c0 ngressional Globe, 29th Cong., 1 Sess., p. 972. 
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discussing with his cabinet a proposal to purchase the rights of the Hudson•s 
Bay Company on the Columbia River. Polk had stated that he was unwilling to 
make such a purchase without a good deal more infonnation on the value of 
what he was purchasing. Buchanan informed the President that he didn r t think 
it would be a good thing to do unless the "Senate previously advised it." 
Polk replied u ••• that [he] would not do so if they did advise it, without 
more knowledge of what we were purchasing than we possessed.nl07 
Congressional Investigations 
President Polk was particularly alert to the danger of Congressional 
domination of the executive branch of the government through the use of the 
Congressional investigative powers. Although it wasn't until after the mid-
term election which placed the House in the control of the Whig party that 
his own administration was faced with serious attempts to investigate its 
action, Polk had previously expressed himself in defense of the rights of the 
executive branch against Congressional prying. In April of 1846 the House of 
Representatives requested information regarding expenditures from a conting-
ency fund for foreign affairs which had been expended, upon Presidential cer-
tification, during the Presidency of John Tyler, with the concurrence of 
Daniel Webster, who had then been Secretary of State. Here was an oppor-
tunity for the Democrats to utilize their investigating power to make polit-
ical gains against their opponents. Polk had such serious doubts about his 
right to surrender the requested information that he called a special cabinet 
meeting for 7 p.m. to discuss the matter. The cabinet agreed with the Pres-
ident that it would be unwise to furnish the required information to the House. 
The President concluded that it " ••• would be a most dangerous precedent to 
lO?Ibid., pp. 301-302. 
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answer the call •••• nlOB The House of Representatives, finding themselves 
checked by the President's action, called on Ex-President Tyler to appear 
before them and testify regarding the use of the secret fund. Polk informed 
Tyler, when he called on him, of his opposition to the Congressional summons. 
Polk records that he had expressed his strong disapproval to Congressional 
leaders regarding the matter and indicated his approval of Mr . Tyler by 
requesting him to lunch at the White House on Saturday next.l09 
Prior to the mid-term election the only occasion Which arose for the 
President to refuse a request for information from the Congress came about 
because of a request by the Senate upon the Secretary of War for inf ormation 
on the intentions of the Administration toward California. Mr. Marcy, the 
Secretary of War, thought he had no discretion in the matter and must furnish 
the requested information. Marcy had, therefore, compiled the information 
and presented it to the President. Polk called Senator Johnson, the author 
of the resolution, to the White House, and confidentially informed him of 
the contents. Johnson, after learning that disclosure of the i nformation 
would reveal the United States' plans for the capture of California, agreed 
with the President that the request of the Senate should not be honored. 
Polk therefore directed his Secretary of War not to reply to the request and 
Senator Johnson stated that if anything was said about it on the Senate 
fl.oor, he would reply that he had seen the papers and was satisfied that 
the request should not be answered.llO 
It was suggested to President Polk on one occasion that he deliver a 
confidential message to the House of Representatives. Polk replied that no 
1Q8 ~., I, P• 552. 109Ibid., P• 451. 110Ibid., II, PP• 13-14. 
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confidential message had been delivered to the House f or at least a dozen 
yea rs and that to " ••• expect my message to be kept a secret, would be as I 
thought a perfect farce.nlll 
The President was always careful to edit any copies of correspondence 
or records being sent to Congress to eliminate any items which were really 
ines sential to an understanding of the topic. For example, in complying with 
a request by the House for correspondence between the Secretary of State and 
Mr. Bancroft over the Irish question, the President authorized sending, "All 
the correspondence deemed important, omitting such protions of it as con-
sisted in speculations and opinions of the Secretary of State and Mr. Ban-
croft •••• nll2 
In January 1848 the President replied quite strongly to a request of 
the House of Representatives for information which the President did not feel 
was wise to reveal. In his mes sage to the House in which he refused to honor 
the r equest he clearly states hi s views on the independent position of the 
execut:irtre bre.nch of the government. 
The customary and usual reservation contained in ce.lls of either House of 
Congress upon the Executive for information relating to our intercourse 
with foreign nations has been omitted in t he resolution before me. The 
call of the House is unconditional. It is that the information requested 
be communicated, and thereby be made public, Whether in the opinion of 
the Executive (who is charged by the Constitution with the duty of con-
ducting negotiations with foreign powers) suCh informDtion, when disclosed, 
would be prejudicial to the public interest or not. It has been a_ subject 
of serious deliberation with me whether I could, consistently with my 
Constitutional duty and my sense of the public interests involved and to 
be affected by it, viol£te an important principle, always heretofore held 
sacred by my £iedecessors, as I should do by a compliance with the request 
of the house. 5 
111 ~., pp. 70-71. 112rbid., IV, P• 251. 
115 Richardson, 22• £11., IV, pp. 566- 567. 
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After citing at some length the action of President Washington rega.rding a 
request for information on the Jay Treaty negotiations, Polk concludes as 
follows: 
Entertaining this conviction, and with a sincere desire to furnish 
any information which may be in possession of the executive department, 
and ~niCh either House of Congress may at any time request, I regard it 
to be my constitutional right and my solemn duty under ~he circumstances 
of this case to decline a. C£fJ4liance with the request of the House con-
tained in their resolution. 
One month :. before the close of his term of office Polk had occasion 
to refer again to his message refusing to comply with an unconditional re-
quest. A number of Congressmen, Houston of Alabama, Boyd of Kentucky, McKay 
of Alabama, Judge Catron of the Supreme Court, and Postmaster General Johnson 
were discussing with Mr. Polk an expected request of the House for information 
regarding negotiations on the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 
The President records his comments as follows: 
••• jocosely and in a pleasant mood remarked to him, you will, of course, 
embrace in the call the usual reservation 11if not incompatible with the 
public interests," for, I said, you know if the House shall ms.ke . an abso-
lute call, that i nvolves a principle, and I may refuse to send you the 
information you ask, when you command it, though I would voluntarily do 
it the next day; alluding to my refusal at the last_ session of Congress 
to respond · to an unqualified call of the House •••• 1J:5 
Mr. McKay was very upset by the President's remarks and replied in a 
tone which Polk took to be offensive, stating: "I will vote for an unquali-
fied call on you, Sir •••• " With those remarks the congressman left, in spite 
of the President's request that he remain and permit him (Polk) to explain 
the temper of his remarks. Polk vowed never to speak to the man s.gain and 
requested Houston to inform McKay of that fact. 116 The President responded 
11~bid. 115Polk, n· IV ~21 1ary, , p. v • 116 Ibid., pp. 521-522. 
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to the request of the House117 and on the following day made the same informa-
tion available to the Senate in "open" rather than in "executive" session.ll8 
Informal Leadership and Lobbies 
The lack of strong responsible political parties has always forced 
the President to rely on personal persuasion and informal arrangements to put 
across his administrative program. Pendleton Herring in his book Presiden-
~ Leadership quotes Justice Story on the informal aspects of Presidential 
leadership. 
The Executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influences, 
to private interviews, and prive.te arrangemeniq to accomplish its own 
appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and sustaining in its own 
duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face 
of its representatives.ll9 
Professor Herring does not view these "privs.te arrangements" with such mis-
giving. Rather he states: 
••• private interviews and private arrangements may be much more important 
and indeed more worthy of respect than spectacular and heroic public 
stands for principle. Were it not for the constant re sort to "private 
arra.ngements" our system would burst from sheer bombast.l20 
It has already been seen that President Polk was constantly at work for 
his administrative measures through individual contacts, not only ·with the 
Congressional leaders but with the rank and file members as well. On occasion, 
Polk would inform a Senator of an occurrence in which the Senator had a per-
sonal interest. For-:-:example, the President took the trouble of informing 
Senator Benton of his son-in-law's exploits in California and inviting the 
117 Richardson, Q2• £11., IV, pp.679-687. 118Ibid., p. 687. 
ll9story ~the Constitution, section 869 et seq.; Senate Report 857, 
February 4, 1881. As quoted in Pendleton Herring, Presidential Leadership, 
(New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940), p. 46. 
120Herring, 22• £11., pp . 46-47 . 
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Senator to call at the War Department and learn tl1e particulars from confi-
dential reports. 121 It was his practice, before submitting a message to 
Congress, to advise individual members of its content and his reasoning so 
" ••• that they might be prepared to vindicate my course, if I should be 
assailed on the floor of the House.n122 Indicative of the executive leader-
ship is Polk's advice to the congressmen who brought to him a copy of a bill 
which they planned to introduce, " ••• consult with the Secretary and officers 
connected with the War Department.nl25 
Also under the heading of "private arrangements" might be considered 
the tactics of President Polk in keeping track of the activities and personal 
habits of members of Congress. In this category might be included such items 
found in his diary as: 
Great confusion, I learned, prevailed in both houses during this night 's 
Session and what is deeply to be regretted several members as I was in-
formed were much excited by drink. Among others I was informed that 
Senators Webster & Barrow were quite drunk •••• l24 
Also recorded is evidence that Senator Calhoun had done the research for a 
speech by a 'Whig Senator who was speaking in opposition to the administration.l25 
Andrew Johnson, in complaining to the President, discloses quite clearly how 
closely the President, through his trusty political adviser, Cave Johnson, 
kept track of Congressional opinion and actions. 
He [Andrew Johnson] said he had held a conversation with Mr. Cave Johnson 
(the P.M.Gen 11) a few days ago, and was surprised to learn from him that 
his course in opposition to the administration, as he said Mr. C. Johnson 
informed him, was understood and marked by the administration.l26 
12L . 
-Letter of Pol~ to Benton, Sept. 1, 1846. Polk Papers, Library o£ 
Congress. 
122Folk, Diary, II, P• 
124--~., II, p. 74. 
63. l23Ibid., I, p. 389. 
125Ibid., I, PP• 204-205. l2R--illQ,., II, p.M. 
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Polk did not attempt to deny the charge, but instead substantiated it by 
citing to Johnson his poor voting record and adverse comments he h~d made about 
the administration. Polk sums up the results of his interview with Andrew 
Johnson as follows: 
I think it fortunate that they have now learned that their course has 
not been unobserved by me. Perhaps their course may hereafter be better, 
but I am satisfied if it is so it will only be from the fear of their 
constituents.l27 
In contrast to his relations wit..h. Andrew Johnson, Polk's relations •Nith Sena-
tor Douglas were most cordial. The warmest feelings expressed in his Diary 
about anyone occur when he and Senator Douglas re-establish their friendship 
after a quarrel.l28 It is interesting to note that Polk never referred in 
his Diary to a personal friend without adding the phrase "personal and 
political friend." Polk very seldom makes any reference to a friendly con-
versation with Whig leaders. A rare exception was a lengthy conversation 
wi th Senator Crittendon. On this occasion he acknowledged that: 
Mr. Crittendon through differing with me in politics is an honorable 
gentleman, and in the confidence that ought to exist between a Senator 
& the President I was unreserved in my conversation.l29 
Polk's conclusions, however, about the results of the conversation expressed 
his usual doubt about the practicality of working closely wi~~ opposition 
members. 
He [Crittendon] seemed to be well satisfied with it, but how far party-
ties may induce [him] to act in opposition to my views, in which he 
concurred in our conversation, remains to be seen.l30 
In urging support for his measures the President did not shrink from 
l27.Ihl.d., P• 41. 
128Ibid., IV, pp. 192-195; see also supra, p.92. 
129p0 lk, ~' II, p. 349. 150Ibid., p. 550. 
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suggesting to the Congress that if necessary he would take the matter to the 
people. For example, he records the following conclusion of a conversation 
held with Senator Calhoun: 
I ••• stated to him plainly that if this great measure was resisted by a 
majority of the Senate I would make an issue with that body before the 
country.l5l 
Polk found the influence of the lobbies a new and revolting experi-
ence. His remarks descriptive of the lobbyists' activities are quite 
modern in their context and could well be taken from a recent text dealing 
with pressure groups. 
I then stated that this bill was but one of many measures proposing 
enormous expenditures of public money, which I understood was pressed 
on Congress by a lobby influence, consisting of leading men out of 
Congress whose special business it was to induce members of Congress 
to vote for and support them. It is said that there are persons now 
in Washington, ex-members of Congress and others, who make this their 
special business. Some member of the Cabinet intimated, indeed ~x­
pressed, the conviction that some members of Congress were feed Lfee] 
attornies to get some of these large claims through Congress. It is 
hoped for the honour of the country that this may not be so. Such a 
thing as an organized lobby influence, such as there is every reason 
to believe now exists, was wholly unknovm while I was in Congress.l52 
The President's attention was first directed to the activities of the 
lobbyists during his attempt to secure passage of his tariff legislation. 
He regarded the manufactures fair which was held in Washington · as an attempt 
on the part of ~he capitalists to influence Congress Rgainst his tariff. He 
accused them of pricing their items on display at lower than the actual 
market price.l33 He was particularly upset when a Senator reported to him 
that a manufacturer had advised the Senator that if the Tariff Bill were 
defeated the Senator could have a loan for any amount he might wish.lM Polk 
records the intensive drive put on to block the tariff bill. 
131Ibid., I, p. 578. 132Ibid., IV, p. 514-315. 133rbid., I, p.421. 
13~~ii~ ., II 49 -~ 'P• • 
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The most tremendous efforts I understand are being made by the Cap-
italists who are engaged in manufactures to defeat the Bill •••• 
Scores of them I understand are flocking to Washington for that 
purpose.l55 
Before concluding this chapter it is necessary to remark on the pass-
age of the Bill which created the Department of the Interior. The bill was 
passed on the 5rd of March 1849, just a day before the President left office, 
and although the author of the Bill was Polk's Secretary of the Treasury, 
Robert Walker, the measure was not supported by the President. Polk was 
afraid that the measure would have a "consolidating tendency," and in its 
practica~ operation would "draw power from the States." Polk states that 
had he been a member of Congress he would have voted against it, but as he 
had lacked the time to examine the measure carefully and did not find it to 
be constitutionally objectionabl~, he had signed it, reluctantly.l36 
It should now be apparent that President Polk placed his support on 
the side of those who felt that it was the responsibility of the President 
to lead and not be led by the Congress; that he regarded it as his duty not 
merely to recommend legislation to the Congress but to advocate by every 
means at his disposal the enactment of the administration's program ; that he 
regarded himself and acted as though he were the representative of all the 
people, while Congress too often was only representative of the narrow or 
special interests. In this latter respect he might well be called the first 
of the modern Presidents. 
155Ibid., 27 28 PP• - • 
156Ibid., IV, pp. 571-572. 
CHAPTER VII 
POLK AS PARTY CHIEF 
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The President has become the chief spokesman for his polltical: party. 
Elected in a constituency of the whole nation, he alone can claim to be the 
authentic voice of his party. He is the only f actor upon which all party 
factions must agree every four years. As issues between the two parties 
become more and more blurred during the campaign, the Presidential candidate 
remai ns the one clear thing which di f ferentiates t he t wo political parties¥ 
Yet, in spite of these factors which place the President at t he helm of his 
party, his hold upon that leadership is tenuous. 
It is acknowledged that one of the results of federalism in the 
United States has been the lack of cohesive national political parti es . 
Every textbook on the American party system is quick to point out the lack 
of party discipline, ideological unity, and cent ral control. Political 
parties in the United States have been described as forty-eight parties bound 
together for the brief span of the Presidential ca~paign ever y four years. 
If the President's task a s leader of his party is difficult, it was 
almost immeasurably more difficult during the Presidency of James K. Polk . 
It will be remembered that Washington in his Farewell Address stated: 
n ••• c~~on and continual mischiefs of the Party ••• sufficient to make i t the 
interest and the duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it." From 
the period of President Madison to that of Andrew Jackson, "King Caucus" 
reigned, and parties all but disappeared, so much so ~~at historians have 
euphemistically labeled the times as "the era of good feeling." With the 
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Presidency of Andrew Jackson, howYever, the poll tical parties began a trans-
formation which is still taking place. 
As Presidential electors ceased to be chosen by state legi sl a tures, 
as nominations for President were made in convention rather than in Congres-
sional caucus, and popular votes determined the results of elections, the 
significance of political parties grew. No longer could the destiny of the 
nation be decided either in the Congressional corridors, or in the parlors 
and drawing-rooms of the aristocratic elite of the Eastern seaboard. For 
the first time party regularity became a real political concept. 
Jackson and Polk both understood the necessity of shaping the Demo-
cratic party into the instrument of the new governing class in America, the 
working-man in the cities, the pioneer on the prairies, and the dirt farmer. 
Jackson knew better than did "Young Hickory" how to dramatize the issues, bow 
to personify the conflict between the East and the West. Polk understood the 
necessity but not the method. From his previous life of service to the Demo-
crs.tic party he appreciated the need for party discipline. He failed to 
understand the need of the people for a hero; the role that personal magnetism 
must play in political life. He understood but two political motives, .loy-
alty to a rational program and greed for office. He attempted to utilize 
both of these to gain support for his party. He was never able to become a 
popular les.der of public opinion, in spite of the f act that in many ways he 
personified the spirit of "manifest destiny." 
Polk used two main devices to achieve political unity and party 
leadership. He insisted, over strenuous opposition which even included Gen-
eral J a ckson, on having a. party press loyal to his personal admini st ration. 
Secondly, he attempted to utilize patronage in the manner of his chief mentor, 
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Andrew Je.ckson. He is not to be too severely blamed if his successes were 
limited; greater and more personable Presidents than he have foundered upon 
the rock of localism. It should also be remembered that he was attempti ng 
to exercise political leadership over the Democratic Party at a time when in 
the near future the issue of slavery Y'>aS to bring not only the Party but the 
Nation into conflict. 
President Polk would have remBined almost completely unknown even to 
his o~n contemporaries if it had not been for the Washington Union. Even at 
the close of his administration the President was hardly kno~~ in the country. 
His careful attention to administrative detail left little time for him to 
become a national figure. Even on those occasions when he desired to address 
the publlc at large, his efforts met largely with failure. He was handi-
capped by his complete inab:Hity to slogani ze or to mobilize the public in 
behalf of his administration by an appeal to emotion. It was not without 
reason that he was called "Polk the Plodder." He could reason closely and 
develop his arguments at great lengths, as he did, for example, e.gainst pro-
tective tariffs, but he could not attract a large personal following. Try as 
he might to appeal to the masses, a.s was his wish in his fourth annmJl mess-
a ge, ~nich he regarded as a valedictory address, he could not compress his 
views into a form suitable for mass consumption. The President recognized 
his own weakness, remarking about his fourth annual message that: 
.... the C.anger is that it will be so long that it will not be res.d by 
the mass of people, end by none but the politicians . l 
In spite of his efforts to shorten the ~ss, it remai ned forty-one pages long.2 
1Polk, Diary, IV, P• 205. 
~ichardson, 2£• cit., IV, pp.629-870. His other three annual messages 
had been 31, 35, e.nd 32 pages long respectively. 
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It has been remarked that "Had it not been fo.r the press, James K. 
Polk might as well have retired to a monastery instead of occupying the 
White House as far as his Presidential contacts with the public were con-
cerned."5 Yet in the area of politi.cal journalism the President was quite 
experienced and astute. 
Polk had constantly paid close attention to the management of the 
Nashville Union, which was the leading Democratic paper of Tennessee. In 
1845, vmen the Nashville Union was in dire need of rejuvenated leadership, 
James K. Polk was instrumental in securing his close personal friend, S. H. 
Laughlin, to take the editorship and pledge the paper so that it would secure 
party financial assistance. He also was instrumental in having the paper 
endorse Van Buren prior to the Democratic convention of 1844.4 
The newly elected President faced a serious problem regarding an ad-
ministration press. There already existed in Washington a Democratic paper, 
the Washington Globe, which, under the editorship of Francis P. Blair, had 
served both the administrations of Jl..ndrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren. The 
new President 'YiaS determined, however, to have an editor more to his own 
liking. Polk was able to give specific examples, dating from 1834 when he had 
been engaged in a contest with John Bell for Speaker of the House, through the 
campaign of 1844, of coolness if not outrigti:,; opposition by Blair towards his 
political advancement. 5 Polk began to cast about for an editor whom he could 
5Jrunes E. Pollard, ~ Presidents and the Pr~.M (New York: Macmillan 
Co., 1947), p. 229. 
~cCormac, 2£• cit., pp. 210-211. 
5Ibid., p. 57; Polk, Diary, I, pp.356-357; see also William Ernest 
Smith, ~Francis Pre~ Blair Family in Politics (New York; Macmillan Co., 
1953), I, pp. 172- 176. 
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be sure was loyal to his administration. When Jackson heard of the plans 
to remove Blair he wrote to the President that an attempt to secure "Father" 
Ritchie as the new editor 
••• would be an insult to the Editor of the Globe & separate him from 
you, whose administration he is determined to support- Keep Blair's 
Globe the administration paper •••• -Ritchie is a good editor but a 
very unsafe one - He goes off at half bent & does great injury before 
he can be set right. 6 
But on this matter as on most others Polk was determined to make his 
own decisions and he told Jackson: 
There is at present no paper here which sustains my administration for 
its own sake. The Globe it is manifest does not look to the glory or 
success of my administration so much s.s it does to the interests, and 
wishes of certain prominent men of the party who are looking to suc-
ceed me in 1848.7 
In the meantime negotiation had continued to obtain the services of "Father" 
Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer. 8 T.homas Hart Benton believed that 
the removal of Blair by Polk was the fulfillment of campaign promises which 
Polk had made to Calhoun and Tyler. Benton claimed that Calhoun had prom-
ised to deliver the electoral votes of South Carolina, where the electors were 
selected by the state legislature rather than by popular vote, if Polk would 
remove his personal enemy Blair; and that Tyler had made the removal of Blair 
a condition for his own withdrawal from the Presidential race of 1844.9 The 
true cause of the failure of the Globe was Polk's personal dislike of Blair, 
~etter of Jackson to Polk, December 15, 1844. Polk Papers, Library 
of Congress. 
7 Letter of Polk to Jackson, March 17, 1845, as quoted in Pollard, 
Q2• £11., PP• 235-236. 
8charles Henry Ambler, Thomas Ritchie (Richmond: Bell Book & 
Sta.tionery Co., 1913), PP• 246-258. 
9Thomas Hart Benton, 22• cit., II, pp.650-655. 
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Blair's strong advocacy of Van Buren and of Van Buren's stand on Texas, and 
Polk 's desire to unite the Democratic party and alter the dominant position 
of the Van Buren faction in party affairs.10 Benton also made the more 
serious charge that Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania had made arrangements 
with the assistance of Secretery of the Treasury Walker to make available 
from the public treasury a sum of $50,000 which would not be recalled for 
three years. This money was to be utilized by Ritchie and Heiss, publisher 
of the Nashville Union, to purchase the Washington Globe. 1~ Once o~~ed, the 
administration organ seemed assured of financial success because of the cer-
ta.inty of receiving the government printing contrs.cts. Testimony included in 
a House Report of 1860 described the relationship which had existed for a num-
ber o-f years between public printing contre.cts and the administration press.12 
The first issue of the newly formed administration newspaper appeaxed 
--------- ----
10wm. E. Smith, QQ• cit., I, p. 181. 11Ibid. 
12 House Report 249, 56th Congress, 1 Sess., p. 28 (March 26, 1860), 
e.s quoted in Leonard D. VVbi te, The Jacksoniru1s, pp. 297-298 • 
• • • the editor of the organ is generally supposed to command the patron-
age of the President. There is a good deal of this work at the disposal 
of the President -- say an aggregate of one hundred thousand dollars per 
year, more or less. 
Q. At the disposal of the President? 
A. Yes, sir. That patronage the organ has commanded for years, it 
being impossible to keep a paper up here without government support • 
• • • • • • • 
Q. Was there ever any understanding with you while you had that print-
ing that a portion of the profits should be used towards sustaining the 
organ? 
A. Yes, sir; it was given for the purpose of sustaining the organ. 
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on May 1, 1845, under the new masthead of the Washington Union.l5 The ed-
itor, Thomas Ritchie, better known as "Father" Ritchie, took on this new 
task at the advanced age of seventy after forty-one years as editor of the 
Richmond Enguirer.14 Ritchie stood by the President faithfully as did the 
President stand by him, but in spite of his loyalty and strength of spirit, 
he was not well sui ted at this advanced age to manage the policy of a new 
administration's newspaper. 
The President worked closely with Ritchie, giving him advance copies 
of messages the President planned to send to Congress;15 he also saw to it 
that Ritchie was the first to see messages from the front during the Mexican 
War;l6 and often utilized the press to answer a critic or to reply to debate 
which was taking place on the floor of Congress. 17 
Ritchie's weaknesses as editor of the Washington Union were printing 
confidential information in the press before it should have been released 
and writing in a style which offended certain Democratic members of Congress. 
Although Polk recognized these weaknesses, he had a strong affection for the 
old man and in spite of his annoyance always rose in his defense. On one 
occasion when Senator Allen came to the President demanding tha.t Ritchie be 
replaced by another editor, remarking, " ••• that Mr. Ritchie could not now 
get five votes for public printer out of the Calhoun faction in either Rouse 
of Congress,n18 Polk replied: 
15Frederic Hudson, Journalism in the United States: 1690-1872 (New 
York, Harper & Bros., Pub., 1875), PP• 214-242. 
14rbi~., p. 271. l5Polk, Diary, I, pp. 108-109. 
16rbid., II, pp. 468-469. 17Ibid., I, pp. 551-352. 
18Ibid., P• 356. 
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••• that Mr. Ritchie was honest in his efforts to sustain our doctrines 
and our party, & that he had not identified himself either with the Cal-
houn or any other faction of the party, but that he had been labouring 
to keep the whole party tmi ted and harmonious; that doubtless he hs.d 
committed errors as all other men in his situation would, but that he 
readily corrected them when he discovered them.l9 
One outstanding virtue of Ritchie's in Polk's view was that he would 
"· •• not answer the purpose of aspiring politicians because he will not lend 
himself to any of the factions who look more to their own adva.ncement than to 
the public good.n20 
The President on a number of occasions did take Ritchie to task for 
his mishandling of articles in the Union. Sometimes Polk felt it was prudent 
to withhold information from Ritchie until the very last moment because: 
The truth is that tp.e old gentleman's passion to put everything he les.rns 
into his newspaper ~is so great] that I did not think it prudent to en-
trust its contents to him at an earlier period.~l 
When Ritchie had printed advanced inform&tion which outlined the substance of 
the President's fourth annual message to Congress, Polk .became very upset. He 
remarked in his diary: 
The Qn!Qn of this morning contains an article undertaking to state what my 
message will contain. I was much vexed when I saw it. It is an infirmity 
of Mr. Ritchie that he cannot keep a secret •••• Without meaning to do 
wrong, such is his propensity to give news to the public, and to appee.r to 
the public to be the Executive organ, that in this morning's paper he shad-
ows forth what I may say in it. 22 
Polk informed the assistant editor of his .displeasure and ordered Ritchie to 
report to him; but upon Ritchie 1 s arrival t..he President 1 s wrath mel ted away 
and he recorded the following results of the conversation: 
Mr. Ritchie called this morning and appeared to be very much morti-
fied at the indiscreet publication of the article in his paper yesterday. 
19Ibid. 20Ibid., P• 559. 
2l:rbid., III, p. 237. 22:£bid., IV, pp. 214-215. 
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He means no harm I am satisfied. It is a constitutional infirmity with 
him, I believe, that he cannot keep a secret; all he knows, though given 
him in confidenc~ he is almost certain to put into his newspaper. My 
sympathies were excited at seeing his mortification, and I relieved him 
by telling him to let it all pass.2B 
The President then sent for the assistant editor and instructed him not to 
tell Ritchie what had been said on the previous day. 
The most serious difficulty in which Ritchie found himself occurred 
when he printed an article critical of the Senate. The circumstances were 
that a small group of dissident Democrats led by .Calhoun joined with the 
united Whig party to defeat, at least temporarily, the ten regiment bill, 
which the President had been so actively backing. The President expressed his 
indignation most strongly. And on the 9th of February 1847, the Union ran an 
article signed the "Vindicator" which had as its theme that the Mexicans had 
achieved another victory. On February 15 there were introduced in the Senate 
two resolutions; one for expulsion of the editor of the Union from the priv-
ilege of the floor for a libel upon the Senate, the second for the expulsion 
of the Union reporters from the reporters' gallery of the Senate.24 
These resolutions started an extended debate, which touched on a vsri-
ety of subjects including freedom of the press, the rights of the Senate, the 
function of political parties, and the presidential aspirations of various 
Senators. Senator Turney of Tennessee raised the issue of party responsibil-
ity, stating: 
There was a party in that body[the Senate] that might properly be termed 
the Balance of Power party.... Such a state of things renders it some-
what difficult for the public in general ••• to form a correct judgment of 
the actions of the body. It is due to the public that such a state of 
2Drbid., p. 216. 24cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 572. 
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parties in this body should be known in onder that the public may place 
the responsibility exactly in the proper quarter.25 
Senator Turney continued by claiming that Ritchie had merely done his duty by 
informing the public of the existence of such cliques. Eventually the second 
resolution, which would have denied the reporters of the Union their place in 
the press gallery, was dropped. This established the right of the press from 
that time on to their reporting privilege in the Capitol.26 The resolution 
barring Ritchie from the floor of Congress was approved by a vote of 27 to 21, 
but met ~ith considerable opposition from the general public. The President 
expressed his anger stating that it was " ••• a second Duane case, and strikes 
a blow at the liberty of the press.n27 President Polk expresses his own 
views of his relationship to the administrative paper in a letter to Senator 
Haywood denying that he, Polk, had been responsible for an article in the 
Union attacking Haywood (see pp. 176-177). 
If by that designation [administrative organ~ it be meant to carry the 
idea, that the "Union" has followed the general policy of my administra-
tion, it is in that sense true, but this has been done upon the sole 
judgment and responsibility of the editor. If because that paper happens 
to be published at the seat of government and supports my administration •••• 
It can hardly be -- that the President shall be required to be the virtual 
editor of a newspaper.28 
President Polk in his desire to preserve his lifelong friendship with 
Senator Haywood denies too much. 
25 Ibid., p. 595. 
26 James H. Lee, Historz 2f American Journalism (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1925), PP• 261-262. 
27Polk, Diar~, II, P• 378. 
28Letter of Polk to Senator Hayvlood, Janw.ry 17, 1849. Polk Papers, 
Library of Congress. Letter of Haywood to Polk, December 18, 1848. Polk 
Papers, Library of Congress. 
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Other papers than the Union met ~~th the President's distrust and he 
went so far as to accuse them of being traitors to their country.29 Polk was 
the last President to utilize effectively an administration press, and even 
his success was limited as the significance and importance of the personal 
I 
journalism of such editors as James Gordon Bennet and Horace Greeley was al-
ready beginning to replace the partisan press. 
Polk and Patronage 
It has been stated that "'To the victor belongs the spoils' was the 
keynote of President Polk's administration.n50 The inclusion of three persons 
closely identified with political party orgs.nization in his Cabinet was an 
es.rly indication of the partisan nature of the new administration. The author 
of the spoils slogan was Polk's Secretary of War, William L. Marcy, who had 
spoken approvingly of political patronage thirteen years prior to his joining 
Polk's cabinet. At that time Marcy said: 
It may be, sir, that the politicians of the United States are not fD _j fas-
tidious as some gentlemen are, as to disclosing the principles on which 
they act. They boldly preach what they practice. When they are contend-
ing for victory, they avow their intention of enjoying the fruits of it. 
If they are defeated, they expect to retire from office. If they are 
successful, they claim, as a matter of right, the advantage of success. 
They see nothing wrong in the rule, that to the victor belong the spoils 
of the enemy. 51 
The chairman of the national committee of the Democratic party, Mr. 
29 Polk, Digry, II, P• 479. 
50Dorothy Ganfield Fowler, ~Cabinet Politician (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1945), p. 54. President Polk expressed a more moderete view 
of patronage, stating: "! removed a Whig when I appointed him, and in that I 
acted upon the general principle - that the principal cbief administrative 
officers of the Federal government should agree in opinion with the Chief Mag-
istrate and be ready to cooperate with him in carrying out the policies of 
his administration." Letter of Polk to Lewis Cass, Sept. 18, 1848. Polk 
Paper~, Library of Congress. 
31Register of Debates, 22 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1325. 
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Walker, became President Polk's Secretary of the Treasury.32 But it was not 
to either of these men that the President looked for assistance in handling 
the patronage function of his office. For that task the President selected 
his personal campaign manager and long-time political mentor, Cave Johnson, 
whom he bDought to the capital and installed in the cabinet as Postmaster 
General, the position ~hich as become traditional for the President's chief 
political adviser to occupy. 3B The Niles Register characterized Ca.ve Johnson 
as follows: 
Cave Johnson, one of the most malignant, narrow-minded, vindictive poli t-
ical partisans alive, and therefore just sui ted to the post office depart-
ment, with thirty thousand subjects for the knife of party proscription, 
and the strengthening of the administration thereby.3~ 
Johnson, coming from the same state as the President and having served 
seven terms in Congress, 1829-1837, 1839-1845, was well equipped to become the 
President's confidant on political matters. It will also be recalled from 
~r II the role which he played in securing the President's nomination at 
the Baltimore convention of 1844. The President's diary records tha t Johnson 
kept Polk constantly informed on administrative measures in Congress, made 
32The election of 1844 was the first time a national committee existed. 
All that is known of its existence is from a letter of Robert J. Walker, in 
which he states, "The National Democratic Convention of Baltimore appointed a 
central committee at this city with a view to promote the election of Polk and 
Dallas. Of this committee I was chose chairman and I consented to remain here 
and discharge the duties of the office." See James Farley, History )nd Func-
tions of the National Committee, (Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1954 , p. 7. 
3~vidence of general recognition of Johnson's role of patronage 
dispenser is Polk's letter to Vice-President Dallas assuring Dallas that he 
will see the Postmaster and prevent a removal distasteful to Dallas, if John-
son hasn't already acted, October 30, 1846. Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 
54Niles Register, March 15, 1845. 
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appointments with congressmen to see the President, and in general acted as 
liaison officer between the executive and the Congress. This is not to be 
construed that Polk surrendered the patronage power to Johnson, but rather 
that Johnson merely acted as the Presidential agent. For example, when Polk 
learned that a loyal Democrat had been mistakenly removed as Postmaster at 
Micklenberg, Tenn., he wrote Johnson to give him a written report on the 
matter which was to include the name of the secretary responsible for this 
blunder. Polk stressed that he wanted to personally "judge" this affair. On 
the same day, Polk informed the Postmaster that he was still Postma.ster.l35 
Johnson was influential even over Supreme Court appointments, persuading both 
the President and Buchanan that Buchanan ought to stay in the cabinet rather 
than go on t..l!e Court. 56 
Throughout the four years of Polk's administration the demand for 
office never ceased, and the President was never able to find enough vacancies 
to satis~ the hunger for office.57 With less than a month still to serve, 
Polk quoted Jefferson to the effect that "few die and none resign.n38 He had 
already discovered much to his dismay that should an office-holder die or 
even become ill, there were many clamoring for the vacancy. Polk records 
receiving a telegram informing him that Paymaster Dix of the U. S. Army had 
died of cholera and that in less than an hour he had received applications 
for the position.09Upon another occasion Polk states, "The Marshall of this 
55polk to Cave Johnson, May 21, 1847; Polk to Postmaster Ramsey, 
May 20, and May 21, 1847. Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 
36polk, Diary, I,pp. 556, 551, 492; II, pp. 27, 36-40, 50, 60, 67-68; 
III, pp. 251, 561; IV, PP• 282-283. 
57 See Plate VII, Cartoon of the period, entitled "Patriots Getting 
Their Beans." 
58Polk, Diary, IV, P• 554. 39Ibid., p. 274. 
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District is reported to be confined to his house by sickness, & I have had 
a half a dozen applications for his place, !! ~ should die.... I am often 
disgusted with such scenes.n40 The story of the demand for office during the 
Polk administration is so well known that it is unnecessary to document it 
in detail. The President did his best to meet the demands of loyal party 
supporters for office, but with limited success. Even Chief Justice Taney 
requested an appointment for his son-in-law and other relatives.41 
The President was confronted with a divided party which was split into 
numerous factions, including Barnburners and the Hunkers in New York State, 
the recalcitrant faction led by Calhoun in the South, and the division in 
Pennsylvania between the forces led by Vice-President Dallas and those led by 
Secretary of State Buchanan. Polk was determined, therefore, to control per-
sonally the patronage of the administration. 42 Criticism of the President's 
decision in this matter fails to reckon with Polk's first need, which was to 
establish himself as the center of the Democratic party in the nation; it 
would have been impossible for him to remain in control had he surrendered 
patronage to the local party leaders in the various states. Had he surrend-
ered patronage it would have strengthened local party control at the expense 
of the national party, which has been the constant threat to Presidential 
leadership throughout our history.45 
40IQid., III, P• 551. 
41carl Brist Swisher, Roger~· Taney (New York: Macmillan Co., 1935), 
pp.459-440. Professor Swisher believes that Taney's requests were not granted 
by Polk because as Chief Justi.ce he had destroyed his political influence. 
42The Washington Union, July 14, 1845, proclaimed that the President 
would not permit any member of his administration to build political strength 
through Federal appointments. 
43For a critical appraisal of Polk's handling of patronage see Norman 
A. Graebner, James K. Polk, a Study in Federal Patronage," The Mississippi 
Vallex Historical Review, XXXVIII,No.l, June 1,1951, pp. 615-632. 
227 
Polk had never made any public statement which could prevent him 
from turning Whigs out of office, and shortly after he took office the new 
broom began to sweep clean. Marcy wrote, "The President has ordered a 
thorough investigation in r egard to the clerks in all the Department s and 
ther e is to be quite a sweep.n44 Beyond this general proscription the Pres-
ident intervened personally to push his rotation policy. The President 
called his Secretary of the Treasury to task for hi s failure to eliminate 
Whig clerks from their position in the Trea sury department. Polk stated 
that: 
My purpose was to show him ~ecretary Walker] a list of very obnoxious 
Whig clerks whi ch had been furnished to me, who are now employed 
in his department. I informed him. that members of Congress were daily 
complaining to me that so many bitter Whigs were retained in the of f -
ices here, whilst worthy and competent Democrats who desired t he 
places were excluded. I gave him the li st end char ges attached to it 
& requested him to investigate the matter and make such removals as 
were proper.45 
Polk continued hi s conversation ~~th Mr. Walker and informed him 
that Walker's br-other-in-law was a violent and bitter ~~ig and tha t he ought 
to be removed from the office he held. Polk acknowledged that it was un-
pleasant to make such a communiCation but that he must speak frenkly and 
relationship ought not to stand in the way of making remo.val. 46 The President 
on still another occasion wrote to Walker that he had observed from reading a 
New York paper that a Democratic customs official had been dismissed. Polk 
said: nrt appears enemies of the administration are kept in and fri ends 
turned out." Walker investigated and answered Polk that this was not the case.47 
4~arcy Papers, Library of Congress, Vol. 10, No. 54, p. 482 (July 
25, 1843). 
45polk, Diary, I, PP• 545-546. 46rbid., P• 346. 
47Polk to Robert J. Walker, Sept. 20, 1848. ~Papers, Librar y of 
Congress. 
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Polk also personally removed the Commissioner of Public Buildings for Washing-
ton, D. C., who had served in that capacity for the last twelve years. Wil-
liam Noland, the Commissioner, protested his dismissal, avowing that although 
ha had once been a ~hig he was now a good Democrat and stated that he had 
kept only those Whigs in office who had been there when he was first hired. 
Noland's protests were to no avail. Poll< records the conclusion of his 
interview as follows: 
••• I have no doubt he is a Whig in all his feelings, and that his patron-
age is bestowed exclusively on the members of that party, as far as he 
thinks he can do so with safety to himself. I told him finally that I 
had made up my mind that it was my duty to make the change, and repeated 
to him what I said on yesterday, that he could resign if he chose to do 
so. He then presented to me his resignation, which he had previously 
written to take effect on the ____ day of ____ • I told him ••• that he 
could fill the blank with the 1st day of Nov. • • • I told him I had no 
unkind feelings towards him personally, and that if it had been other-
wise I should not have held this conversation with him, but would have 
made the removal without seeing him. I told him it was a painful duty, 
but one which I felt bound to perform.48 
The record of the Post Office department might well serve as a meas-
ure of the success0of the President's policy of proscription. During Polk's 
first year in office there were more than seven hundred removals, and during 
hi s four-year term more than 13,500 pos~masters were appointed at a time 
when the total number of postmasters was only 16,000. There were 1,600 
removals and over 10,000 resignations. It is impossible to determine ~~th 
any exactness how many of the resignations were for political reasons; cer-
tainly low pay and the loss of the franking privilege in 1845 contributed 
4i Polk, Diary, II, pp. 114-115; for other examples of Polk's per-
sonal action in removing office-holders, see Polk, Diary, I, pp. 40, 57, 
60. 
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greatly to the resignations.49 
Polk refused to remove Democrats so that they could be replaced with 
other Democrats, 50 but in spite of this policy the President was accused of 
favoring one faction of the party over others. The Barnburners, which was 
the Van Buren faction of the Democratic party in New York State, accused 
the President of favoring the Hunkers, the faction led by the Secretary of 
War, Marcy. The President's attempt to remain neutral in his appointments 
failed to please either Marcy and the Hunkers or Wright and the Barnburners.Sl 
When Wright lost his bid for re-election as Governor of New York in 1846, the 
Barnburners were co11vinced that Polk had used his patronage against him, and 
the break with the Van Buren faction in New York greatly widened.52 
As early as November 1845, Polk was informed of the displeasure of 
the Van Buren supporters regarding the patronage policy of his administration 
in New York State. Polk rightly felt that the only patronage policy ~nich 
would satisfy them would be one that proscribed all other Democrats from any 
appointment. This he refused to do.5B His determination to remain neutral 
49Fowler, 22• £it., p. 65. The following table 
information contained in the appendix of Fowler's work, 
Postmasters 
Administration 
Jackson 
Removals Resignations 
Van Buren 
Harrison-Tyler 
Polk 
1,034 
1,568 
72 
1,640 
50Polk, Diary, II, PP• 201-202. 
6 
14 
9,529 
is extracted from 
p. 505. 
51President Polk attempted to explain his failure to make an appoint-
ment on the basis that the office-holder did not resign as exp~cted. He also 
expressed concern for Governor Wright's re-election. Polk to Senator Dix, 
Oct. 27, 1846. Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 
52Fowler, QR• cit., pp. 64-65; Graebner, QE• cit., pp . 624-625. 
55polk, Diary, I, pp. 103-104. 
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caused a severe disturbance in his relations with Secretary of War Marcy, 
when the President refused to appoint Marcy's candidate to a position of 
Brigadier General. The feelings between the two became so violent that it 
was reported to the President that Marcy and Senator Dicki~son from New York 
might both resign their offices. The President replied that he didn't care 
whether they resigned or not, but added sagely that he knew they v'!Ouldn' t 
dare to resign.54 By July of 1847 Polk's relations with Van Buren had 
deteriorated to the point where the President during his trip into New York 
State refused to visit Van Buren, feeling that the late verbal i nvitation 
extended to the President to pay a ·visit was not genuine.55 
After the Barnburners had walked out of the Democratic Convention of 
1848, the President was faced with the task of deciding whether the Barn-
burners who held Federal office should be removed. Polk decided that it 
would be best to delay their removal, stating: 
If removed they would probably represent themselves as victims; and 
would appeal to the people by representing that they were removed by a 
President from a slave-state because they were opposed to permitting 
slavery in the territories recently acquired in which it did not now 
exist. This ••• would not be the reason of my action if I removed 
them, M their secession f!:Qm. the Democratic party ~ their efforts to 
defeat ~ regular nominations of the Democratic ps.rty. 56 
The proper action to take regarding the Barnburners continued to dis-
turb the President until the 9th of August. At that time a convention was 
held in Buffalo, New York, which nominated Van Buren as a Presidential c~~-
didate on the Free Sollers ticket. As the Barnburners, joined by Whigs and 
Abolitionists, were the chief supporters of the Buffalo convention, the Pres-
ident felt he must act to remove them from Federal office. Mr. B. F. Butler 
54rbid., II, PP• 599-405. 55Ibid., III, P• 74. 
56Ibid., IV, p. 10. (Italics mine) 
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was the leading Barnburner holding national office and his removal was sym-
bolic of the President's disapproval of the entire movement. On the 1st of 
September the President acted and on that day recorded at some length his 
views on patronage and party loyalty. 
Today I appointed Charles McVean of New York to be attorney of the u. s., 
vice Benjamin F. Butler removed. Shortly after I became President I re-
moved a Whig from this office & appointed Mr. Butler. I did so upon the 
general principle that the important subordinate public offices should 
be filled by persons who agreed in opinion with the President as to the 
policy to be pursued by the Government, and who would co-operate with the 
President in carrying out that policy. Mr. Butler at the time he was 
appointed was a democrat. He has since abandoned the Democratic party; 
has bolted from and does not support the regularly nominated candidates 
of the Democratic party for President & Vice-President of the U. s ..... 
I should not have removed Mr. Butler for his mere opinions upon any ab-
stract question, nor for his free expression of them, but when he becomes 
a leading champion of a faction in assailing me per,ao~ly and politically, 
in throwing every obstacle in his power in the way Lofj the successful 
administration of the Go~ernment upon the publicly declared principles 
upon whi ch I conduct [it_j, I do not hesitate to remove him from the honor-
able and profitable office which he has heretofore held under my admin-
istration. 57 
Polk did take, however, a nonpartisan position on one class of appoint-
ments. Polk insisted that it was essential that army commissions be given to 
Whigs as well as Democre.ts; 58 he did retain the appointing power in his own 
hands, nevertheless.59 This policy of nonpartisan appointment of officers 
met ~~th some criticism and Polk records a conversation he held with Repre-
sentative Douglas of Illinois, ~ho complained that a Whig had been appointed 
Second Lieutenant in an Illinois ~ifle regiment. 
57Ibid., pp. 114-115; see also pp. 56-37, 57-58, 85, 107-115. It was 
the same BY.Butler who withdrew Van Buren 1 s name from the Convention of 1844 
and cast the total vote of New York's delegation for James K. Polk. See 
supra, Chapter II, p. 51. 
58Polk, Diary, I, pp. 412-413. 
59Secretary of War Marcy in response to a request for a commission 
sitated: " ••• it is proper to say what I presume you are not ignorant of, that 
the selections are not made by the War Department , but by the President him-
self." Wm. L. Marcy, Private Letter ~' 1845-.1.M2., PP• 20-21 (Sept. 2, 1845). 
Library of Congress. 
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I told him that we were at war with a Foreign country and that I thought 
it improper to make politics a test in appointments in the army, and that 
I had resolved therefore to appoint some Whigs to office in the army. I 
told him that all the poll tical friends vd. th whom I had conversed had 
agreed with me in this, but when I came to make the selections none of my 
friends in Congress wished any Whig appointed from his State, but a~l said 
they were willing that I might select Whigs from any other State than 
their own. 60 
Polk's greatest difficulty in connection with patronage matters was 
with members of Congress. The President was determined to maintain the con-
stitutional separation of powers between those t wo powers. Polk learned that 
a provision of a bill before Congress had designated by description the three 
persons who were to be appointed commissioners t o serve on a commission which 
the bill would create. Polk considered this measure clearly unconstitutional, 
citing that "the Constitution confers upon the President the power to make all 
appointments to office ••• n and advised his cabinet tha t he would certainly 
veto the measure. 61 
The President was confronted with great pressure exerted by congress-
men in behalf of their own appointment to office. To t his practice the Pres-
ident y,ras most assuredly opposed. The question most commonly a.rose when mem-
bers of Congress desired the President to appoint them officers in the army. 
On a number of occasions he clearly ste.ted the principle involved in his denial 
of their request for appointment. Perhaps the best and most determined state-
ment is as follows: 
The passion for office among members of Congress is very great, if not 
absolutely disreputable, and greatly embarrasses the operations of the 
Government. They create offices by their own votes and then seek to fill 
them themselves. I shall refuse to appoint them, though it be at the 
almost certain hazard of ixrutring their displeasure. I shall do so because 
their appointment would be most corrupting in its tendency. I am aware 
that by refusing their applications I may reduce my administration to a 
minority in both Houses of Congress, but if such be the result I shall have 
60Polk, Di ary, I, P• 478. 61Ibid., IV, p. c5. 
255 
the high satisfaction of having di scharged my duty in resisting the self-
ishness of members of Congress, who are willing to abandon their duty to 
their constituents and provide places for themselves. I will not counten-
ance such selfishness, but will do my duty, and rely on the country for 
an honest support of my administration.62 
Five days later Polk had developed a general rule on the subject which was: 
As a general [rule] ••• members of Congress should not be appointed to 
office by the Executive. The exceptions to this rule may be, Cabinet 
officers, Foreign Ministers 'of the higher grade, Judges of the Supreme 
Court, and in time of war perhaps the higher military officers. But 
even in these cases it is desirable to avoid appointing members of Cong-
ress, if men equally qualified and with sufficient character before the 
country can be procured.65 
Yet the thirst of congressmen for position, if not for themselves, for 
their constituents continued. Just such a request, by a Representative who 
wished to be appointed a purser in the Navy, caused Polk to remark that " ••• at 
least 20 members of the present Congress have been disappointed in the same 
way, and in all the cases ••• they have afterwards voted against the measures 
which I have recommended.n64 Polk continues to point out that they have not 
the courage to break openly with the President but utilized every opportunity 
to oppose him when their course could not be made clear to ~heir constituents.65 
The President expressed his determination to expose this : vil practice, 
stating: 
If God grants me length of days and health, I will, after the expiration 
of my term, give a history of the selfish and corrupt considerations which 
influence the course of public men, as a legacy to posterity.66 
Senatorial courtesy was not in Polk's administration a recognized 
62rbid., I, p. 485. 65rbid., p. 491; see also pp. 466, 497. 
64rbid., II, P• 329. 
65Polk expressed the determination to "appeal from the judgment of 
those of our party who only want office to the people." Polk to G. Pillow, 
November 6, 1845, Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 
66polk, Diary, II, pp. 529-550. 
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practice;67 neither in its formal sense, Which permits a Senator to rise on 
the floor of the Senate and object to a nominee upon the grounds that he finds 
him personally obnoxious, nor in the more general sense which implies that a 
Senator or Congressman ought to be consulted about an appointment to be made 
in his district or State.68 This idea, vffiich had already begun to gain 
ground, was not an acceptable principle to President Polk, who stated: " ••• in-
deed many members of Congress assune that they have the right to make appoint-
ments, particularly in their own states, end ••• fly into a passion when their 
wishes are not gratified.n69 President Polk did, nevertheless, while always 
reserving final judgment to himself, consult Congressmen regarding appoint-
ments in their districts. 70 Rather it might better be stated that he was 
unable to avoid completely the constant stream of Congressmen at his door 
requesting appointments for constituents. Polk stated to a close political 
friend that there were at least a half dozen applicants from each of the 
twenty-eight states to fill each vacancy. 71 
67Polk did indicate that it was necessary that a judge must be a 
resident of the circuit to which he is appointed, or he would be r ejected ~ 
by the Senate. Polk to G. Pillow, Feb. 4, 1846. Polk Papers, Library of 
Congress. 
68see Joseph P. Harris, "The Courtesy of ' the Senate," Political 
Science Quarterly, LXVII (1952), pp. 56-65. The first instance of a Senator 
declaring a nominee "personally obnoxious" did not occur until 1859, and it was 
unsuccessful. Leonard D. White, 'J'he J acksonians (New York, Macmillan Co., 
1954), pp. 120-121. 
69polk, Diary, IV, PP• 28-29. 
70spea.king of three Democratic Senators, Polk stated, "I have 
treated them with great civility and have yielded to their wi shes about ap-
pointments in their respective States until they seem to have come to the 
conclusion that I must administer the Government precisely as they may direct. 
In this they will find themselves mistaken." Polk, {liarz, I, pp. 486-487. 
71Polk to A. P. Nicholson, April 25, 1846. Polk Papers, Library of 
Congress. 
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The President often felt that he and the reputation of his a.dminis-
tration had been damaged by the false recommendations which he had received 
from Congressmen.72 One situation had its humorous aspects when a nomination 
was rejected by the Senate because of the opposition of the same Senator who 
had made the recommendation. To add insult to injury, the Senator then came 
to Polk to recommend another for the same office. Polk questioned the Sena-
tor about this odd request as follows: 
••• well, you rejected the man I nominated; 0 yes, he replied, he was 
without character & wholly unqualified. I then asked him if he knew 
upon whose recommendation I had appointed him, to which he replied that 
he did not. I then handed to him his own letter & told him that that 
was the recommendation upon which I had appointed him. He appeared 
confused and replied, Well, we are obliged to recommend our constitu-
ents when they apply to us.73 
In most instances of such unreliable recommendations, of which there 
were many, the President was not amused in the least. The clearest indict-
ment of Congressmen for their failure to make reliable recommendations and 
for their reluctance to assume any responsibility for the bad appointments 
which result, Polk records as follows: 
Every day that I remain in the Presidential office satisfies me more and 
more of the selfishness and want of patriotism of men high in office. 
To accomplish their own selfish ends members of Congress constantly 
deceive me in their recommendations for office, and the consequence is 
that many bad appointments are made; and when they are made, the whole 
responsibility devolves on me, & those ~~o have importuned me to make 
them never assume any portion of the responsibility, but on the contrary 
in some instances carefully conces.l the fact that the obnoxious appoint-
ments have been made at their instance. I am disgusted ¥dth the trickery 
and treachery practised upon me by same members of Congress in their 
recommendations for office.74 
72rolk records embarrassment that an appointment he had made of a 
Paymaster in the Army proved to be incapacitated by reason of insanity. 
Polk to Senator Haywood, June 29, 1846, ~Papers, Libra.ry of Congress. 
?Bpolk, Diary, II, p. 315. 74Ibid., P• 296. 
It has become quite fashionable recently, out of a commendable zeal 
to make our political parties more responsible, i.e., stronger and more 
disciplined, to recommend the return to a system where patronage had a great-
er role to play. The Polk administration should serve as a grim reminder 
not only that patronage is an inefficient we.y to provide the manpower to 
operate our government, but also of greater significance, that pe.tronage 
does not build stronger, more disciplined political parties. Instead, it 
weakens and divides them; rather than strengthening Presidential control, it 
subverts it. President Polk was merely speaking what every practicing poli-
tician has learned When he stated: 
In every appointment which the President makes he disappoints half a 
dozen or more applicants and their friends, who, actuated by selfish 
and sordid motives, will prefer any other candidate in the next elec-
tion, while the person appointed attributes the appointment to his own 
superior merit and does not even feel obligated by it. The number of 
office seekers has become so large that they probably hold the balance 
of power between the two great parties in the country, and if disap-
pointed in getting place under one administration they will readily 
unite·~: themselves with the party and candidate of opposite politics, so 
as to increase their chances for place. Another great difficulty in 
making appointments which the President encounters is that he cannot tell 
upon what recommendations to rely. Members of Congress and men of high 
station in the country sign papers of recommendation, either from inter-
ested personal motives or without meaning what they say, and thus the 
President is often imposed on, and induced to make bad appointments. 
When he does so the whole responsibility falls on himself, while those who 
have signed papers of recommendation and misled him, t~e special care 
never to avow the agency they have had in the matter, or to assume any 
part of the responsibility.75 
75Polk, Diary, II, pp. 314-315; see also, "It is one year to-day 
since I entered on the duties of my office, and still the pressure for office 
has not abated. I most sincerely wish that I ha.d no offices to bestow. If 
I had not it would add much to the happiness and comfort of my position. As 
it is, I have no offices to bestow without turning out better men than a large 
majority of those V!ho seek their place." Polk, Diary, I, p. 261; "I sincerely 
wish I had no offices to bestow. I csnnot gratify all who apply and it is cer-
tain from my experience that the dispensation of the public patronage is a 
weakening operation." Polk, Diary, II, p. 20; "I am thoroughly satisfied that 
the patronage of the Government greatly weakens any President of the U. States, 
237 
President Polk's Personal Relationship_~ Leading Politicians 
Polk maintained a strong interest in State politics throughout his 
Presidency. In particular he maintained his interest in Tennessee politics, 
but, even there, he observed the principle tha.t the President should not 
interfere in intraparty struggles. An example of Polk's observing this prin-
ciple occurred when the legislature of Tennessee elected Senator Turney to 
the United States Senate. Mr. Turney had been in a contest with Mr. Nichol-
son for the Senate seat. It seems certain that Polk preferred Nicholson for 
the position, and all ~~e legislators from East Tennessee, Polk's strong-
hold, supported Nicholson; nevertheless, Turney was elected by winning sup-
port from the Whigs. Turney had charged that the President was interfering 
in the choice and favoring Nicholson, a charge the President refused to 
repudiate in public but did disavow to Turney. Polk felt that Turney had 
made the charges as a clever political maneuver to win Whig votes, or as 
the President himself wrote: 
The truth, I have no doubt, is that Mr. Turney resolved to come to the 
Senate if he could, and finding that a majority of his o~n party pre-
ferred Mr. Nicholson, made the charge that I had interfered in the elec-
tion and expressed a preference for Mr. Nicholson knolrlng it himself to 
be fa~se, for the sole purpose of securing Whig votes, and in this he 
succeeded.76 
Whether true or false, charges of interference by the President in behalf of 
a state candidate were, in those days as now, likely to work against the 
so much so, indeed, I doubt whether any President vdll ever again be re-
elected." Ibid., p. 278; "The party in power will always be we~~ened by the 
votes of this class of persons. I am confirmed in the truth of the remark 
which I have long since made, that the patronage of the Government will, 
from the day any President enters upon his duties, we~~en his administration." 
Polk, Diary, IV, p. 194. 
76:rbid., I, p. 115. 
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candidate that the President favored. 77 
In 1847 Polk commented upon the expected defeat of Governor Brown 
for re~election and his comments indicate very well his feel for local poli-
tics, his astute appraisal of election issues, and failures of the Democratic 
party. Because this is one of the clearest analyses by a President of the 
United States of an election defeat, it is worthy of quoting at some length: 
1st, the Taylor feeling, which the Democratic party have been afraid to 
meet boldly by taking the ground that they would oppose him or any other 
man, who refused to avow his principles, and who was not the regularly 
nominated candidate of his party. This was the mistake committed in the 
canvass in Tennessee. 
2nd, The dispensation of the patronage of the Federal Government, 
and especially in appointments to military offices, has given offense to 
many leading men in the State, who have been lukewarm & inactive. All 
the leading men in Tennessee know me personally, and many of them aspire 
to high commands in the army who could not be gratified. It illustrates 
beyond doubt the truti1 of the opinion which I have long since formed 
that the Pat1:,onage must necessarily LweaJcen] any President. Many of the 
leading [men_j of the Democratic party whose poli ticsl principles hang 
loosely about them an~who have sought office from me and have been 
disappointed, not ~only_Jin Tennessee but throughout the Union, have 
taken ground & led off in favour of Gen'l Taylor. They have no higher 
object than to have another chance for getting an office if he should 
be elected. 
5rd, Another cause of the result in Tennessee, [is] the overconfi-
dence of the Democratic party in their strength, and the consequent 
failure to make the proper exertion in the late contest.78 
Polk was capable of making bitter personal enemies politically. His 
dislike often went to the extent that he was not on speaking terms with them. 
Yet it is interesting that he reserved his strongest feelings not for the 
77Letter to Governor Brown of Tennessee, October 24, 1845. ~ 
Papers, Library of Congress. Polk denied the charge that he had "dictated" 
the political decision in Tennessee. 
78polk, Dia~, III, pp. 119-120; Letters from Polk to Governor Brovm 
of Tennessee, Sept. 8 and Nov. 1, 1847. ~Papers, Library of Congress. 
Polk comforts Brovm with the observation that he (Polk) had twice been de-
fe~ted as gubernatorial candidate in Tennessee, but that standing on prin-
ciple has its own reward. 
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Whigs, possibly because he expected so little from them, but for those Demo-
crats whom he considered disloyal to their party or to their country. Among 
these, the two Whom he disliked the most were Senator Calhoun and Representa-
tive Andrew Johnson of Tennessee. Polk had kept a record of Johnson's oppo-
sition and had denied to Johnson any votce in appointments in Tennessee. Yet 
in spite of his dislike, Polk did not attempt to e~ert any influence to 
defeat him in Tennessee. The President wrote: 
There are no two districts in Tennessee more democratic or in which I 
have more devoted friends than those represented by Johnson and Jones, 
and though I have it in my power, as I believe, by communicating the 
truth to ~heir constituents to destroy them politically, I have not 
done so. 7 
Polk's feelings toward Andrew Johnson did not abate during his term 
in office. On New Year's Day 1849, he professed this view of Johnson's con-
duct and character, a viewpoint which has been generally shared by historians 
of the Johnson Presidential adrndllistration. 
Professing to be a Democrat, he has been politically if not personally 
hostile to me during my whole term. He is very vindictive and perverse 
in his temper and conduct. If he had the manliness or independence to 
manifest his opposition openly, he knows he could not be again elected 
by his constituents.80 
Polk's regard for Senator Calhoun has already been indicated, and as 
in the case of Andrew Johnson, Polk's ability to size up political leaders 
indicates his unusual shrewdness and insight into American politics. It is 
for these reasons, therefore, that the following appraisal of Senator Cal-
houn is included. The occasion for Polk's remarks was his learning of Cal-
houn's intention to support General Taylor for the Presidency. 
If the rumor be true then all Mr. Calhoun's loud profession in favour of 
a strict construction of the Constitution & State rights are false. It 
79Polk, Diary, II, PP• 40-41. 80rbid., IV, P• 265. 
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was but a few years ago that Mr. Calhoun was ready to nullify & dissolve 
the Union about the tariff. Now that the tariff has been reduced under 
my administration & all has been effected on that subject which he de-
sired, he is opliged to mount some other political hobby to keep himself 
before the public, and for that purpose some weeks ago selected the 
slavery question. Finding now that he cannot gratify his :' ambition by 
the agitation of that question, he now abandons every leading political 
principle he has ever professed and, if the rumour be true, avows himself 
for Gen'l Taylor for the Presidency •••• I cannot exp~esj the contempt 
I feel for Mr. Calhoun for such profligate political Lin consistency. If 
I had retained him in my Cabinet & consented to yield myself up to his 
control, I might have secured his support, but not by the support of 
principle. 81 
Polk was capable, however, of ma~ing friends with old political rivals, 
and his reconciliation \rlth Senator Bell, with whom he had not been on speak-
ing terms ever since their bitter contests for the Speakership of the House 
in the 1830's, is particularly touching.82 
Polk's "No Second Term" Pledge and~ Election of 184885 
It will be recalled that Polk disavowed any intention to run for a 
second term in his letter of acceptance addressed to the Baltimore Conven-
tion of 1844.84 Polk maintained this position throughout his term of office. 
As early as Christmas 1845, Polk informed Senator Turney that Van Buren and 
Calhoun had nothing to fear from him as he was not a candidate for re-election.85 
Polk often expressed the view ~~at not being a candidate for re-election gave 
81Ibid., II, PP• 470-471. 
82Ibid., III, pp. 258-285, passim. An amusing part of the reconcilia-
tion was the difficulty of getting the wives together. Polk records that: 
~Before he left I told him Mrs. Polk would be glad to see Mrs. Bell. He inti-
mated that there had been some difficulty on that point, but that Mrs. Bell 
would call soon. I suppose the difficulty consisted in the pride which ladies 
sometimes feel, whlch makes them reluctant to yield to each other, and the 
fact that the established etiquette of the Presidential office required the 
first call from Mrs. Bell." Ibid., p. 285. 
85see Plate VIII, Political cartoon on the election of 1848, entitled 
"Progressive Democracy." 
84suprs., Chapter II, p. 52. 85polk, Diary, I, pp. 141-142. 
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him greater freedom of action. He felt that every political leader of any 
stature was an avowed candidate for the Presidency, and that as such he was 
always being forced to trim his sails to appeal to this group or that. Polk, 
however, believed that by not being a candidate he enjoyed the rare advantage 
of being above the partisan strife and could pursue an independent course. He 
also refused to align himself with any faction of the party. It becomes appar-
ent that Polk felt that any political disadvantage which he acquired by not 
being a candidate for re-election was more than offset by hi s position as a 
balance between leading candidates. 86 
That his tactics of playing one faction of the party against another 
kept control of the situation in his own hands is evidenced by the attempts 
which were made beginning in January of 1848 (the Democratic Convention was 
to be held in Baltimore on May 22nd) to induce him to run for a second term, 
the constant theme of his adherents being that only he could reunite the Party 
and provide the harmony necessary for victory. Those advocating his renomina-
tion even informed the President that it might be necessary to renom!nate him 
against his personal wishes. Undoubtedly the President was flattered by these 
overtures and probably would have been tempted had not his health been declining 
so rapidly. In each instance he maintained without wavering his intentio-n t o 
retire at the end of one term.87 Eventually Polk faced the necessity of pre-
paring a letter which would remove him from the contest and prevent his nom-
ination in case his name should be introduced into the Convention. Polk de-
cided to draft a letter to a Tennessee delegate to the Convention which could 
be read to the Conventior; ·~-.and thus eliminate the President once and for all 
8~., PP• 201, 248-249, 265-266, 280, 402. 
87Ibid., III, p. 298, 520~521, 420-422. 
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~rom consideration. A measure o~ the signi~icance the President gave to 
the dra~ting o~ this letter is the ~act that he consulted with almost all 
members o~ his cabinet and with numerous other politics~ leaders.88 
The letter, which was read to the Democratic National Convention 
o~ 1848, ~ollows: 
Washington, May 1848 
Dear Sir: 
From speculations which have appeared in some o~ the public journals, 
and ~rom frequent inquiries which have been. made o~ me by many political 
friends some of them delegates to the Democratic National Convention 
which will assemble at Baltimore on the 22 inst, I am induced to suppose 
that it may be the desires o~ some o~ my friends to propose my renomina-
tion as the candidate o~ the democratic party for the o~fice o~ President 
o~ the United States. Should you ascertain that such is the intention 
of any of the delegates, I desire, through you, to communicate to the 
convention that I am not a candidate for the nomination, and that any 
use of my name with that view, which may be contemplated, is without any 
agency or desire on my part. 
The purpose declared in my letter o~ the 12th June 1844 in accept-
ing the nomination tendered to me by the Democratic National Convention 
o~ that year, remains unchanged: and to relieve the convention from any 
possible embarrassment which the suggestion o~ my name might produce in 
"making a ~reer selection o~ a successor, who may be best calculated to 
give e~fect to their will, and guard all the interests o~ our beloved 
country," I deem it proper to reiterate the sentiments contained in that 
letter. Since my election I have often expressed the sincerest desire, 
which I still ~eel, to retire to private li~e at the close o~ my present 
term. 
I entertain the confident hope and belie~ that my democratic friends 
at the convention will unite in the harmonious nomination of some citizen 
to ~ucceed me, who, if elected, will firmly maintain and carry out the 
great political principles embodied in the resolutions adopted by the 
Democratic National Convention in 1844. Principles which it has been the 
earnest endeavor and the constant aim of my administration to preserve 
and pursue, and upon the observation of which, in my opinion, mainly 
depend the prosperity and permanent welfare of our country. 
I~, on reviewing the history of my administration, and the remarkable 
events, ~oreign and domestic, which have attended it, it shall be the 
judgment of my countrymen that I have adhered to these principles, and 
~aith~ully performed my duty, the measure o~ my ambition is ~ull, a.nd I 
am amply compensated for all the labors, eares, and anxieties which are 
inseparable from the high station which I have been called to fill. I 
shall ever cherish sentiments of deep gratitude to my fellow-citizens 
88 . Ibid., PP• 448, 452, 454-458, 465. 
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for the confidence they reposed in me, in electing me to the most distin-
guished and responsible public trust on earth. 
It is scarcely necessary that I should add, that it will be no less 
my duty, than it will be my sincere pleasure as a citizen to unite with 
my democratic friends in the support of the nominees of the convention 
for the offices of President and Vice-President of the United States. 
With great respect~ I am your obedient servant, 
James K. Polk8:1 
On the fourth ballot the Democratic Convention nominated LerN.is Cass 
as its standard-bearer. The real struggledn the Convention, however, oc-
curred in the committee on credentials. New York State came to the Conven-
tion with two sets of delegates, one group of 56 delegates representing the 
Hunkers and another group of 36 delegates representing the Barnburners. A 
compromise was adopted which would admit both groups of delegates but give 
them only the vote to which New York was entitled. The Barnburners, however, 
refused to accept the compromise and bolted the Convention. President Polk 
took great satisfaction that the Convention readopted the platform of 1844 
and included a resolution giving a vote of confidence to the administration 
of James K. Polk. 90 
Cass called on the President shortly after the Convention and asked 
for Polk's comments on a draft of a reply ~hich Cass had prepared for a com-
mittee of the Convention. 91 The President was obviously pleased with the 
8~etter of James K. Polk to J. G. M. Ramsey of Tennessee as printed 
in the Washington Union, May 26, 1848. (There is not a copy of this rather 
significant Presidential letter in print.) See Plate IX for photostatic 
copy of this letter, taken from letter in Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 
90Edward Stanwood, ! Histor;y- of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910), pp. 232-237. 
91Polk, Diary, III, pp. 470-472. 
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respect paid to him and favored Cass' candidacy above all others as he had 
done for some time. 92 For a.s early as February lOth, after informing Cass 
that as President he must remain neutral between all the candidates for the 
Democratic nomination, Polk wrote: 
The truth is that Gen'l C. has given to my administration an honest and 
hearty support, and if he is the nominee I will support him with great 
pleasure. There is no other whom I would support with more pleasure.93 
Polk's optimism about the chances for Democratic victory was very 
short-lived, indeed. The President was a realist in politics and was aware 
that the withdrawal of the Barnburners from the Convention was a dangerous 
sign. Whenever the occasion presented itself he informed members of the 
Barnburners that "• •• if they did not support the nomination of Cass & Butler 
they could not continue to be members of the Democtratic party •••• "94 In 
June when the Barnburners met in separate convention in Utica, New York and 
nominated Van Buren as their candidate for the Presidency, Polk remarked: 
It is more threatening to the Union than anything which has occurred 
since the meeting of the Hartford convention in 1814. Mr. Van Buren's 
course is selfish, unpatriotic, and ~holly inexcusable.95 
The President did not take the stump in behalf of Lewi s Cass, for in 
those days it would have been considered ill-mannered for the President to do 
so. It will be remembered that even the candidates themselves did not deliver 
public addresses but were limited to expressing their views in print. In a 
letter on October 17, 1848 to his good friend, J. G. M. Ramsey of Tennessee, 
92polk continued to correspond with Cass throughout the campaign. 
See especially letter of November 4, 1848 in which Polk listed the various 
states and indicated the possible combinations which might lead to Cass's 
election. He also passed on what information he had been receiving from 
poll ticians in the several states. Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 
9~olk, Diary, III, p. 355. 94rbid., p. 481. 95Ibid., p. 502. 
245 
the President complained of the fact that his position as President prevented 
him from taldng an active role in the Presidential election. But he expressed 
his views on the possible outcome of the contest, which the President regarded 
as very much in doubt. He suggested that Ramsey might prevail upon Joseph S. 
Williams, a. Vl'hig, whom Polk felt to be "a person who controls more votes in 
his state than any other person" to make a speech for Cass instead of Taylor~ 
Polk observed that the old issues such as the Bank and tariff which had 
divided Williams and himself were no longer significant. In a second letter 
to Ramsey written on the same day, Polk instructed Ramsey to show Williams 
the other letter, Viti. th the comments that if he (Williams) should support Cass, 
the "whole Democracy in the state would be under his obligation.n96 In the 
Polk Papers there are numerous letters of the President to inf'luentie~ poli-
ticians urging them to work harder for Cass's election.97 
Polk felt that Cass's election would enable Polk's e.dministration to 
resolve the question of territorial government for California which was such 
a threat to the Union itself. Polk, in the previously cited letter, i nformed 
Ramsey, "If Cass is elected then great confidence -- that it will gain my 
administration such strength and enable me to settle this only remaining 
question of difficulty before I retire." 
Upon learning that the Free Soilers had nominated Van Buren at their 
Buffalo Convention, Polk stated, "Mr. Van Buren is the most fallen ma.n I 
have ever knov.rn.rr98 On election day, Polk noted that this was the first time 
96Polk to Ramsey, Oct. 17, 1848. Polk Papers, Library of Congress. 
97 One such example is Polk's letter to Vice-President Dalls.s, Oct. 14, 
1848, urging Dallas and Democrats in Pennsylvania to work harder or Pennsyl-
vania Vv-ill be lost to the "Democracy." Poll£ pa.p,ers, Library of Congress. 
98rolk, ~' IV, P• 67. 
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that all the states voted for President on the same day, in e.ccordance with 
an act of Congress passed in January 1845. He went on to estimate that the 
popular vote wo\1ld be 5,000,000. The actual vote was 2,875,000.99 The elec-
tion was, as Polk had feared, a. victory for General Taylor,lOO the outcome 
being decided by the loss of New York State by a plurality.lOl Van Buren's 
candidacy on the Free Soilers ticket had drawn sufficient votes away from 
the Democratic nominee to insure Taylor's success.102 The President greeted 
the news of Taylor's election with great misgivings for the welfare of the 
country and for the continuation of t he policies of his administration. He 
recorded his reaction as follows: 
Without_political inf ormation and without experience in civil life, he 
[Taylor~ is wholly unqualified for the station, and being elected by the 
Federal party a.nd the various factions of dissatisfied persons who have 
from time to time broken of f from the Democratic ~B~ty, he must be in 
their hands, and be under their absolute control. Having no opinions 
or judgment of his own upon any public subject, foreign or domesti c, he 
will be compelled to rely upon the designing men of the Federal party 
Who will cluster around him, and will be made to reverse the whole policy 
99 Ibid., pp. 181-182. 
100As early as August 1847, Polk had written Governor Brown of Tennes-
see, 11 Clay may be a candidate, but make no mistake, Taylor is a \'lhig. 11 Aug. 
25, 1847, Letter of Polk to Governor Bro~~ of Tennessee, Polk PaRers, Library 
of Congress. 
10~olk's high regard for Cass continued. The President urged Cass 
to return to the Senate and he appointed Cass's son Charge of Affairs to the 
Papal states . Letters of Polk to Cass, November 14, 1848 and January 9, 
1849. ~ Paaers, Library of Cong~ess. 
102stanwood, op. cit., pp. 242-243; A. K. McClure, Our Presidents and 
How We Make Them (New York: Harper & Bros., Pub., 1909), pp. 94-115. 
105prior to the election, Polk had vii'i tten "Should our opponent -- by 
a.ny[i1legible] come into power, this President must from his total want of 
civil qualification, be in the h,ands and wholly under the control of such 
political leaders as [illegiblej •••• Can the country desire this? I hope 
not." Polk to Ramsey, October 17, 1848. ~Papers, Library of Congress. 
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of my administration, and to substitute the Federal policy in its stead. 
The country will be the loose [loser] by his election, and on this 
account it is an event which I should deeply regret.l04 
President · Polk's record as leader of his party is a mixed one. He was 
able to dominate Congress and insure the successful passage of most of his 
legislation, but in his relations with the general public his record was 
rather weak. In spite of the fact that he led the nation in its de:i3ire for 
territorial expansion, he was unable to assume the mantle "Manifest Destiny." 
It was his misfortune to become President at a time when the need for the 
Chief Executive to be the spokesman of public opinion was just being realized. 
He was a master of the political maneuvers which had dominated his life as 
a legislator and Governor, but was unable to become a public figure on a 
national scale, as the rising ~emocratic interest in politics demanded. His 
handling of the administration press met the earlier standards, but this 
technique of political leadership was on the wane during his administration. 
He was one of the first Presidents to recognize that patronage as a. means 
of party control had more disadvantages than advantages for the party in 
power. In the last years of his administration the split in the Democratic 
party over the slavery issue was so deep that it is doubtful th~t any leader 
could have harmonized the differences. Certainly Polk could not, lacking as 
he did the magnetic personal! ty and the means of making an appeal over the 
heads of political leaders to the people. Polk was a man whose whole life 
was centered in politics. It was the one topic of conversation which he 
enjoyed; the only thing in which he displayed a sense of humor, yet in spite 
104polk, Diary, IV, p. 184. Dyer records that victory brought to 
Taylor " ••• sixteen months of tiresome struggle with the burdens and cares of 
an office he had not sought and for which he had no liking. It brought him 
discouragement, disillusionment, and death." Dyer, 22• cit., p. 301. 
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of this total preoccupation with politics, he never completely mastered this 
most subtle role of the American Presidency. He was unable to supply the 
charismatic leadership which is essential to real success in this field. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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The Democratic victory in 1844 brought to the office of President 
of the United States a man who was determined to establish for that posi-
tion the prerogatives of an independent, equal brs.nch of the government 
which his political mentor Andrew Jackson had successfully asserted during 
his term of office. President Polk was to fix the Jacksonian concept of 
the Presidency by his continued willingness and insistence upon being the 
nucleus about which his entire administration revolved. He accepted with-
out question or doubt all the vast responsibility which the office placed 
upon his shoulders; he was never willing to say that a Presidential respon-
sibility for a given task rested with Congress, ~~th a member of his cabinet, 
or with the military. Rather by all his words and deeds he said the respon-
sibility rested with the President. 
If Jackson in his fight over the Bank asserted the principle that 
the President was as representative of the people as was the Congress, Polk 
was even more explicit in his challenge to the Whig claims that only Cong-
ress, certainly not the President, was the true spokesman for the people . 
By contrasting Jackson's t wo statements on Presidential responsibility with 
that of Polk, it becomes obvious that Polk understood more clearly than 
Jackson the changed role of the President. Jackson in his first mes sage t o 
Congress, with obvious reference to the election of 1825, recommended the 
direct election of the President so that "as few impediments as possible 
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should exist to the free operation of the public will,"l and in 1834 Jackson 
in asserting his right to control his cabinet members stated, "The President 
is the direct representative of the American people, but the Secret&.ries 
are not."2 Neither of these statements by Jackson, the one being concerned 
with defects of the electoral college and the other ~~th Presidential author-
ity over his subordinates, confronted clearly the question whether Congress 
or the President was the true representative of the people. Certainly Pres-
ident Polk's views are a more direct refutation of the Whig position, ~hich 
President Harrison stated as follows: 
••• it is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment be 
entertained that the President, placed at the capital, in the center 
of the country, could better understand the wants and wishes of the 
people than their own immediate representatives •••• B 
Polk chose his fourth and last annual message to Congress to deliver 
his considered view on this most significant question a view that reflected 
his continued application of the Presidential responsibility. 
The people, by the Constitution, have commanded the President, as much 
as they have commanded the legislative branch of the Government, to exe-
cute their will. 
If it be said that the Representatives in the popular branch of 
Congress are chosen directly by the people, it is answered, the people 
elect the President. If both Houses represent the States and the people, 
so does the President. The President represents in the executive 
department the ~hole people of the United States, as each member of the 
legislative department represents portions of them. 4 
He implemented this belief by leading Congress to enact a legis-
lative program of his own choosing; he was not content merely to recommend 
and let Congress dispose. It mattered not whether the issue be domestic 
tariff legislation or an important war measure, the President was in the fore-
1 Richardson, Messages, II, p. 448. 
5rbid., IV, PP• 7-10. 
2rbid., III, P• 90. 
4Ibid., IV, pp. 664-665. 
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ground leading the administrative forces to victory. Even his handling of 
the Oregon Boundar y dispute was consistent, although paradoxical, for, while 
seerningly surrendering leadership to the Senate by asking for its prior 
approval, he was able to achieve what b,y any other means might have proven 
impossible. 
By his refusal to answer a request from Congress which omitted the 
usual reservation, n ••• if not incompatible with the public interests," he 
protected the integrity of the executive from a possible misuse of the Con-
gressional investigative power. Even in his unsuccessful attempt to resolve 
the conflict over the extension of slavery in the newly acquired terri t ories, 
he recognized that Presidential responsibility required him to be the spokes-
man for the whole Union, rather than a sectional leader. By refusing to 
give countenance to the extremists, he made all aware o.f their responsibility 
to the nation and gained the time so essential for national survival. Had 
President Polk in 1848 elected to cast his lot with Calhoun and his followers, 
the geographical parties would have been born eight years earlier, at a time 
when the North might well have consented without a struggle to the South 1 s 
leaving the Union. President Polk, without embarrassment or apology, might 
well have repeated Jackson's famous words, "The Federal Union-- it must be 
preserved." 
A Jacksonian-type President must do more than meet emergencies and 
defend his prerogatives, for at the core of our concept of the Jacksonian 
strong executive is the expectation that the President ~~11 have a program, 
e. definite set of objectives and goals to be accomplished, and that in addi-
tion to having a program he will have the ability to get it implemented. 
Bernard De Voto in describing President Polk expressed this view most forcefully: 
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But if his mind was narrow it was also powerful and he had guts. If he 
was orthodox, his integrity was absolute, and he could not be scared, 
manipulated, or b~ought to heel. No one bluffed him, no one moved him 
with direct o.t' oblique pressure. Furthermore, he knew ho~ to get things 
done, which is the first necessi t~ of government, and he knew what he 
wanted done, which is the second.~ 
The record is clear that Polk came to office with his goals clearly 
in mind, for during the inaugural parade he informed George Bancroft, his-
torian and Polk's Secretary of the Navy and Ambassador to England, of the 
four great measures of his administration. In foreign aff&irs they were the 
acquisition of California and the settlement of the Oregon Boundary dispute 
with Great Britain. The domestic program consisted of a. lowering of the 
tariff to almost a free-trade standard and the establishment of the inde-
pendent treasury.6 
President Polk as chief of foreign affairs adhered relentlessly to 
his prime objectives. Although his methods often varied, encompassing such 
diversity as the sub~ negotiations with Santa Anna, and the display of 
a harsh attitude before Congress, while at the same time offering, through 
diplomatic channels, to compromise the Oregon dispute, he never wavered from 
his ultimate goals. When the final decision had to be made, he remained 
firm, even if that meant accepting a treaty negotiated by a disliked and 
discredited commissioner and opposing the leading members of his o~~ cab-
inet in their desire for still greater territorial expansion, and even if 
it necessitated getting the prior approval of Congress to the Oregon 
~ettlement. Throughout his administration he adhered to his ultimate 
5Bernard De Voto, ~ ~ of Decision: 1846, pp. 7-8. 
Cueorge Bancroft, "James K. Polk," Appleton's Cyclopedia of American 
BiographY, V, P• 55. 
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objectives with stubborn determination, never permitting obstacles or 
emotional involvement to deflect him from his course. 
During his entire administre.tion, which is noted for its activity 
in the field of foreign relations, his leadership was constantly being 
challenged. More often than not, his own Secretary of State was to be 
found in opposition to his views, yet President Polk was able and willing 
to keep Buchanan in his cabinet, for he could never dominate ~he President. 
Nor was Polk's opposition limited to his Secretary of State; he was con-
stently opposed by the Whigs in Congress, who after 1846 were in a majority 
in the lower house; also in opposition during different periods in his admin-
istration were sizable elements of the Democratic Congressional delegation. 
Yet, in spite of this constant opposition, he was able to accomplish every 
major objective of his foreign policy, so that he could in truth state in 
1848 that: 
My successor will be relieved of all existing questions of difficulty 
with F'oreign Nations.... His situation in this respect will be very 
different from mine When I assumed the administration of the Government 
on the 4th of March 1845.7 
Since the time of Andrew Jackson we have looked to the President to 
embody the national sentiment. For exa.mple, we use the phrase, "age of 
Jack~on," as the symbol of the break from autocratic rule and the beginning 
of popular democracy. In a similar fashion, Woodrow Wilson has become 
identified with the term, "New Freedom," Franklin D. Roosevelt with the "New 
Deal, 11 and James K. Polk with "Manifest Destiny." Tq1 those who insist, from 
a restricted view of history, that western expansion should be expla.ined 
solely in terms of economic determinism and a slave economy, the folloYdng 
7Polk, Diary, IV, P• 267. 
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passage from Bernard De Voto is quoted: 
••• that expansionism contained such other unanalyzable elements as 
romance, Utopianism, and the dream that men might yet be free. It 
also contained another category of ingredients -- such as the logic 
of geography, which the map of J anus.ry 1, 1846, made quite as clear 
to the Americans then as it is to anyone today. You yourself, looking 
at a map in which Oregon was jointly occupied by a foreign power and 
all the rest of the cont~nent west of Texas and the continental divide 
was foreign territory would experience a feeling made up of incomple-
tion and insecurity. Both incompletion and insecurity were a good 
deal more alive in the 1840~s than anythi ng short of invasion could 
make them now. And finally, expansionism had acquired an emotion 
that was new -- or at least signified a new combination. The Americans 
had always devoutly believed that the superiority of their institu-
tions, government, and mode of life would eventually spread, by inspira-
tion and imitation to less fortunate, less happy peoples. That devout 
belief now took a new phase: it was perhaps the American destiny to 
spread our free admirable institutions by action as well as by example, 
by occupying territory as well as by practising virtue •••• For the 
sum of these feelings, a Democratic editor found, in the summer of 1 45, 
one of the most dynamic phrases ever minted, Manifest Destiny.8 
James K. Polk was able to give concrete meaning to that phrase; to 
him it meant Texas to the Rio Grande, certainly; Oregon, at least including 
the Columbia River; but more than that it meant California. His objectives 
clear, he organized his authority to achieve them, peacefully if possible, 
but by war if that was necessary. And even those who deplore his methods 
would be most reluctant to abandon the territory which he added to the 
nation. 
Yet it is paradoxical that it was on this issue that President Polk 
fell short of fulfilling that Presidential requirement significant since 
Jackson's time of being the leader of public opinion. For ordinary times 
or for any President prior to Andrew Jackson, Polk's record as the champion 
of manifest destiny would have marked him as a successful les.der, but the 
years from 1845 to 1849 were not ordinary; momentous decisions had been 
8 DeVoto, 22• cit., pp. 8-9. 
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made, the West had been won, the slavery issue could no longer be over-
looked, and most important of all there was a new vitality in the poli t-
ical affairs of the nation, a new democratic fervor was in the air, the 
voices of the multitude had to be he~rd and provided with leadership. 
President Polk, although a man of great humanitarian and democratic feel-
ing , was unable to provide the necessary leadera~ip; the people would have 
to wait for a man named Lincoln. 
Polk was no people's hero; he understood partisan politics well; . 
he appreciated the significance of party discipline, which he thought could 
be obtained only through loyalty to a rational legislative program or by 
an appeal to the base motive of the desire for jobs. In this latter regard 
he was probably the first President to recognize, much to his ovm surprise, 
that patronage had disadvantages which outnumbered its advantages; yet he 
was unable to perceive any method, such as a merit system, for eliminating 
the problem. In a day when the partisan press was rapidly losing its sig-
nificance as a political organ, it remai ned the only way he knew to appeal 
to the people. He could muster the votes for his program, but not the 
support of public opinion necessary for great leadership1 
President Polk's control over the executive branch of the govern-
ment greatly exceeded that of President Jackson. While it is true that when 
the necessity arose Jackson was willing to dismiss members of his cabinet 
who endangered his supremacy, he failed to exercise anything like the con-
stant control over his subordinates that Polk L~sisted upon exercising. 
Jackson often disregarded the day-by-day operations of government and was 
prone to ignore or by-pass his cabinet in favor of relying upon the unoffic-
ial advisers who constituted the well-known "kitchen cabinet." Polk, in 
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contrast both to this Jacksonian technique and to the Whig view tha t the 
cabinet constituted a council whose advice was legally binding upon the Pres-
ident, asserted his independence and personal responsibility for t he conduct 
of every action anyvmere in the executive branch, ~nile at the same time mak-
ing constant use of his cabinet as the chief coordinating body of the govern-
ment and as a sounding board for di scussion of administration policy. Fur-
thermore, Polk expected and insisted tha.t his cabinet members be loyal to the 
program of his administration and use their poli tice.l influence to advance 
that program through ~~e halls of Cohgress. 
It mattered not whether Polk was dealing with his cabinet as a whole 
or with an individual member -- the Secretary of State or of the Treasury -
Polk insisted that there be but one voice for his administration. He clearly 
understood that unity in the executive was a prime requisite for responsible 
government. Undoubtedly it would be impossible for a present-day executive 
to supervise the details of administration to the extent that Polk was able 
to do, but his right to do so and his responsibilit;x: for the actions of the 
subordinate officials President Polk clearly established. He exemplified 
the virtues of hard work and diligent application of energy to the task to be 
accomplished. It never occurred to him to answer an inquiry with evasion or 
a denial of responsibility. To a greater extent than any previous President, 
he asserted the right of the President to control every aspect of administra-
tion. His control over the Treasury and the budgetary process was unique, in 
that for' the first time he brought that function, which had been beyond Pres-
idential control from the time of Alexander Hamilton, under the day-by-day 
control of the President. This was done \d thout fanfare or dismissal but as 
a matter of routine administrative supervision. His control over the Treasury 
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was so thorough-going that for the first time there was presented to the 
Congress and to the people a truly executive budget, which accurately re-
flected ~~e intent of the government. In dominating affairs both large and 
small of the subordinate officers and agencies of the administration, Polk 
contributed to Presidential aggrandizement to an extent unchallenged by the 
acts of any of his predecessors, even Andrew Jackson. 
Polk established that a President without previous military service 
could serve in fact as well as in name as the Commander-in-Chief, and do so 
successfully. He was able to accomplish this by his constant attention to 
every phase of military matter from planning grand strategy to such inci-
dental problems as supplying army mules. By knowing more than any other 
person in his administration about the many facets of military operation, 
he was able to maintain control. He brought the Department of War and Navy 
into the sa~e constitutional relationship with the President as the other 
departments of the government. This was done in the same manner in which he 
brought the Treasury Department under his control; that is, by knowing the 
details of administration and by insisting that he was responsible for every 
decision anywhere in the chain of command. Whether civilians or military 
men, no army officials were too high or too strong to escape his surveillance, 
nor were any too insignificant to avoid his supervision. 
His record of success a.s Commander-in-Chief was achieved in spite o:f 
opposition to the war on the part of a large segment of the Congress and of 
the public generally. Probably not until the Korean War has there existed 
such an organized opposition by the people of the country to a military ac-
tion being carried on by the government. Furthermore, President Polk was 
faced with the open hostility of his leading military commanders, vmo 
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resented his interference in what seemed to them purely military affairs. 
The President, always suspicious of Whig motives and intentions, was hardly 
reassured when, before the war had ended, his most popular and successful 
field commander became an avowed Whig Presidential candidate. This was not 
the last time that an opposition party which strongly opposed the conduct 
of a·,,war considered selecting, nevertheless, one of the leading generals as 
the party's standard-bearer in the next election. Polk continued, however, 
to assert his own pre-eminent position, which the Constitution had given him. 
It is rather unfortunate that James K. Polk, who probably more t han 
any of his contemporaries had been schooled in the traditions of party poli-
tics, was not a greater success as party chief. It was an even greater mis-
fortune for the nation that he was unable completely to master this most 
difficult of Presidential roles; for, had his leadership been greater, he 
might have mended the rift in the party and the nation over the slavery 
issue. In 1860 it was too late for Senator Douglas's compromise doctrine 
of "squatter sovereignty" to be acceptable to either side; but had President 
Polk in 1848, who clearly saw the danger to the union, been able to provide 
a more dynamic leadership along with his support of the doctrine, it might 
have been possible to secure the necessary consent for the compromise. 
A President, however, who was able to secure the passage by Congress 
of every leading measure of his administration can hardly be called a fail-
ure as a party chief. This was President Polk's record, and it included the 
passage of a lower tariff, the enactment of the independent treasury bill, 
Which was to continue as the principal ba~~ng act of the country until the 
Federal Reserve System was enacted during the Wilson administration, the 
settlement of the Oregon boundary dispute and its acceptance by a hosti le 
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Senate, Congressional recognition of a state of war with Mexico, and the 
passage of the necessary legislation to bring the war to a successful con-
clusion. A conclusion which was to add vast new territory to the Union. 
This dissertation has as its thesis a twofold proposition: first, 
that the Polk administration institutionalized those changes in the American 
Presidency which have become associated with the Jacksonian-type executive; 
and, second, as a coordinate thesis, that President Polk in his own right 
made some significant contributions to Presidential aggrandizement. 
In reference to the first proposition it has been demonstrated that 
Polk, L~ a more direct manner even than Jackson, advocated and acted upon a 
theory that the executive is directly responsible to the people. Further-
more, Polk controlled the subordinate executive officers of the government 
with a degree of consistency never equalled by J ackson. Polk as the driving 
power behind "Manifest Destiny" represented the great force of his time, as 
Jackson had been in a similar way the symbol of the growing demands for popu-
lar democracy during his administration. Finally, as a political leader 
Polk attempted to follow closely in Jackson's path, but already the times 
were demanding a new type of lea.dership, a dynamic personal leadership of 
the people, a role which Polk was unable to fill. 
In reference to the second proposition, it is necessary to refer 
again to Polk's control over the subordinate officials of the executive 
branch of the government, for in this regard Polk 's supervision was so much 
more pervasive than Jackson's that it really represents~: a difference in 
kind rather than in degree. Polk established beyond challenge and as a 
matter of institutionalized routine the right and the responsibility of 
the President to control and supervise all actions of the executive branch 
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of the government. This was carried to the extent of instituting for the 
first tLme a truly executive budget, which reflected the President's 
choice of goals and administrative objectives. Polk's other major contribu-
tion to P.irresidential development was his domination in a similar fashion of 
the military. He resolved the constitutional doubt which Madison's inept 
exercise of the Commander-in-Chief role had raised regarding that important 
Presidential function by demonstrating conclusively in time of war t ha t a 
civilian ¥dthout previous military experience could effectively exercise 
the powers of military command which the Constitution had placed in his 
hands. 
George Bancroft's judgment of the Polk presidency, delivered forty 
years after the fact, still represents what is perhaps the most appropriate 
concluding note for this dissertation. 
His [Polk's] administration viewed from the standpoint of results, was 
perhaps the greatest in our national history, certainly one of the 
greatest. He succeeded because he insisted on being its center and in 
overruling and guiding all his secretaries to act so as to produce 
unity and harmony.9 
9 Letter to J. G. Wilson, March 8, 1888, quoted in J. G. Wilson, 
The Presidents, II, P• 230. 
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The Democratic victory in 1844 brought to the office of President 
of the United States a man who was determined to establish f or that posi-
tion the prerogatives of an independent, equal branch o f the government. 
He accepted without question or doubt all the vast responsibility which 
the o ffice p laced up on his shoulders; he was never willing to say that a 
Presidential responsibility for a given task rested with Congress, wi th a 
member of his cabinet, or with the mi l itary. Rather by all his words and 
deeds he sa i d the responsibility rested with the President. 
This dissertation has as its thesis a twofo ld p r oposition: first, 
that the Polk administration institutionalized those changes in the Amer ican 
Pres i dency which have bec ome associated with the Jacksonian-typ e executive; 
and, sec ond, as a c oordinate thesis, that President P o lk in his own right 
made some significant contributions to the presidency. 
In reference to the first prop osition it has been demonst r ated that 
Po lk, in a more direct manner even than Jack son, advocated and acted u pon a 
theory that the executive is directly respons i ble t o the people. Further-
more , Polk controlled the subordinate executive officers of the g overnment 
with a degree of consistency never equaled by Jackson . Polk as the driving 
power behind 11manifest destiny" represented the great force o f his time, as 
Jack s on had been in a similar way the symbol of the growing demands for 
popular democracy during h i s administration. Finally , as a political 
leader, Polk attempted t o follow c losely in Jacks on's pattern, but already 
the times were demanding a new type of leadership, a dynamic personal 
leadership of the people, a role which Polk was unable to fill. 
To demonstrate the second proposition, it is necessary to refer 
again to Polk's control over the subordinate officials of the executive 
branch of the government, for in this regard Polk's supervision was s o 
2 
much more pervasive than Jackson's that it really represents a difference 
in kind rather than degree. Polk established the precedent that as a 
matter of institutionalized routine it was the right and the responsibility 
of the President to control and supervise all actions of the executive 
branch of the government. This was carried to the extent of instituting 
for the first time a truly executive budget, which reflected the President's 
choice of goals and administrative objectives. Polk's other major contri-
bution to Presidential development was his domination in a similar fashion 
of the military. He resolved the constitutional doubt which Madison's in-
ept exercise of the role of commander-in-chief had raised regarding that 
imp ortant Presidential function by demonstrating conclusively in time of 
war that a civilian without previous military experience could effectively 
exercise the powers of military command which the Constitution had placed 
in his hands . 
The material in this dissertation is presented in terms of the 
traditional analysis of Presidential authority and operations. As Louis 
Brownlow reminds us, no cataloging of the various roles that the President 
plays would satisfy all students of the Presidency. Nevertheless, for pur -
posses of analysis, it seems essential to make such a classification so that 
the tools of the political scientist can best be brought to bear on the sub-
ject. Therefore, chronological order has been sacrificed for analytical 
clarity, and the dissertation is organized aroun:d such themes as Polk's 
3. 
concept of the Presidency and the President as commander-in-chief, chief 
of foreign affairs, chief legislator, and party chief. 
In addition to the contemporary works on the Presidency and histori-
cal studies of the period the dissertation makes e xtensive use of Pol k' s 
diaries and his personal papers which have been collected at the Library 
of Congress . 
Autobiographical Sketch 
I was born in Chicago on the 19th of May, 1920. My father, Charles 
Richard McCoy and my mother, Mrs. Marie Peterson McCoy, are both deceased. I 
attended the public schools of Oak Park, Illinois, receiving my high school 
diploma in 1938 from the Oruc Park and River Forest Township High School. 
By 1940, I was financially able to enter college, and enrolled at 
Illinois State Normal Universi ty, Normal, Illinois. In March of 1941, how-
ever, I entered the military service and remained in service until April, 
1946. Upon my release from the army, I re-entered Illinois State Normal 
University and received the B.S. in Ed. degree in June of 1948. 
In September of 1940, I bega~ my graduate work at Colgate University, 
majoring in political science. In 1950, I received the M.A. ~ith distinc-
tion. While at Colgate, I also served as a Graduate Preceptor. 
From September, 1950 until February, 1954, I taught economics and 
government at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, Massachusetts 
where I attained the rank of Assistant Professor. During that period I 
continued my graduate studies, enrolling as a candidate for the Ph.D. in 
Government at Boston University. 
In February, 1954, I left Worcester Polytechnic Institute to accept a 
position as a Research Assistant in the Bureau of Public Administration, 
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia . I remained there until 
September of 1956, at vmich time I accepted a teaching position at Temple 
University, where I am presently employed. In addition to teaching American 
National Government, I also teach courses in Political Theory and Compara-
tive Government. 
-l 
J . 
